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ABSTRACT 
 
This study attempts to systematically analyze the determinants of state participation in 
International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). The study focuses on two core elements: (i) 
IEA characteristics; and (ii) state characteristics. Hypotheses for state participation in IEAs are 
formulated based on the two main International Relations theories dealing with cooperation – 
Realism and Liberalism. The study presents five different models for state participation in IEAs. 
The first model analyzes the influence of treaty variables, while the remaining four focus on state 
variables. The second and third models analyze the influence of Realist and Liberal variables 
respectively. The fourth model specifically focuses on variables which reflect the various socio-
economic, political and logistical constraints of developing countries. The fifth model presents 
an integrated analysis of participation based on the previous models. Results of the study show 
that participation can be understood in terms of both the Realist and Liberal variables, and that 
there can be no rarefied partitioning of those factors on participation. More specifically, the study 
empirically demonstrates that state participation in IEAs is influenced by the following four main 
factors: (i) the impact of domestic and international institutions (ii) human development; (iii) 
power motivations; and (iv) IEA design. Policies proposed to increase participation in IEAs 
therefore have to enhance any positive influence exerted by these parameters, and mitigate their 
negative influences, if any.  
 
INDEX WORDS: International Environment Agreement, Environmental Treaties, 
Participation, Environmental Cooperation, Domestic Characteristics, 
Ratification  
THE INFLUENCE OF STATE AND TREATY CHARACTERISTICS ON 
PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (IEAs) 
 
by  
 
CHENAZ B. SEELARBOKUS 
 
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy  
in the College of Arts and Sciences 
Georgia State University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
CHENAZ B. SEELARBOKUS 
2005 
THE INFLUENCE OF STATE AND TREATY CHARACTERISTICS ON 
PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (IEAs) 
 
by  
 
CHENAZ B. SEELARBOKUS 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Professor: Michael E. Smith 
Committee:  John S. Duffield 
David C. Nixon 
 
Electronic Version Approved: 
 
Office of Graduate Studies 
College of Arts and Sciences 
Georgia State University 
August 2005 
  iv 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
I wish to dedicate this work to my husband, R. Girdhar (a.k.a. Waseem), who supported me 
unreservedly throughout this entire venture.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
 
My first thanks are owed to Dr. Albert Yee who assisted me tremendously in the initial phases of 
this project, and who inspired me with his warmth and dedication to the cause of the students of 
the Department.  
 
I also wish to convey my thanks and gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Michael Smith, for his 
expert guidance and for his ready willingness to accommodate my tight schedule. I am also very 
grateful to Dr. John Duffield for all his close involvement in the project and for his timely and 
insightful comments and suggestions. Thanks are also due to Dr. David Nixon who guided me 
through the statistical analyses involved in the project.  
 
I would also like to convey a special thanks to Dr. Allison Calhoun-Brown, then Chair of the 
Department, who was instrumental in allowing me to complete my program.  
 
Finally, thanks are due to my husband, Waseem, without whom this enterprise would have been 
impossible.
  vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ______________________________________________________v 
LIST OF TABLES ___________________________________________________________ viii 
LIST OF FIGURES___________________________________________________________ ix 
LIST OF ANNEXES __________________________________________________________ x 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ___________________________________________________ xi
CHAPTERS 
1.  INTRODUCTION__________________________________________________________ 1 
1.1 Definition of terms ___________________________________________________ 3 
1.2 Participation as an emerging field of study _______________________________ 6 
1.3 Limitations of current studies and scope for further study ___________________ 9 
1.4 A Conceptual Model of State Participation in IEAs________________________ 10 
1.5 Implications of study ________________________________________________ 18 
1.6 Conclusion ________________________________________________________ 21 
2.  WHY STUDY PARTICIPATION IN IEAs? ____________________________________ 22 
2.1 Rapid and Expansive Onset of Environmental Change_____________________ 24 
2.2 Complex and Interdependent Nature of Environmental Issues_______________ 26 
2.3 Environmental Security ______________________________________________ 30 
2.4 Operation of IEAs __________________________________________________ 32 
2.4.1 Effectiveness of IEAs___________________________________________________ 32 
2.4.2 Overlap and interdependence among treaties________________________________ 35 
2.4.3 Problem of free-riding and the economic implications of participation ___________ 36 
2.5 Conclusion ________________________________________________________ 38 
3.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON PARTICIPATION IN IEAs _____________________ 40 
3.1 Part I: State Characteristics __________________________________________ 41 
3.1.1 Structure and Stability of Political Structures______________________________ 41 
3.1.2 Level of Development __________________________________________________ 45 
3.1.3 Power of States and Environmental Vulnerability __________________________ 48 
3.1.4 Non-state Actors ______________________________________________________ 49 
  vii 
 
3.1.5 Trade Openness ______________________________________________________ 50 
3.2 PART II: IEA Design _______________________________________________ 52 
3.2.1 Flexibility of the IEA __________________________________________________ 53 
3.2.2 Strength of IEAs ______________________________________________________ 54 
3.2.3 Participation Incentives ________________________________________________ 54 
3.2.4 Minimum Ratification Clause ___________________________________________ 56 
3.3 Critique of current state of research and proposals for advancement of knowledge
_____________________________________________________________________ 56 
3.4 Conclusion ________________________________________________________ 62 
4.  DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES ________________________________________ 63 
4.1 Consideration of Domestic Factors in IR ________________________________ 64 
4.2 Models and Hypotheses for the Analysis of State Participation in IEAs________ 66 
4.2.1 Analysis of treaty characteristics ________________________________________ 66 
4.2.2 Analysis of state characteristics__________________________________________ 70 
4.3 Conclusion ________________________________________________________ 83 
5.  RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYSIS_______________________________________ 84 
5.1 Research Design____________________________________________________ 84 
5.2 Model Building_____________________________________________________ 84 
5.2.1 Model I: Influence of IEA characteristics on IEA participation _______________ 84 
5.2.2 Models II, III, IV and V: Influence of country characteristics on IEA participation
_________________________________________________________________________ 87 
5.3 ANALYSIS ________________________________________________________ 95 
5.4 RESULTS_________________________________________________________ 96 
5.4.1 REGRESSION RESULTS FOR MODEL I________________________________ 96 
5.4.2 REGRESSION RESULTS FOR MODELS II, III, IV and V_________________ 101 
5.5 Discussion of Findings _____________________________________________ 110 
5.6 Conclusion _______________________________________________________ 124 
6.  CONCLUSION __________________________________________________________ 126 
6.1 Overview of the research findings_____________________________________ 126 
6.2 Policy implications of research findings________________________________ 131 
6.3 Suggestions for further research______________________________________ 139 
BIBLIOGRAPHY___________________________________________________________ 141 
ANNEXES ________________________________________________________________ 158 
 viii
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Operationalization of variables for Model 1................................................................... 86 
Table 2: Independent variables for Model II ................................................................................ 92 
Table 3: Independent variables for Model III ............................................................................... 93 
Table 4: Independent Variable for Model IV ............................................................................... 94 
Table 5: Regression Results for Model I ...................................................................................... 96 
Table 6: Regression Results for Model I - Developed Countries ................................................. 98 
Table 7: Regression Results for Model I - Developing Countries.............................................. 100 
Table 8: Regression Results for Model II ................................................................................... 101 
Table 9: Regression Results for Model III.................................................................................. 104 
Table 10: Regression Results for Model IV ............................................................................... 106 
Table 11: Regression Results for Model V................................................................................. 108 
Table 12: Differences of IEA Preferences for Developed and Developing Countries ............... 113 
Table 13: Profile of Likely Participants in IEAs ........................................................................ 128 
Table 14: Summary of Data for Selected Countries ................................................................... 129 
Table 15: Articles of VCLT........................................................................................................ 159 
Table 16: Full Dataset for Model I ............................................................................................. 171 
Table 17: Descriptives for Variables for Model I....................................................................... 172 
Table 18: Descriptives of Variables for Model II - V................................................................. 173 
Table 19: Correlation Matrix for Model I Variables .................................................................. 175 
Table 20: Correlation Matrix for Model II Variables ................................................................. 175 
Table 21: Correlation Matrix for Model III Variables................................................................ 175 
Table 22: Correlation Matrix for Model IV Variables................................................................ 175 
Table 23: Correlation Matrix for Model V Variables................................................................. 176 
Table 24: Variance Inflation Factors for Models I - V ............................................................... 177 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model for Participation in IEAs................................................................. 13 
Figure 2: Link of Participation in IEAs with other Variables....................................................... 23 
 
 
  
  
  
 x
LIST OF ANNEXES 
Annex 1 – VCLT ARTICLES .................................................................................................... 159 
Annex 2 – List of IEAs (1921 – 1998) ....................................................................................... 165 
Annex 3 – List of IEAs for Model I............................................................................................ 169 
Annex 4 – Full Dataset for Model I ............................................................................................ 171 
Annex 5 – Descriptives for Variables for Model I ..................................................................... 172 
Annex 6 – Descriptives for Dependent and Independent Variables for Model II - V................ 173 
Annex 7 – Corelation Matrices for Models I - V........................................................................ 175 
Annex 8 – Variance Inflation Factors for all Models ................................................................. 177 
 
 
 xi
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
   
 
Abbreviation Full title  
 
AEWA The African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbird Agreement (16 June 
1995) 
AEPI Army Environmental Policy Institute 
CBD  Convention on Biological Diversity (5 June 1992, Rio de Janeiro) 
CCD United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism  
CFCs Chlorofluorocarbons 
CIESIN Center for International Earth Science Information Network 
CITES  Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Animals 
CMS Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild 
Animals (Bonn, 1979) 
COP Conference of Parties 
EKC Environmental Kuznets Curve 
ENTRI  Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators 
ESI Environmental Sustainability Index 
GHGs Greenhouse gases 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HDI Human Development Index 
HDR Human Development Report 
HELCOM The Helsinki Commission 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
IEA International Environmental Agreement 
IEC International Environmental Cooperation 
IGO Intergovernmental organization 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IR International Relations 
JB Jarque Bera 
JI Joint Implementation 
KP Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change 
MARPOL 73/78 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
MP Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer 
NASCO North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
N-S North-South 
ODA Official Development Assistance 
 xii
ODS Ozone-depleting substance 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
R&D Research and Development 
SEDAC Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center 
UN United Nations 
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
VIF Variance Inflation Factor 
WWF 
 
 
World Wildlife Fund 
  
1.  INTRODUCTION 
On 2 December 2003, Russia announced that it would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol (KP) 
to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), following 
suit to USA’s earlier decision in 2001 to withdraw from the treaty. While Russia eventually 
altered its stance and ratified the treaty on 18 November 2004, thereby allowing the KP to come 
into force on 16 February 2005, the USA is still not a party to the KP, though it has ratified a 
host of other international environmental agreements (IEAs). Moreover, despite the reluctance of 
the USA (and initially of Russia) to participate in the KP, there are around one hundred and forty 
countries worldwide which have ratified the treaty.  
Indeed, states’ participation1 in IEAs can be characterized by its non-uniformity, either 
spatially or temporally. For example, the US, despite its status as a major superpower and it 
being a major member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), has ratified far fewer IEAs than other developed nations such as Germany, Finland, 
France, or Italy. Based on data compiled from the Environmental Treaties and Resource 
Indicators (ENTRI) database of the Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC) and 
the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN),2 the US has ratified 
fifty-five global3 IEAs, whereas Germany has ratified seventy-eight of such treaties. Smaller 
nations such as Belgium, Greece or the United Kingdom have ratified more IEAs than the US.  
                                                 
1 Participation is defined as country ratification (or other technical terms deemed equivalent to ratification – such as 
accession, approval or acceptance) of the IEAs. For more details, see Section 1.2. 
2 This database is accessible online from www.sedac.ciesin.org/  
3 This study is concerned solely with global IEAs as opposed to bilateral or regional IEAs. See Section 1.2.  
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Further, Chile, a developing nation, has ratified fifty-seven global IEAs, and Brazil is almost at 
par with the US, having ratified a total of fifty-four global IEAs. On the other hand, there are 
other nations such as Angola and Eritrea, which have ratified only eight global IEAs.  
What factors can explain this differential participation in IEAs? What can account for the 
low participation of Eritrea or Angola as compared to that of Germany or Finland? Is a country’s 
participation in IEAs aided by its level of economic development, or is it constrained by social 
and development challenges such as poverty and corruption? Does power matter? Why is the KP 
subject to such great controversies, while other treaties (e.g. the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)) manage to sustain a high level of international 
participation without much contentious international debate? Does the legal content of IEAs 
influence the level of participation sustained by the IEAs? 
Despite the tremendous growth in IEAs since the 1970s, systematic empirical research 
into the determinants of state participation in IEAs has been scant. While studies on 
environmental regime formation have been rife, not much empirical work has been done on why 
(i) countries participate differentially in IEAs; and (ii) why specific treaties command a higher 
level of participation than others. This research aims to bring empirical and theoretical 
contribution to the study of the determinants of participation in IEAs by focusing on both 
country and treaty variables. In the next sections, I provide a definition of the terms ‘IEA’ and 
‘participation.’ I then present an overview of the emergence of participation as an independent 
element of investigation within the field of international environmental cooperation (IEC). I 
thereafter delineate a conceptual model to establish domestic country characteristics and treaty 
variables as potential determinants of participation in IEAs. Finally, I present an outline of the 
models of this study.  
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1.1 Definition of terms 
International Environmental Agreement (IEA) 
According to Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
treaties are a primary source of international law4 (Slomanson 1995 p. 9). The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),5 adopted by the United Nations Conference on the 
Law of Treaties on 23 May 1969, establishes treaties as an important source of international law 
and “as a means of developing peaceful cooperation among nations, whatever their constitutional 
and social systems.”6 Article 2, paragraph 1(a) of the VCLT defines a treaty as:  
“an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, 
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation. 
 
The same definition holds for an IEA because in the jargon of international law, terms 
such as convention, protocol, accord, covenant, pact, agreement, charter, statutes or regime are 
commonly used to denote a treaty. The only difference between an IEA and other international 
treaties lies in the subject matter; otherwise, an IEA, very much like any other treaty, is an 
agreement which is “governed by international law.”  
In this study, no distinction is made between the terms international agreement, protocol, 
convention. The term IEA thus refers to a written legal document, arising out of international 
negotiations and governed by international law, reflecting international or regional concern over 
a specific environmental issue, and embodying general and specific commitments to enhance and 
                                                 
4 Other sources include: “…b. international customs, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d…judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law.” 
(Slomanson, 1995 p. 9, quoting Article 38.1 of the Statute of the ICJ). 
5 Full text available online at www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/viennaconvention.pdf . While the 1969 VCLT governs 
treaties concluded between States, a 1986 version of the VCLT was negotiated to govern treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations.   The 1986 Vienna Convention is not yet in 
force. For more information, see http://untreaty.un.org  
6Paragraph 2 of Preamble of VCLT. 
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improve the environmental situation. Normally, these provisions may include the following, inter 
alia: (i) a general framework for cooperation and collaboration; (ii) specific measures to address 
the specific environmental problem; (iii) provisions for scientific, technological, and technical 
cooperation; (iv) provisions for dispute settlement; (v) provisions for ratification, accession, and 
entry into force; (vi) sanctions in cases of violation; and (vii) monitoring and reporting 
requirements. 
IEAs can be bilateral, regional and global, depending on the scope of the environmental 
problem or on the scope of membership. A global IEA is normally open to membership from any 
sovereign country, while a regional IEA is limited to a specific group of countries in a particular 
region. Bilateral IEAs, as the name suggests, is an agreement between two countries. The present 
study is concerned solely with participation in global IEAs.  
According to the principles of International Law, characterized by the lack of a 
supranational authority for enforcement and a general lack of compellence, states have to 
willingly enter into IEAs. However, once a state has ratified a specific IEA, the IEA is governed 
by the articles of the VCLT, which bestows certain legal characteristics to IEAs. The most 
important legal characteristics of IEAs, under the provisions of VCLT, are as follows: (i) IEAs 
can be made by every independent state (Article 6); (ii) IEAs must be honored by the states 
entering into them (Article 26); (iii) IEA enforcement is not subject to the internal laws of the 
parties (Article 27); (iv) an IEA is non-retroactive (Article 28); (v) an IEA does not create either 
rights or obligations for a third State7 (Articles 34-37); (vi) an IEA can be amended by agreement 
between the parties (Article 39);  (vii) an IEA may be declared invalid in case of error, fraud, 
                                                 
7 The VCLT makes the following distinction between the States (Article 2, paragraph 1): (i) A ‘negotiating State’ is 
a State which took part in the drawing up and adoption of the text of the treaty; (ii) A ‘contracting State’ is a State 
which has consented to be bound by the treaty, whether or not the treaty has entered into force; (iii) ‘Party’ is a State 
which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force; and (iv) ‘Third State’ means a 
State not a party to the treaty. 
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corruption, coercion, use of force, or conflict with Jus Cogens (Articles 48-53); and (viii) a 
material breach of an IEA by one of the parties entitles the other parties to suspend the operation 
of the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it (Article 60).8  
Participation 
The VCLT provides for various means for states to express their consent to be bound by a 
treaty. While Article 11 of the VCLT enumerates ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession 
as legal and valid means of signifying consent to be bound, it leaves the final mode for signifying 
such consent to the treaty-makers. Thus, based on the intent of the negotiating states and the final 
treaty text adopted, mere initialing or signature may signify that a state is legally bound under 
International Law to abide by the provisions of the treaty (VCLT, Articles 11, 12); otherwise, 
such consent may be expressed by ratification, acceptance, approval or accession (VCLT, 
Articles 2(1)(b), 14, 15, 16).9  
However, in normal parlance, treaty commencement normally involves the following five 
steps: (i) initialing; (ii) signature; (iii) ratification; (iv) accession; and (v) coming into force 
(Hingorani 1972). These various steps embody a gradual procession from agreement on the 
treaty text to final consent to be bound by the treaty. Unless otherwise to be gathered from the 
intent of the treaty negotiators or specifically spelled out in the treaty text, under customary 
practice, initialing “is merely an indication of approval of the text for subsequent signature” 
(O'Connell 1965 p. 230 as cited in Hingorani, 1972 p. 14). Signature of an IEA, on the other 
hand, means that the negotiating states have agreed to the general wording of the text of the final 
draft of the treaty (Slomanson 1995).  
                                                 
8 The relevant articles of the VCLT referred to above are given at Table 1, Annex 1. 
9 Also, see United Nations Treaty Collection. Treaty Reference Guide. 
http://untreaty.un.org/English/guide.asp#acceptance  
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Ratification, in International Law, is the main step taken by states to signify their consent 
to be bound by the treaty once the treaty has been opened for signature. Treaties which require 
ratification have no legal validity until they are ratified. In between the signature and ratification, 
the signatory states are bound to obey Article 18 of VCLT, which prevents signatories from 
engaging in “acts that would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.” Accession, as per Articles 
2(1)(b) and 15 of the VCLT, is considered at par with ratification in signifying a state’s consent 
to be bound by a treaty. Accession is normally an act of a state which has not participated in the 
initial drafting process leading to the making of the treaty (Hingorani 1972 p. 23; Slomanson 
1995). Accession can only be made in cases where the treaties provide for accession (Hingorani 
1972 p. 23), and accession normally does not require ratification, unless otherwise specified by 
the treaty. Once a state has acceded to a particular treaty, it is considered as a full-blown member 
of the treaty, on the same level as those which have signed and ratified the treaty (Hingorani 
1972 p. 23).  
A state is considered to be a participant or party member of an IEA if it has either 
ratified, acceded to, approved or accepted the treaty (as opposed to merely initialing or signing 
the treaty) (VCLT, articles 2(1)(b); 14(1); 16). Participation is thus equivalent to ratification, 
accession, approval, or acceptance.  
1.2 Participation as an emerging field of study 
In view of the national sovereignty of states of the world, international cooperation has 
traditionally been heavily premised on agreements between countries. These agreements serve 
primarily as an embodiment of the agreed upon rights and obligations to secure the required level 
of commitment and cooperation. Voluntary participation in these treaties is therefore of 
paramount importance in securing and thereafter sustaining the desired level of cooperation.  
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In the field of IEC especially, IEAs have become a tool of major importance in enlisting 
the cooperation of the international community in committing to specific measures to protect the 
global environment, as attested by an upsurge in the number of IEAs adopted internationally 
since the 1970s. IEAs take on primal importance in view of their positive role in diffusing 
potential conflicts and tensions arising out of the natural tendency of states to free-ride on the 
efforts of others or of fulfilling their national priorities at the expense of neighboring states. In 
situations characterized by environmental, economic or socio-political asymmetries, for example, 
IEAs serve as a useful tool to bring equivalence to the relationships among concerned parties. 
IEAs can, for example, promote a mutual resolution of complexities arising from transboundary 
transport of pollutants, thereby catalyzing a framework of cooperation for both the ‘guilty’ party 
and the ‘victim.’ By legally codifying common standards and rules, IEAs thus form “the juridical 
basis for creating rights and obligations between the parties” (Levi 1991), especially so in cases 
of the global commons, which by definition, are not amenable to any particular national 
jurisdiction. 
In view of the crucial role played by IEAs in enhancing IEC, environmental economists 
have long been concerned with the theme of treaty participation and alliance building. Economic 
analyses have been conducted to estimate the likelihood that countries would sign and implement 
IEAs, the types of countries that are most likely to sign the treaties, and the kinds of treaties that 
are most likely to be signed (e.g. Congleton 2001; Congleton 1992; Murdoch et al. 1997). 
Researchers within the econometrics field have also typically focused on the optimal size for an 
IEA, the cost-effectiveness of IEAs, and the design of instrument choices to attract high 
participation, often commonly referred to in the literature as the “incentive compatibility” of 
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IEAs for enhanced cooperation (e.g. Carraro 1999a; Downs 1998; Helm and Sprinz 2000; 
Schmidt 2000 p.4). 
The theme of IEA participation has been receiving increasing interest from outside the 
field of environmental economics as well. Drawing from the insights provided by general 
theories bearing on international cooperation, several researchers have recently attempted to 
provide a quantitative determination of the factors influencing state participation in IEAs. This 
line of research has typically tried to empirically link states’ varying levels of participation in 
IEAs to their domestic characteristics such as their levels of democratic governance, trade 
openness, economic parameters, pollutant emissions, demographics, or land area, inter alia (e.g. 
Dietz and Kalof 1992; Dolsak 2001; Frank 1999; Fredriksson and Gaston 2000; Neumayer 
2002a; Neumayer 2002b; Recchia 2002). In the most recent of such endeavors, Roberts et. al. 
(2004) have relied on the perspective of world-systems theory to analyze the participation of 192 
nations in twenty-two treaties. 
This non-economics-based interest in participation also focuses on treaty design as a 
potential determinant of state participation in IEAs.  Among the emerging studies in that domain 
is DeSombre’s (2001 p.190-228) investigation of the influence of specific treaty clauses or 
“participation mechanisms” on participation in IEAs. The clauses studied include the following: 
presence of economic sanctions; provision of environmental aid; differential obligations; and the 
creation of club goods.   
Unfortunately, as detailed in the next section, the present state of research into the field of 
IEA participation is not well advanced and there is scope for contribution, both theoretically and 
empirically.  
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1.3 Limitations of current studies and scope for further study 
The present status of the research agenda on IEA participation can be deemed to be still 
in its infancy, with no well-developed theories and no large-scale empirical foundation. As 
expounded in more detail in Chapter Three, the studies dealing with participation in IEAs 
typically suffer from three main lacunae: (i) lack of large IEA sample size; (ii) lack of a clear 
association between the formulation of hypotheses and basic International Relations (IR) theories 
dealing with international cooperation; and (iii) lack of systematic quantitative analysis of the 
influence of variation in treaty design or in country characteristics on state participation levels in 
IEAs.  
Overall, many of the conclusions relating to participation in IEAs are specific to the cases 
studied and cannot be generalized over the broader range of IEAs adopted internationally or of 
different types of political regimes worldwide. These studies therefore do not provide a 
systematic explanation of the influence of the heterogeneity of states, or of the variation in treaty 
provisions, on states’ participation levels in IEAs. From a theoretical standpoint as well, many of 
the hypotheses being tested in the quantitative cross-national analyses mentioned above do not 
logically stem out from an application of the basic postulates of the main IR theories governing 
international cooperation. 
Since participation in IEAs is a sine qua non of IEC premised on inter-state agreements, 
an understanding of the determinants of IEA participation becomes necessary for successful 
formulation and implementation of IEC. This study therefore proposes to enhance the research 
agenda on IEA participation by contributing empirical and theoretical insight into determinants 
of state participation in IEAs. The driving question of this research is as follows: Which state or 
treaty characteristics exert an influence on states’ participation in IEAs? In addressing this 
  10  
question, this study aims to fulfill three main objectives: (i) to formulate hypotheses for state 
participation in IEAs based on the theoretical underpinnings of IR theories; (ii) to provide a 
quantitative analysis of the influence of country characteristics on IEA participation; and (iii) to 
empirically analyze the influence of treaty variation on state participation levels in IEAs. The 
next sections delineate the research design and the implications of this study.    
1.4 A Conceptual Model of State Participation in IEAs 
A state’s decision to participate in a particular IEA can be influenced by numerous 
factors, the most prominent being: (i) the science of global environmental change and the nature 
of the issue area; (ii) the state of the global environment; (iii) the dynamics of world politics and 
the nature of international negotiations pertaining to the IEA; (iv) the textual characteristics of 
the IEA adopted; and (v) the domestic conditions or characteristics of the state.  
The level of scientific knowledge governing a particular issue area determines the 
salience of the issue area in both domestic and international politics and the strategies eventually 
arrived at for addressing the particular environmental problem. Numerous researchers have 
argued that scientific consensus and the involvement of effective epistemic communities tend to 
strengthen international commitments to relevant IEAs by sharpening agenda-setting and by the 
clear articulation of desired goals and objectives (Haas 1989 p. 398; Kolk 1996 p. 31; Krasner 
1982 p.510; Weale and Williams 1998 p. 85). 
The dynamics of international negotiations clearly impact the form that the IEA 
eventually takes. For instance, ‘who’ is negotiating ‘what’ is very important in shaping the nature 
and outcome of negotiations. The qualities and level of expertise of international negotiators 
have been deemed important in determining whether negotiations proceed smoothly or get mired 
by deadlocks and preventable delays (e.g. Citron 1989; Grunert 1989; Lundstedt 1989). Many 
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studies have been conducted on international environmental negotiations and researchers have 
recommended various negotiating strategies to secure wide participation in the instruments 
finally adopted by the negotiating group (e.g. Arend 1990; Barrett 1992a; Botteon and Carraro 
1998; Carraro 1997; Chasek 2001; Dupont 1994; Laws 1990; Mautner-Markhof 1989; Susskind 
1994; Tussie 2000a; Underdal 1998). Researchers have often broken down the negotiations 
process into various phases – a process often referred to as phased process analysis (Chasek 
2001 p. 35). While many phases have been postulated in the literature (for a summary, see 
Chasek 2001 pp.38-49), a simple one is that provided by Porter and Brown (1991), who consider 
that the development of multilateral negotiations involves the following four processes: issue-
definition, fact-finding, bargaining, and regime strengthening. Porter and Brown (1991) have 
further categorized negotiating states into four groups, depending on their stance and moves 
during international negotiations.10  
In delineating the conceptual model underlying this study, I argue that the state of the 
world environment, the dynamics of world politics, the science of global environmental change, 
and issue area characteristics can be considered as inputs to the processes of international 
environmental negotiations, effectively impacting upon the bargaining strategies adopted and the 
compromises struck, and thereby determining the content of the final text adopted. Successful 
negotiations will result in positive codification of the consensus reached, with stronger 
                                                 
10 Based on Porter and Brown’s definitions, a ‘lead state’ demonstrates a strong commitment to foster international 
action on a specific issue, initiates the process of negotiations, makes proposals for an IEA and tries to enlist the 
support of other states. A ‘supporting state’ can demonstrate strong commitment during the initial phases of 
negotiations or it can be relatively non-committed in the beginning and subsequently moves towards stronger 
support. A ‘swing state’ generally lacks enthusiasm for a particular IEA and, as such, often requests for significant 
compensation before it supports the cause of the IEA. Finally, a ‘veto state’ is a state which opposes the IEA either 
through inflexibility during the negotiations or by failing to respect the treaty clauses during the implementation 
phase. Porter and Brown (1991) have  documented in detail the different roles played by various countries in the 
negotiations pertaining to eight main areas – viz. acid rain; ozone depletion; whaling; trade in ivory from African 
elephants; international toxic waste trade; Antarctic minerals; global warming and destruction of tropical forests. 
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agreements among the negotiating group resulting in strong clauses and contentious debates 
resulting in weak or ambiguous provisions. The content of IEAs, therefore, reflect, more or less, 
the parameters governing international environmental negotiations, merely by virtue of the fact 
that IEAs are essentially a product of international environmental negotiations. 
Since the content of IEAs reflects the dynamics of international negotiations preceding 
the adoption of the IEAs, rules governing model-building allow me to make certain assumptions 
and simplifications for isolating the determinants of state participation in IEAs. Considering the 
IEA as a negotiation outcome and the clauses of the IEA as reflective of the nature and dynamics  
of negotiations, I treat as exogenous the various inputs that directly impinge on and determine 
the processes of international environmental negotiations, and focus on the end-product of 
international environmental negotiations – viz. the IEA as adopted by the international 
community. Through this process, I isolate two possible types of explanations for the varying 
participation levels in IEAs. The first deals with the structure of the IEAs, and the second relates 
to country conditions (Figure 1). 
  13  
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model for Participation in IEAs 
 
This study seeks to provide answers to the following questions: (i) Which state 
characteristics can account for the variation observed in the level of state participation in IEAs 
worldwide? and (ii) Which treaty clauses act as incentives (or disincentives) for state 
participation in IEAs? The dependent variable is ‘participation in IEAs,’ where participation is 
defined as ratification, accession, approval, or acceptance (as in Section 1.2 above). This 
research is not focused on delineating why states participate in particular IEAs or why IEAs take 
on different forms. Rather, the study aims to provide an understanding of why some states 
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participate in IEAs to a greater (or lesser) extent than other states, and whether the various legal 
forms of IEAs influence the level of participation sustained by the IEAs. As I later discuss in 
more detail in Chapter Four, I propose five models to capture the potential relationships, as 
detailed below (Figure 1). 
In order to delineate the influence of potential determinants of state participation in IEAs, 
I make use of basic concepts governing international cooperation to formulate hypotheses 
relating a state’s level of participation in IEAs to its domestic characteristics. Using the premise 
of Realist and Liberalist theories on international cooperation, especially those strands which 
emphasize the national-international linkages (e.g. Bueno De Mesquita et al. 1991; DeSombre 
2000; Leeds 1999; Owen 1994 p.926; Putnam 1988; Solingen 1994; Sterling-Folker 1997), I 
posit specific associations between identified potential determinants and participation in IEAs.  
The first model, the legal-incentives model, is meant to capture the influence of variations 
in treaty design on participation levels in IEAs.  This model relies on the literature on IEC 
dealing with the design and structure of IEAs. This model predicts that IEAs which secure higher 
participation rates are those which: (i) are more flexible, (ii) have weaker provisions, (iii) have 
provisions for capacity-building, and (v) are transparent. Moreover, since it has generally been 
postulated that the legal provisions of IEAs exert a differential impact on developing countries as 
compared to developed countries, this model will empirically verify the conditions (e.g. presence 
of financial transfers) under which this statement is validated (or contested).  
The second model, the power-interest model, reflects arguments made by the Realist 
school of thought that states enter into treaties only if the latter enhance their power potential or 
reduce their threats and insecurities. This general line of thought predicts that a state will 
participate in more IEAs if it (i) has a high level of industrial production and economic 
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development; (ii) is politically stable; (iii) has small natural resource base and small extent of 
raw materials; (iv) has a high level of environmental vulnerability; and (v) a low military power.  
 The third model, the liberal-interdependent model, relies on neoliberal institutionalist 
literature pertaining to interdependence and institutionalism and focuses on the influence of 
global economic trade flows, the role of civic engagement, and the domestic political and 
institutional structures of countries as variables influencing their international behavior. This 
model predicts that a state will participate in more IEAs if it: (i) is democratic; (ii) has a high 
quality of life; (iii) has a liberal economy; (iv) has strong environmental institutions; (v) has  
high volumes of trade; and (vi) has a high level of civic environmentalism.  
Scholars contend that the current development paths of developing countries imply that 
the latter will be the greatest contributors to global environmental problems in the future, and 
hence there is a need to enlist their participation for success in implementing global 
environmental protection measures. While the importance of securing the participation of 
developing countries in IEAs is easily acknowledged, there is no comprehensive empirical work 
done to analyze the dynamics of developing countries’ participation in IEAs. Why do some 
developing countries participate in more IEAs than others? Are there structural constraints 
endemic to the developing countries which prevent them from participating in IEAs? The fourth 
model, the developing-logistics model, further deepens the framework of second image 
theorizing by focusing specifically on the domestic constraints influencing the participation of 
developing countries in IEAs. This model is deemed necessary in view of the fact that 
developing countries face special challenges such as high dependence on foreign aid and high 
levels of malnutrition, which typically are not present in the developed world. An analysis of 
variation of participation among developing countries can thus provide insight into which of 
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such socio-political or economic challenges exert overriding influence on the levels of 
participation of developing countries in IEAs. This model predicts that the developing countries 
which will participate in a greater number of IEAs are those that: (i) have a low level of 
corruption; (ii) suffer from a low level of social challenges such as malnutrition, poor sanitation, 
or infant mortality;  (iii) are more democratic; and (iii) have a low amount of dependence on 
foreign aid, inter alia.  
Finally, this analysis hopes to move beyond the confines provided by an exclusive focus 
on either the Realist or the Liberalist framework, and aims to arrive at an integrated explanation 
for participation in IEAs, based on the various models delineated above. Can we explain 
participation in IEAs merely from the realist or liberalist framework, or is it subject to an 
interactive framework, whereby both realist and liberalist determinants interact? Can the subject 
of IEA participation function as a bridge between realist and liberalist concerns? The fifth model 
of this study, the interactive model, attempts to bring crucial factors from the power-interest, the 
liberal-interdependent, and the developing-logistics models together to arrive at such an 
integrated and synthesized understanding of state participation in IEAs.   
As explained in further details in Chapter Five, the design of this study follows a 
quantitative approach, relying on the technique of multiple linear regression to determine 
associations between the dependent and independent variables. For model I, the unit of analysis 
is the IEA, and the dependent variable is the total participation rate sustained by the IEA. 
Further, to investigate whether treaty design impacts developing country participation 
differentially from that of developed countries, the model is also run with two other dependent 
variables: the total participation rate from developed countries, and the total participation rate 
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from developing countries. For models II, III, IV and V, the unit of analysis is the state, with the 
dependent variable being the total number of global IEAs in which the state has participated.   
Data for this study was compiled from the ENTRI database of SEDAC/CIESIN. The 
ENTRI database provides basic information for 464 treaties. However, not all the treaties can be 
classified as ‘environmental’ and many of the IEAs are regional in scope. The database was thus 
parsed out to delineate the global IEAs from the regional ones. 110 of such global IEAs were 
identified, spanning the period from 1921 to 1998 (see Annex 2). The level of participation of 
each country across these IEAs, as compiled from membership data available for each of the 
treaties, provides the dependent variable for the models. The total number of countries included 
in the dataset for this study is 196, with 152 developing countries and 44 developed nations.  
Model I relies on extensive content analysis for the coding of the IEAs based on specific 
treaty characteristics. Content analysis of the full range of the 110 identified IEAs was beyond 
the scope of this present study. In view of the time and resources constraints governing the 
present study, a sample of the IEAs was selected for Model I. In order to maximize the 
probability of having a normal distribution for the multiple linear regression analysis, a total of 
thirty-one IEAs was selected (Annex 3). Selection bias was minimized by choosing roughly the 
same number of IEAs dealing with various issue areas, and including an almost equal number of 
framework conventions and protocols (see Section 5.3). 
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1.5 Implications of study 
This research consolidates previous efforts made to determine the factors that tend to 
enhance (or decrease) states’ participation in IEAs.  In this sense, this study directly addresses 
the following stipulations of Agenda 21:11
 “To identify and address the difficulties which prevent some States, in particular developing countries, 
from participating in or duly implementing international agreements or instruments… 
To promote and support the effective participation of all countries concerned, in particular developing 
countries, in the negotiation, review and governance of international agreements and instruments…” 
 
This research will be immediately useful for its contribution in providing empirical 
validation (or contest) of many general and unsubstantiated statements which have been made 
regarding countries’ participation in IEAs, and to identify variables, hitherto not investigated, 
which impact participation in IEAs.  Undertaking this study will also help to fill gaps in the 
literature (as identified in the introductory section) dealing with participation in IEAs, and 
addresses the calls for future research into IEA participation, as made by Breitmeier (1996), 
Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994), Keeley (1990), Helm(2000b) and Carraro (1999), inter alia, by 
providing a systematic large-n analysis of both country and IEA characteristics. 
Since IEAs function as a primary instrument which allows nations to cooperate on 
international environmental matters, a study on participation in IEAs can therefore contribute to 
our understanding of the dynamics and determinants of IEC. Moreover, apart from being an 
important precursor of IEC, participation in IEAs also acts as an important indicator of the 
success of IEC, and several researchers have utilized participation in IEAs as a proxy for 
international environmental commitment (Dolsak 2001; e.g. Neumayer 2002a p. 146;  also 
Neumayer 2002b).  Participation in IEAs can thus capture the success of IEC and provide an 
indication of the commitment of nation states to a particular set of rules and regulations directed 
                                                 
11 Agenda 21 is a document that was adopted during the Rio Conference in Brazil in 1992. Source of quote: Sections 
39.3(a) and 39.3(c) of Agenda 21, accessible online at 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21chapter39.htm
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towards a particular aspect of international environmental protection. Especially in this era where 
global environmental change is occurring at an unprecedented rate (as further expounded in 
Chapter Two), understanding the determinants of IEC remains imperative.   
As discussed later in Chapter Two, I also argue that participation in IEAs should also be 
significant for the effectiveness of international environmental policies. There can be no 
compliance and ultimately no implementation of the international strategies embodied within 
IEA texts if there is an inadequate level of international participation in IEAs. An understanding 
of participation incentives can thus link directly with the possibility of compliance, and hence 
ultimately, on treaty effectiveness. My argument is that if there are domestic structural 
constraints which prevent a state from participating in an IEA, the same variables will, in all 
likelihood, negatively impact on the implementation and hence effectiveness of the IEA. The 
logic is simple enough: if we do not have widespread participation, we cannot hope for 
widespread implementation and therefore strong effectiveness. Participation lies at the 
foundation of any desired level of implementation and effectiveness. 
Furthermore, the successful implementation of new market mechanisms within some 
recent IEAs (such as the Montreal Protocol (MP)12 or the KP) rests heavily on the meaningful 
participation of both the developed and developing countries. In the case of the KP, for example, 
the success of the ‘clean development mechanism’ (CDM), whereby developed parties can earn 
emission credits through emission reduction programs in developing parties, is premised on the 
participation of the latter. Without the willingness of developing nations to open their production 
processes to the modalities of the CDM,  overall global emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
will not be successfully (and perhaps significantly) reduced, while developing nations will 
continue on their unsustainable paths of development. As provided by the KP, the CDM not only 
                                                 
12 Full title: Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer.  
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allows for the reduction of GHGs in developing nations by developed states, but it also allows 
for developed nations to provide the necessary know-how and technology transfer for developing 
nations to implement more environmentally sustainable paths of development.  
Though it is not within the scope of the present study to fully test and develop a general 
theory governing IEC, it is hoped however that the present study will aid towards the 
development of such a theory in later research activities. This study hopes to catalyze the process 
by identifying crucial variables from the two main IR theories on international cooperation viz. 
Realism and Liberalism, and to integrate these determinants in an integrated model which views 
IEC as emanating from both power and institutionalist concerns.  
This study will also have important implications for policy prescriptions regarding 
international environmental policies as it will empirically verify the influence of key state 
variables on a state’s decision to participate (or not) in a particular treaty. Variables acting to 
reinforce participation in IEAs can be considered as an ideal set to be achieved globally for 
optimal global environmental protection. Global environmental strategies may thus need to be 
integrated with policies aimed at improving domestic conditions such that the ideal set of 
domestic variables is achieved worldwide. Similarly, variables acting as constraints need to be 
managed such that they no longer exert their constraining force on participation in IEAs. This 
may likely require policies aimed at strengthening political development, resolving social 
challenges, altering the modalities of international transactions to make them more 
environmentally friendly and more conducive to promoting international environmental 
cooperation, or empowering domestic groups, inter alia.  
Finally, this research will be valuable to treaty negotiators and drafters who are interested 
in carving out treaty texts that will be most acceptable to as wide an audience as possible. With a 
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full understanding of which treaty clauses act as incentives and disincentives for participation, 
negotiators can strike out the right balance, through protracted and positive discussions, for 
unwilling parties to commit to the codified environmental standards. Such balance may be 
achieved, for example, by the right mix of financial and technology transfer, capacity building, 
and trading of emissions, inter alia.  
1.6 Conclusion 
The study of participation in IEAs is still an under-studied field, suffering from the lack 
of rigorous empirical analysis as well as from insufficient theoretical construction for the various 
determinants of participation. In this chapter I have expounded the research question for this 
study, which is as follows: Which country or treaty characteristics exert an impact on a state’s 
participation in IEAs? I have established a general conceptual model to understand the various 
interactions that can exist among the factors influencing participation. I have also proposed five 
different models to analyze the influence of specific country and treaty variables on IEA 
participation. 
I provide in the next chapter an overview of the reasons why my dependent variable, 
participation in IEAs, is legitimate and relevant as an element of investigation and why the topic 
of participation needs to be taken seriously in analyzing IEC. In Chapter Three, I provide a 
literature review of the research status in the field of IEA participation. Based on the literature 
review and relying on the main theories governing international cooperation, I formulate in 
Chapter Four the general hypotheses underlying this research. Chapter Five expounds on the 
research design, the analytical templates and a general discussion of the results of the study. 
Chapter Six presents a general conclusion of the study. 
  
2.  WHY STUDY PARTICIPATION IN IEAs? 
Increasing participation in treaties concluded by the international community has always 
been deemed “desirable.”13 Participation in IEAs was a constant theme in the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), commonly referred to simply 
as the Earth Summit, or the Rio Conference. Agenda 21, a forty-chapter Plan of Action for 
global environmental protection adopted during UNCED, recognizes the “essential importance 
of the participation in and the contribution of all countries…to treaty making.” 14  
The importance of securing wide participation in IEAs has also been underlined by 
Maffei et. al. (1996).  In the preface to their book Participation in World Treaties on the 
Protection of the Environment, Maffei et. al. (1996) note that “[t]oday, wide participation in 
international treaties for the protection of the environment – and in particular of developing 
countries – is perhaps even more important than the conclusion of new treaties.” Furthermore, 
from an International Law perspective, a high level of participation is important since it increases 
the probability that the specific treaties may “take on the stature of customary law” (Vig 1999 
p.25) or may “generate customary international law upon coming into force” (Carr and Scott 
1999 p. 314).  
The purpose of this chapter is to explicate the reasons why I consider that participation in 
IEAs needs to be studied. In the following sections, I argue that participation is important in view 
of its association with several other crucial variables of IEC and global environmental protection.   
                                                 
13 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifteenth session, May 6-12July 1963. ILC Report, 
A/5509 (A/18/9), 1963, Chapter III, paragraphs 18-50. Also available at www.un.org.  
14 Agenda 21. Chapter 39. International Legal Instruments and Mechanisms. Section 39.1(c) 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21chapter39.htm  
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More specifically, I advance that there are four main reasons which make an analysis of 
determinants of state participation in IEAs necessary. First, I argue that participation in IEAs is 
important because of the urgent need to address environmental change which is occurring at an 
increased rate and on an enlarged scale.  Second, I consider that the complex and 
interdependent nature of global environmental issues requires that participation in IEAs be 
optimal. Third, I posit that the evolution of the dangers posed to our security through the 
processes of environmental degradation and environmental scarcity mandate that the 
international community cooperate globally to address the impending dangers. Fourth, I argue 
that participation is important for the successful operation of IEAs (see Figure 2). Further details 
on these issues are presented in the next sections. 
 
 
Figure 2: Link of Participation in IEAs with other Variables 
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2.1 Rapid and Expansive Onset of Environmental Change 
At a very basic level, the upsurge in the number of IEAs over the past few decades can be 
related to our greater understanding of global environmental processes and risks, and to the 
phenomenon of global environmental change. On the international political agenda today, 
discussions about global environmental change normally pertain to such issues as global 
warming and climate change, deforestation, stratospheric ozone depletion, desertification, loss of 
biodiversity, marine water pollution, and acid rain, inter alia.  
Though environmental change per se is not a new event, with the present structure of the 
world being completely different from that which existed some 300 million years ago (Kutzbach 
1989; Mannion 1999 pp. 1, 11; Williamson and Liss 1996 p.29), what is of concern today relates 
to three dimensions of the processes of environmental change – namely, (i) the pace of the 
change; (ii) the scale of the change; and (iii) the agent of the change. Environmental change in 
this era is occurring at an increased pace, with a shift in gear from ecological or geological time 
to ‘human time.’ Whereas environmental change was happening over the span of geologic time 
in the past, nowadays the time duration can be counted only in centuries or decades, and it is 
impossible to adapt to such tremendous changes over short time intervals. According to Hidore 
(1996), plant and animal species are becoming extinct at a rate of 24 to 400 species a day and we 
may be losing as many as 6000 species of plants and animals a year. As cited in Wood (2000), a 
1999 World Wildlife Fund (WWF) report considers that the world has lost thirty per cent of its 
natural wealth from 1970 to 1995. In his book Climatic Change and Human Society, Ian Whyte 
(1995) states that since the early nineteenth century, carbon dioxide levels have risen by around 
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25 per cent from around 280 ppmv15 to about 355 ppmv, a figure which has not been reached in 
the last 160,000 years. 
The scale dimension of environmental change relates to the impacts of such change, 
which have the potential of being reverberated throughout the whole planet. In other words, the 
impacts are global or “systemic” (Turner et al. 1990  quoted from Kasperson, 2001 p. 2), 
implying that environmental change in one particular area has the capability of influencing 
environmental conditions throughout the  whole global system. It is for these reasons that global 
climate change or ozone depletion is considered to be looming threats for the whole planet (see 
Section 2.4 below).  
The third dimension of environmental change pertains to the source of the changes. One 
of the main characteristics of contemporary global environmental problems is that they can 
mostly be classified under Hidore’s (1996) concept of “anthropogenic change,”16 which alludes 
agency to human activities (Blowers and Leroy 1996 p. 259;  also DeFries and Malone 1989). 
For example, though global climate change can occur from several natural processes (e.g. from 
the changes in Earth’s rotation around the Sun or from the changes in oceanic circulation – see 
Mannion 1999 p. 29), it is generally acknowledged that the release of carbon dioxide from 
anthropogenic activities is the major driving force for the increased levels of carbon dioxide in 
the atmosphere (e.g. IPCC 1995).17 Loss of biodiversity has also been related to anthropogenic 
activities resulting in the destruction, alteration and loss of the natural habitats of species (Wood 
                                                 
15  i. e. parts per million by volume. 
16 Hidore (1996) classifies global environmental change into the following categories, based upon the various time 
duration: (i) persistent change, which takes place steadily for millions of years – for example, the slowing of the rate 
of rotation of the Earth and the resulting longer days; (ii) rhythmic change, such as the changes produced by the 
revolution of the moon about the earth; (iii) cyclical phenomenon, such as droughts which recur at regular intervals 
and with varying intensities; (iv)  short-lived events,  such as lightning, earthquakes, landslides and avalanches; and 
(v) anthropogenic change, resulting mostly from the explosion in human population and from the tremendous 
progress made in technology. 
17 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).  
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2000 p.5). Blowers and Leroy (1996 p. 259) thus aptly describe the processes of “environmental 
globalization” as emanating from the anthropogenic “diffusion of sources,” which relates to the 
spread of pollution through industries, technologies, and export of hazardous wastes, inter alia, 
as well as through the natural processes of the “unevenness of impacts,” which occur naturally 
through air, water and the atmosphere. Blowers and Leroy (1996 p. 259) also point out that 
events which seem to be ‘natural’ at first sight often end up as being of  anthropogenic origin on 
closer examination.  
This general consensus on human agency as a main impetus for global environmental 
change has resulted in a critical look at man’s production and consumption patterns, with special 
focus on the possible repercussions on the carrying capacity of the planet, the ecosystem impacts 
of economic policies, and the implications for the health and the survivability of the human 
species on the planet (see Section 2.4).  
2.2 Complex and Interdependent Nature of Environmental Issues 
It is almost uncontentious to state that problems such as ozone depletion or global climate 
change require a systemic approach and a global focus for effective global environmental 
protection. Researchers routinely agree that there is need for a holistic perspective in carving out 
strategies to address global environmental issues. This need for a global commitment strategy is 
engendered primarily by the nature of the world environment and of the global environmental 
problems. Typically, global environmental problems demonstrate such characteristics as global 
interdependence, transboundary impacts, synergistic effects between various issue areas, and the 
international corollaries of domestic policies, inter alia.  The world environment in fact performs 
as one big interdependent system, where the air and water masses mix and interact with each 
other. Kupchella and Hyland (1986) say it best: 
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…“Without labels and national boundaries it is easier to see that the world is one big  system, one thin layer of 
atmosphere, one enormous ocean into which all rivers drain, one resource of minerals that all living beings 
must share.” 
 
Global interdependence, in so far as environmental issues are concerned, has been amply 
manifested by the transboundary impacts of air or water pollution. The 1986 Chernobyl accident 
demonstrated irrevocably that pollution is not restricted by jurisdictional or geographical 
boundaries. Radioactive fallout spread across former Yugoslavia, France, Italy, Germany, 
Scandinavia, and even North America (Cunningham and Saigo 1990). The pervasive nature of 
environmental pollution was also tragically established by the 1984 Bhopal disaster, which 
claimed thousands of lives in Bhopal, India, through the accidental leakage of the poisonous gas 
methyl isocyanate from a Union Carbide pesticide plant operating in the area.  And of course, 
modern problems such as global climate change or stratospheric ozone depletion will not be 
restricted to any one particular region, but will affect the whole Planet. As noted by Harris (2001 
p. 26), “global environmental change is one of the most profound manifestations of 
globalization.” 
Environmental problems are also typified by close interlinks and mutual interactions 
among each other. Global warming, for example, is influenced both by the severity of 
deforestation and the levels of stratospheric ozone depletion, the latter mostly because 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), an ozone-depleting substance (ODS), also act as a GHG (Barrett 
2000 p.123; Schmidt 2000 p. 16). Global warming, on its part, with its manifestation in a rise in 
sea level and an increased frequency of extreme weather, can cause nefarious impacts on aquatic 
ecosystems and population, such as the Atlantic salmon population.18 Salmon stocks can also be 
                                                 
18 NASCO. Ten Year Review of the Activities of the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization, 1984-1994. 
p.11 
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negatively impacted through the acidification of the salmon habitat.19 Further, deforestation can 
catalyze processes of soil degradation and biodiversity loss (Ross 1996 p. 166).  
This close-knit interaction among various elements of the environment is further 
strengthened by the fact that domestic policies in a remote area can potentially exert an impact 
on the global environment. Several researchers have attempted to elucidate the various 
interconnections that exist between domestic environmental policies and global environmental or 
economic conditions (e.g. Carraro and Metcalf 2001 p.8). Nash (2000 p.241-249), for example, 
has detailed the interrelationships that exist between domestic transport policies and regional 
acid rain problems or global warming. Likewise, Barrett (2000 p. 123) has established 
interconnections between policies relating to land use or forestation and the extent of climate 
change.  
Given this interlinked nature of environmental issues, sporadic regional implementation 
strategies or selective participation in IEAs may not serve the basic purpose of global 
environmental protection and conservation, even though the participating countries may be 
highly committed to resolving the issues. However, due to the different stringency levels of 
national environmental regulations, the different levels of economic and industrial development, 
and the varying extent of natural resource endowments, securing the participation of a specific 
country or a specific group of countries may prove crucial for the success of a particular IEA. If 
the majority of states participate in an IEA while the greatest contributor to the specific 
environmental problem shies away, the efforts of the majority may not be sufficient to 
effectively address the environmental problem. For example, the non-participation of US in the 
climate change regime means that around 23% of the global emissions of carbon dioxide (the 
                                                 
19 Ibid. p. 14. 
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share of US’s carbon emissions) will remain outside the purview of the control measures of the 
climate regime. 
This difficulty has not gone unnoticed by IEA negotiators. In order to cater to this 
problem of potential hold-outs from countries which matter most in addressing a specific 
environmental problem, some IEAs (e.g. MARPOL 73/7820 or the KP21) specifically require that 
stakeholders having significant leverage in the environmental issue become parties to the IEAs 
before these can enter into force. However, though some treaties require participation from major 
stakeholders before entry into force, the participation of lesser contributors to the environmental 
problem will still need to be promoted. Most countries are on a path of material progress which 
relies on high levels of industrial development and which, in the process, generate high levels of 
pollution. Even though some countries may matter more than others in some specific issue area 
for the present, the situation will likely change in the future decades. As the environment is 
always in flux, adopting a short-term perspective, whereby only those states which matter most 
right now are given attention, is bound to lead to ineffective global environmental protection 
policies. To prevent future deterioration of the global environment, a proactive stance needs to be 
adopted to mitigate and abate future sources of environmental pollutants emanating from 
countries which do not matter right now, but which will in the future. A global strategy is 
therefore mandatory to address environmental problems which are global in scope.  
                                                 
20 MARPOL 73/78 required ratification from at least fifteen States, the combined merchant fleets of which would 
constitute at least 50% of the gross tonnage of the world’s merchant shipping, before the convention could enter into 
force. 
21 Article 25(1) of the KP reads: “This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on which 
not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total for at 
least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited 
their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.” Text of the KP is available online at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html. 
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2.3 Environmental Security 
In recent years, several researchers have called for a reconceptualization of ‘security’ in 
view of the potential for the eruption of conflict generated by environmental scarcity or 
environmental degradation (e.g. Birnie 1988; Bjorkbom 1988; Brock 1991; Gleick 1993; Hauge 
and Ellingsen 2001; Homer-Dixon 1991; Mathews 1989; Matthew 2000; Von Moltke 1988). 
According to Brunnee and Toope (1997), scarcity of resources, especially ones which can easily 
be degraded or exhausted, has the potential of causing subnational conflict or of negatively 
impacting on governmental structures and the lives of citizens. This links with Ullman’s (1983 
p.133) definition of a ‘security threat’ as constituting a potential for degradation of the quality of 
life and a limitation on available policy choices.  
Apart from the above conflict-related concept of environmental security, environmental 
degradation also poses risks in terms of the survivability of life on the planet. Official institutions 
are increasingly recognizing this survival-based concept of environmental security. A July 2000 
report of the Army Environmental Policy Institute (AEPI) recognizes that environmental security 
is not restricted to the prevention of damage from war, but also includes threats induced by 
ignorance or mismanagement of socio-economic activities, terrorism, migration and natural 
disasters. The report lists thirty-two examples of environmental security threats, among which 
feature: ozone layer depletion, global climate change, biodiversity loss, deforestation, 
desertification, soil erosion, radioactive waste management, oil spill, and water scarcity.22 Other 
potential triggers of environmental dangers identified in the literature include, inter alia, 
transborder flows of hazardous substances; transboundary air or river water pollution; health 
impacts from toxins in food chain; decline in natural capital base (e.g. timber, oil, genetic 
                                                 
22 Joe B. Sills, Jerome C. Glenn, Theodore J. Gordon, Renat Perelet. July 2000.  Environmental Security: United 
Nations Doctrine For Managing Environmental Issues In Military Actions. Volumes I. Army Environmental Policy 
Institute. AEPI IFP 0700A. Page 9. 
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diversity, water); and the phenomenon of environmental refugees (Barnett 2001 pp. 68, 69; 
DeSombre 2002 pp. 32, 33; Kolk 1996 p. 25; Matthew 1999 p.156).  
Starting from the other end of the spectrum, some scholars have analyzed the 
environment-security nexus from a peace perspective, which postulates that environmental 
cooperation can generate international peace. This falls in line with the general finding regarding 
the inverse relationship between war occurrence and participation in treaties. Quoting the study 
conducted by Faber and Weaver (1984) on European politics from 1815 to 1915, Vasquez (1998 
p. 305) notes that the occurrence of war was found to be inversely related to states’ participation 
in conferences and treaties. In the same spirit, Brock (1991 p. 408) notes that the environment 
has become “a firmly established item” on the agenda of peace research, with environmental 
change regarded as a factor spurring international cooperation and thereby reducing conflicts. 
Brock (p.413) sees environmental cooperation as “a means to build peace,” similar to the Baltic 
Sea regime, which was instrumental in strengthening East-West cooperation. Brock (p.414) in 
fact establishes “a functional equivalence” between war and environmental depletion, with 
environmental degradation having the same potential as war in terms of causing loss of lives, and 
“negating the claim of national integrity and self-determination.” The idea that IEC can bring 
about peace has been further elaborated by Conca (2001 pp. 230-245), who considers that 
environmental cooperation can trigger and solidify peace through reducing uncertainty, 
promoting “diffuse forms of reciprocity,” strengthening the ‘shadow of the future,’ creating new 
forms of interdependence, promoting new norms, strengthening transnational civil society, and 
increasing transparency and accountability of governmental institutions (also Conca and Dabelko 
2002).   
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Based on the arguments presented above regarding the security risks posed by 
environmental scarcity and degradation, a cooperative framework for international 
environmental protection seems promising as a way to save lives and promote peace. IEAs, by 
virtue of their ability to generate and sustain IEC, stand out as a major tool for enhancing global 
environmental protection. Widespread participation in IEAs therefore has implications for peace 
promotion. As per a 1999 report of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on 
environmental security:23
Taking preventive action on environmental stress thus is the most appropriate approach to preventing 
environmental conflicts. Such preventive action is needed at all levels, but given that environmental 
stresses tend to be rooted in transboundary, regional and global environmental problems, international and 
regional environmental agreements play a particularly important role in preventing environmental conflict 
[emphasis added].  
 
2.4 Operation of IEAs 
2.4.1 Effectiveness of IEAs 
 
International negotiators and treaty drafters usually devote lots of attention and energy to 
ensuring maximum participation in the treaties being negotiated. Implicit in such endeavors is 
the notion that participation matters for the ultimate effectiveness of the treaties. Ensuring near 
global participation in IEAs is the first necessary step towards guaranteeing widespread IEC and 
effective implementation of international environmental policies. Participation thus acts as a 
necessary precursor for the successful implementation of international environmental strategies. 
As stated by Barrett and Stavins (2003 p. 350), “successful implementation requires effective 
promotion of compliance and participation [emphasis added].”  
                                                 
23 NATO. Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society. 1999. Environment & Security in an International 
Context. Report 232. Brussels, Belgium. Quoted from Joe B. Sills, Jerome C. Glenn, Theodore J. Gordon, and Renat 
Perelet. July 2000.  Environmental Security: United Nations Doctrine For Managing Environmental Issues In 
Military Actions. Volumes I. Army Environmental Policy Institute. AEPI IFP 0700A. Page 9. 
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In the IEA implementation time-frame, participation directly influences the effectiveness 
potential of IEAs.  In realization of this, many treaty secretariats regularly emphasize the 
desirability and often, the necessity, of securing maximum participation in the relevant treaties. 
As stated by the Secretariat for the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of 
Wild Animals (CMS): 24
Agreements concluded under its [CMS] auspices will show positive results only if a large number of 
countries whose borders are regularly crossed by migrating animals are bound by common conservation 
commitments. For this reason, the conference strongly encouraged more countries to join the Convention, in 
order to assume their share of the global responsibility for conserving migratory wild animals [emphasis 
added]. 
 
 The Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
regularly encourages states to ratify or accede to the various treaties falling under its aegis.25 
Similarly, the Conference of Parties (COPs) or other regular meetings of treaty bodies often 
function as an avenue for treaty bodies to call for increased participation in the relevant treaties. 
During the 1992 COP of the Basel Convention26 in Uruguay, for example, the Conference 
invited “all States who have not done so to become Party to the Basel Convention.”27 Likewise, 
in an attempt to ensure greater participation in the Ramsar Convention,28 the COP negotiated a 
                                                 
24 Source: UNEP/CMS Secretariat. Governments Reinforce Species Conservation Efforts. Bonn Convention World 
Conference Highlights serious threats for the survival of migratory animals. Also see: UNEP/CMS Secretariat. 24 
March 1997. Review of Article IV: Agreements Concluded Or Under Development. Report presented at the Fifth 
Meeting of the Conference of Parties of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 
Geneva 10-16 April 1997. UNEP/CMS/Conf. 5.9. 
25 See, for example, the 22nd session of the UNEP Governing Council, held in Nairobi, Kenya from 3-7 February 
2003, during which delegates were invited to ratify or accede to the Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions. (Source: 
UNEP Governing Council takes a number of chemicals-related decisions. ENB Linkages, 
www.iisd.ca/recent/recentmeetings)  
26 Full Title: Basel Convention On The Control Of Transboundary Movements Of Hazardous Wastes  
And Their Disposal (22 March 1989, Basel). Text available online at http://www.basel.int/text/con-e.htm  
27Decisions Adopted by the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention in Piriapolis, 
Uruguay on 4 December 1992 Decision I/17 ( http://www.greenpeace.org/~intlaw/baseldec.html 11/6/97) 
28 Full title: Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar, 1971). 
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protocol29 to the main treaty to include French as authentic language (apart from English) so that 
France may be enticed to ratify the treaty. The protocol reads: 
The Contracting Parties,  
CONSIDERING that for the effectiveness of the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 
especially as Waterfowl Habitat, done at Ramsar on 2nd February 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the 
Convention”), it is indispensable to increase the number of Contracting Parties, AWARE that the addition 
of authentic language versions would facilitate wider participation in the Convention…”  [emphasis added]. 
 
Participation also enhances IEA effectiveness by reducing the vulnerability of the IEA to 
the potential negative impacts on the IEAs caused by the behavior of non-participants (see 
Section 2.5.3 for the related problem of free-riding). A concrete example of the negative impacts 
of non-participating states’ behavior on the sustenance of a regime is provided by the case of the 
North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO). In 1990, NASCO had to develop 
special protocols for adoption by non-Contracting parties as the latter were fishing for salmon in 
the Convention Area, thereby undermining the conservation efforts of NASCO parties.30  
Finally, as mentioned in Section 1.6, the effectiveness of many new market-based 
incentives within the most recent IEAs relies on the participation of both the developed and 
developing nations. There can be no successful implementation of the CDM of the KP without 
commitment to the process by developing nations. Apart from the CDM, the KP also provides 
for two other market-based incentives: Joint Implementation (JI) and emissions trading. Both JI 
and emissions trading provide for developed nations to earn or acquire credits through emission 
reduction programs within other developed nations. Without the participation of the majority of 
states in these three market mechanisms, effective implementation of the KP will be substantially 
arrested.  
                                                 
29 Protocol to Amend the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat 
known as the Paris Protocol, adopted at the Extraordinary Conference of the Contracting Parties, Paris, France, 2-3 
December 1982. http://www.ramsar.org/key_paris_protocol.htm 
30 NASCO. Ten Year Review of the Activities of the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization, 1984-1994. 
Page 4. 
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2.4.2 Overlap and interdependence among treaties 
 
Wide participation in IEAs is rendered crucial by the fact that many treaties often 
regulate the same environmental parameters – especially those for the protection of fauna and 
flora, or marine water protection. For example, the importation and exportation of protected 
fauna is regulated under both CITES (Articles III-V) and the Convention on Nature Protection 
and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere (Article IX). Bird protection is ensured 
under both CITES and the International Convention for the Protection of Birds. Likewise, the 
dumping of organohalogen compounds, mercury, cadmium and their compounds, inter alia, is 
prohibited under both the London31 and Oslo32 Dumping conventions. Hence, if a state is party to 
one specific treaty but not to another which is closely related, the success of implementation 
strategies may not be fully realized.  
The above is especially true if the effective implementation of one specific treaty is 
dependent on the implementation mechanisms set out in other closely related treaties. For 
example, successful implementation of the African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbird Agreement 
(AEWA)33 is dependent on the protection of wetlands and the safeguard of biodiversity in these 
habitats.34 Hence, domestic implementation of the terms of AEWA is also dependent on the 
implementation of the clauses of both the Ramsar Convention and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), which deal, inter alia, with the protection of wetlands and the protection of 
biodiversity respectively. Ideally, therefore, we would want the same groups of nation states to 
                                                 
31Full title: Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, London, 
1972. See Articles 1 and 4. 
32 Full title: Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, Oslo, 1972. 
See Articles 5 and 6. 
33 This agreement, adopted on 16 June 1995, is concerned with the protection of around 172 species of birds which 
are ecologically dependent on wetlands for at least part of their annual cycle.  
34 UNEP/CMS Secretariat. 24 March 1997. Review of Article IV: Agreements Concluded or Under Development.  
Report presented at the Fifth Meeting of the Conference of Parties of the Convention on the Conservation of 
Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Geneva 10-16 April 1997. UNEP/CMS/Conf. 5.9. 
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commit to all of these treaties to facilitate integrated implementation and close coordination of 
strategies.  
In increasing recognition of these interconnections among various IEAs, it is a common 
feature nowadays to witness treaty bodies endeavoring to link and coordinate their strategies in 
order to better resolve the relevant environmental problems. For example, a 1996 report of the 
Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) established the Baltic Sea Area (delineated under Article 1 of 
the 1992 Baltic Sea Convention35) as a Special Area under Annex I of the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (also known as MARPOL 73/78). The 
report further issued a call for close coordination of policies and collaboration among countries, 
stating: 36
…Since none of the States alone can establish and keep in preparedness the necessary resources of vessels, 
personnel and equipment to cope with major oil spills, cooperation and mutual assistance between States is 
necessary.  
 
In the same fashion, during the twelfth session of the Global Biodiversity Forum, held 
during the 1998 meeting of the COP to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification 
(CCD), discussions pertained specifically to the synergies between the CCD and the treaties 
relating to biodiversity protection.37 Linkages have also been established between climate 
change, biodiversity and desertification.38
2.4.3 Problem of free-riding and the economic implications of participation 
 
The global environment can be characterized by its property of ‘non-excludability’ 
(Barkin and Shambaugh 1999 p.5; DeSombre 2002 p. 21), which means that every state is free to 
                                                 
35 Full title: Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki, 1992). Full 
text available at http://www.helcom.fi/convention/conventionframe.html  
36 Source: HELCOM. April 1996. Protection of the Baltic Sea – results and experiences. Page 24. 
37 GBF 12-Dakar. Linking the Biodiversity and Desertification Agendas, 4-6 December 1998. Dakar, Senegal. 
http://wri.igc.org/wri/wri/biodiv/gbf/gbf12.htm 
38 World Resources Institute. www.wri.org/wri/wri/biodiv/gbf    
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consume it or to enjoy the benefits accruing from increased global protection measures 
implemented by other states. In the case of IEAs, free-riding becomes a persistent problem due 
to the fact that it is impossible to prevent countries which do not participate in the IEAs to freely 
benefit from an enhanced global environment emanating from the protection measures 
implemented by the parties to the IEAs. Finus (2001 p.14) thus rightly considers that IEAs are 
“typically plagued” by free-riding. This free-riding has the potential of thwarting the efforts of 
others committed to protecting the resource, and is considered to be among one of the factors 
that tend to prevent full participation and compliance (Barrett and Stavins 2003 p. 350). 
Moreover, if enough states decide to free-ride, the whole regime may collapse (DeSombre 2001 
p. 191). According to Desombre, this tendency to free-ride makes participation in IEAs “more 
important than in some other situations of international cooperation” (DeSombre 2001 p. 190; 
DeSombre 2002 p. 21).  
Less than full participation in IEAs also entails economic implications. Within the 
context of the UNFCCC, for example, the “number and identity” of participating countries have 
an influence on the costs of emission reductions (Carraro 2002 pp. 5, 14), with a higher 
participation rate resulting in reduced implementation costs for all party members as well as 
increased abatement emissions. Carraro (2002 p. 14) therefore argues that “strategies that 
increase the size and the number of participating countries also increase the environmental and 
cost-effectiveness” of agreements. Barrett and Stavins (2003 p.351) also recognize that for “cost-
effective implementation” of IEAs, full participation is required so that marginal costs can be 
equally distributed across all countries (also Barrett 2000). 
Incomplete participation also hampers trade and increases transaction costs (Barrett 2000 
pp.123-139). If we consider as example the KP, less than full participation can give rise to what 
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is known as the “leakage problem” (Barrett 2000 p.133; Barrett and Stavins 2003; Hoel 2001 p. 
178), which refers to an increase in emissions in non-Annex I39 countries due to a fall in prices of 
carbon-intensive fuels as participating countries reduce their emissions and cause prices of these 
fuels to fall. In this sense, less than full participation works against the effectiveness of the KP.  
Moreover, lack of worldwide coordination of environmental regulations can become “a 
source of trade distortion” if some countries decide to use their environmental policies as a 
“hidden trade barrier” (Gabel and Folmer 2000 p. xxiv). For enforcement measures such as trade 
restrictions to work, there need to be enough participants for the threat to be credible. In Barrett 
and Stavins’s (2003 p. 365) words, “[t]he greater is the rate of participation, the more credible is 
the threat to restrict trade.” Sand (1991 p. 247) has documented the initial difficulty faced by the 
OECD while negotiating a regional treaty to control for the transboundary shipment of hazardous 
wastes. While the OECD succeeded in securing a higher level of cooperation and consensus than 
would be possible under an international framework, it was also evident that the regional treaty 
would have “an undesired spillover effect, reorienting trade flows to countries outside the region 
that were unlikely to abide by OECD-imposed regulation.” The OECD finally had to accept a 
weaker agreement in the form of the 1989 Basel Convention, which was open for participation 
by all sovereign states of the world. 
2.5 Conclusion 
 In the introductory paragraphs of this chapter, I posed the question: Why is there a need 
to study state participation in IEAs? I have proposed four main reasons why participation 
matters. I have argued that participation is important because of: (i) the increased pace and the 
extensive scale of global environmental change; (ii) the transboundary and global nature of 
                                                 
39 Non-Annex I countries are the developing countries within the context of the Climate Change treaty. 
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environmental issues; (iii) the operation of IEAs, which relies on wide participation for the 
effective implementation of IEA provisions, the reduction of free-riding and the coordination of 
strategies for highly interdependent IEAs; and (iv) the economic implications of less than 
optimal participation. Having established the legitimacy and need of studying participation, I 
now move forward to review the literature governing the current state of research into the field of 
participation in IEAs. The next chapter provides such a review. 
  
 
3.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON PARTICIPATION IN IEAs 
 
In Chapter One, I formulated the main thesis of this research: to analyze the potential 
determinants of state participation in IEAs by focusing on state and treaty variables. The purpose 
of this chapter is to review the literature on state participation in IEAs and to provide an analysis 
of the limitations of current research in the field. A look at the various studies conducted on 
participation in IEAs shows that several determinants of participation have been identified by 
researchers. Most of the analyses have been conducted within the framework of environmental 
economics, which has heavily relied on applications of game theory to explain state participation 
in IEAs. Despite the predominance of the game-theoretic framework, the study of state 
participation in IEAs has also benefited from other approaches.  
However, in view of the ad hoc way in which the theme of participation has been 
approached, due mostly to a reliance on a set of very broad and general theories, it is not possible 
to organize this review section based on the various theories governing IR. In the sections that 
follow, I have therefore organized the literature in such a way as to highlight the various 
potential determinants of participation identified in the literature. In some instances, studies 
pertaining to states’ international environmental commitments have been included in view of the 
fact that participation in specific IEAs was used to operationalize the international commitments. 
As I go about discussing the identified variables, the various theoretical frameworks are 
addressed in an interdependent fashion as they arise. Moreover, to facilitate the discussions, I 
divide this chapter into two parts: Part I dealing with state variables; and Part II dealing with IEA 
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variables.  I conclude this chapter with a critique of the current state of knowledge into IEA 
participation and provide a synopsis of the contribution to be brought about by the present study.  
3.1 Part I: State Characteristics  
3.1.1 Structure and Stability of Political Structures 
Various studies have pointed to the fact that domestic political structures have an 
influence on the level of states’ international commitments as well as on the substance of 
multilateral regimes. According to Congleton (2001 p.253), different types of political structures 
command varying demand levels for domestic and international environmental regulations. 
Democracies and dictatorships are deemed to differ in their preferences for environmental 
standards, with authoritarians preferring lower environmental standards than their democratic 
colleagues who are considered to be motivated by the median voter.40 Further, liberal regimes are 
also more “likely to find international agreements along similar lines [i.e. stringent 
environmental standards] to be in their interest” (Congleton 1992 p.412). Thus, Congleton (2001 
p. 258) concludes that, ceteris paribus, “[d]emocracies will be more inclined to sign and 
implement environmental treaties than dictatorships,” with the latter requiring positive 
inducements (e.g. direct cash or in-kind transfers) to participate in the IEAs. Based on these 
findings, Congleton (1992 p. 421) predicts that IEAs will attract a higher level of participation as 
the number of democratic regimes increases worldwide.  
Several other studies have similarly posited a positive relationship between democracy 
and treaty ratification. Based on their analysis of states’ ratification delays of the UNFCCC (used 
                                                 
40 Congleton (2001, p. 258) defines the median voter as being “approximately the voter with the median income 
share and time horizon,” who is deemed to be the “pivotal decision maker within a democratic country.” Cowhey 
(1993 p. 304) has provided a simpler definition, stating “[t]he median voter is a shorthand term for the range of 
policy preferences around which most voters cluster. Parties have to cover a significant part of this cluster if they 
want to attract a majority.” 
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as a proxy for a state’s level of commitment to the UNFCCC provisions), Fredriksson and 
Gaston (2000 pp.347, 357, 361) conclude that nations with greater civil liberties ratified the 
treaty sooner than those with low civil liberties. Neumayer’s (2002a p. 156) study on the 
influence of democracy on international environmental commitments also proves that there is 
“strong evidence” that “democracies exhibit stronger international environmental commitment 
than non-democracies,” even though, as per Neumayer, the link between democracy and 
environmental outcome (e.g. soil degradation or carbon dioxide emissions) may not be as clear. 
Based on this finding, Neumayer (2002a) predicts that a vulgarization of democratic ideals 
around the globe will result in increased international environmental commitment, echoing 
Congleton’s (1992) reflection on this issue, as mentioned above.  
Payne (1995) has attempted to provide a rationale for the ways in which democracy can 
be beneficial for the environment. Payne argues that democratic countries tend to favor 
environmental protection because of (i) various types of freedoms guaranteed by democracies 
viz. freedom of citizens to lobby their governments; freedom of the press; freedom of speech; 
freedom to gather and disseminate information; and other types of political liberties; (ii) regime 
responsiveness and regime accountability, as ensured through the electoral process; (iii) political 
learning engendered through the free flow of information and global market forces; (iv) 
internationalism marked by participation in international institutions and the freedom of 
transnational pressure groups to freely carry out their activities; and (v) open markets.  
However, Payne’s hypotheses are mostly based on conjecture and anecdotal evidence, 
with no empirical testing. Midlarsky (1998 p. 344) has questioned this “hypothesized positive 
relationship” between democracy and the environment. Midlarsky (1998 p. 344) contends that 
Payne’s thesis represents an “idealization of democracy that ignores the rough and tumble of 
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actual decision-making within the legislative and executive branches of government.” Based on 
his multivariate analysis of several environmental variables (e.g. carbon dioxide emissions, soil 
erosion by water and chemicals, protected land area, and freshwater availability, among others) 
on three different measures of democracy (viz. Gastil, 1988; Bollen, 1993; and Jaggers and Gurr, 
1995), Midlarsky (p. 358) finds that “there is no uniform relationship between democracy and 
the environment.” Although Midlarsky’s choice of environmental indicators all pertain to the 
domestic domain, the result is enlightening in that it establishes that democracy does not 
necessarily lead to better environment. Thus, if we use Congleton’s (1992 p. 412) earlier 
argument that states choose international environmental standards more in line with their 
domestic ones, it is not necessarily evident that democracies will want to participate in IEAs 
which are legally mandating higher environmental standards than their domestic ones. 
Other researchers have focused on the structure of the governmental system as an 
explanatory variable for a state’s level of environmental commitment. Dolsak’s (2001 p. 426) 
analysis on states’ commitment levels to mitigating global climate change shows that 
parliamentary systems face lower “political costs of environment/energy tradeoffs” than 
presidential systems. Recchia’s (2002) analysis of the participation of nineteen democracies in 
fifteen IEAs tests four different theories viz. structural constraint theory, political institutional 
theory, idea-based theory, and interconnectivity theory, to determine causal factors for the 
varying levels of international environmental commitments of stable democracies. Recchia finds 
that the “value orientations of the citizenry” and “executive dominance” – key elements of the 
idea-based theory and the institutional theory respectively – provide the strongest explanations 
for the international environmental behavior of the countries analyzed. Moreover, Recchia (pp. 
487, 488) finds that states with a higher pollution load do not necessarily participate in more 
  44 
IEAs, while states with “strong executive-centered ratification power” stand more chance of 
participating, especially when “citizen’s demands for international environmental protection are 
solid.”  
The political stability of a regime has also been deemed crucial for a state’s ability to 
sustain international cooperation. According to Maoz and Russett (1993 p. 908), the political 
stability of a state is associated with the “persistence of its regime in years” and the longer that a 
political regime exists “without fundamental change,” the more likely that norms of political 
conduct will develop that will “form and influence the foreign policy codes of conduct of the 
regime.” It is common wisdom that political contestation occurring within the shadow of 
impending elections is typically characterized by politicians who notoriously focus on policies 
with short-term benefits, with no regard for the long-term horizon. As stated by DeSombre (2000 
p. 152), “[t]rading uncertain future harm for certain current benefits is a common political 
choice.”  Thus, changes in government may induce policy reversals which may renege on prior 
commitments to international environmental cooperation (Caldwell 1988 pp. 13-28). 
Major political destabilization brought about by political corruption or civil wars is also 
significant in impairing the state of the environment or in constraining choices for effective 
implementation of environmental policies. The predominance of civil wars in Africa has been 
identified as a causal factor for the ineffective implementation of natural resources management 
policies (Brinkerhoff and Cage 2002 p.101; Mallya and Talbott 1990; O'Keefe et al. 1991). 
Morrell and Poznanski (1985 p. 165) contend that widespread corruption in many developing 
countries prevents the latter from implementing effective strategies for environmental protection.  
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3.1.2 Level of Development 
It has generally been noted that the level of economic development is related to the 
environment (e.g. Asthana and Shukla 2002 p. 271; Evans 2000 pp. 42-63; Hurrell and 
Kingsbury 1992; Von Prittwitz 1990), with the general notion that developed countries have 
stronger environmental protection policies than developing states. Young (1982 p. 739), for 
example, considers that the incidence of “negotiated orders” is greater in “advanced 
industrialized societies” which are “highly developed and not severely constrained in functional 
terms.” According to Desombre (2000 p.2), countries with “advanced environmental protection 
policies” are more involved in internationalizing their domestic environmental regulations – 
which implies that the developed countries (e.g. EU countries, Canada, Norway, US) will more 
likely participate in IEAs than the developing ones.  
Income levels are deemed to be related to environmental quality through the notion that 
environmental quality is a ‘luxury’ or ‘superior’ good (e.g. Schulze and Ursprung 2001b pp. 27, 
42). The richer and developed countries of the North are considered to value environmental 
quality more than the developing countries (Schulze and Ursprung 2001b p.28), whereas low 
incomes have been associated with a “high degree of tolerance to environmental hazard” and a 
low willingness to pay for improved environmental quality (Rauscher 2001 p. 148). This line of 
reasoning also argues that the population in developed countries exert greater pressure on their 
governments to enforce environmental protection (Ervin 2001 p.85; Sage 1996). Fredriksson and 
Gaston (2000 p. 357) find that though larger economies tend to have higher total pollution levels, 
they exhibit shorter delays in ratifying the UNFCCC due to greater internal or external political 
pressure to ratify the treaty. Neumayer (2002a; 2002b p. 823) has also shown that per capita 
income has a positive relationship with a country’s willingness to ratify or sign IEAs. Focusing 
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on a world systems theoretical perspective, Roberts et. al. (2004 p. 56) have demonstrated that 
“larger, wealthy, “core” countries tend participate in more IEAs than do very small and/or poor, 
“peripheral” countries.”  
The relationship between income levels and environmental quality has also been 
analyzed through what is generally known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), based on 
Kuznet’s research on income inequality across developing countries, which posits that as per 
capita income rises, income inequality initially rises, and then subsequent falls (Jha and Whalley 
2001 pp. 228-230; Schulze and Ursprung 2001a). The EKC hypothesis suggests the following 
relationship between demand for environmental quality and per capita income: as per capita 
income rises, pollutant levels (e.g. sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, nitrogen oxides, carbon 
monoxide, carbon dioxide, CFCs, etc.) per capita rise, and then fall after a threshold level is 
reached, yielding what has been widely termed as the ‘inverted U-relationship’ (Perrings 2001 
p.321). However, there are many researchers who have contested the applicability of the EKC 
hypothesis, arguing, for example, that “there appears to be nothing automatic about this relation” 
(Jha and Whalley 2001 p. 230), or that the hypothesis applies only to certain air pollutants (e.g. 
sulfur dioxide emissions) and not to other environmental problems such as deforestation (for 
critiques see Jha and Whalley 2001 pp. 228-230).  
It is widely acknowledged that the developed and developing nations face different 
aspirations where environmental protection is concerned (e.g. Wells 1996), an asymmetry often 
reflected in the North-South (N-S) 41 conflict in international environmental negotiations. At the 
                                                 
41 In International Relations, the term ‘North’ comprises both the “West” (rich countries of Western Europe, North 
America and Japan) and the old “East” (the former Soviet Union and its bloc of allies). The South includes Latin 
America, Africa, the Middle East and much of Asia. The South is often called the “third world” (third after the West 
and East). Countries in the South are also referred to as “developing” countries or “less developed” countries 
(LDCs), in contrast to the “developed” countries of the North (Goldstein, 1994). 
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root of this N-S divide, according to some analysts, lies the fact that the nature of environmental 
problems in developing countries is not the same as that in the developed countries (e.g. Jha and 
Whalley 2001 p. 217). Protecting the environment in the developing countries is viewed, most 
often than not, as a struggle between the environment and meeting immediate socio-economic 
needs for daily subsistence (Atkinson 1991; Ledec 1985; Miller 1991). Barbier (2001 p. 242) 
notes that whereas environmental problems in the developed world are understood mostly in 
terms of “conventional pollution problems” such as pollutant discharges or emissions, in the 
developing world, environmental problems tend to be associated with “uninternalized 
externalities” and environmental ‘degradation,’ which carry different economic and 
environmental implications than those from emissions or pollutant discharges. Such 
‘degradation’ problems include deforestation, desertification, soil erosion, congestion, depletion 
of fisheries stocks, improper solid waste disposal, urban congestion, and environmental and 
health problems such as infectious diseases, poverty, untreated water, low sanitation,  and 
watercourses polluted with untreated sewage discharges, inter alia (Barbier 2001 p. 242).  
Tussie (2000b p.1) also makes such a distinction when she differentiates between the 
“Northern” or “green agenda” characterized by issues such as climate change, biodiversity, and 
fisheries, and the “Southern” or “brown” agenda dominated by drinking water, poverty 
alleviation, trade, market access, technology transfer or flows of development assistance. Tussie 
(2000b) further considers that the concept of sustainable development connotes different 
meanings for the developed and developing countries, with the former associating it with 
“meeting the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs,” and the latter equating it to poverty alleviation and future 
economic development. Rosenberg (1994 pp. 129,130) suggests that poverty in the South, 
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coupled with the “fiscal austerity and protectionism in the North,” has resulted in the fact that the 
“sustainable development bandwagon has thus far been characterized by inaction and more than 
a little hot air.”  
3.1.3 Power of States and Environmental Vulnerability 
Within the field of IEC, the overall power potential of a state has to include 
considerations of the level of vulnerability to transboundary environmental and ecological 
disturbances. Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1998 p. 13) have used a combination of the concept of 
maximization of self-interest and the game-theoretic framework of a unitary rational actor model 
to build an ‘interest-based theory’ of international environmental regulation. Sprinz and 
Vaahtoranta  (p.14) focus on two domestic factors to explain nations’ support for international 
environmental regulation: a country’s level of ecological vulnerability towards pollution, and the 
economic costs of pollution abatement. They argue that countries which are ecologically 
vulnerable and have low abatement costs tend to participate more in IEAs than those with low 
ecological vulnerability and high abatement costs. Similarly, Helm (2000a p. 134) considers that 
non-signatories of the Helsinki Protocol tend to be countries which “are either substantial net 
emission exporters or have a low ecological vulnerability.” This ties in with Recchia’s (2002 p. 
483) finding that polluted democracies do not necessarily ratify more treaties. Similarly, Mitchell 
(2003 p. 449) considers that countries with high ecological vulnerability and low adjustment 
costs tend to participate in more IEAs than those that have low vulnerability and high costs 
The traditional association of state power with military prowess is reshuffled in the 
domain of IEC. Researchers often talk about a new form of power – viz. the “power to destroy” 
(DeSombre 2002 pp. 15, 181; Downie 1999), where large developing countries become 
‘powerful’ in the sense that they muster the power to potentially destroy the environment due to 
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their future development paths. Due to this new “power to destroy,” developing countries can 
dictate the terms of their participation in IEAs. Developing states also become ‘powerful’ in the 
sense that they possess resources which the international community is intent on protecting, and 
thus they can prescribe the terms of access to these resources or the international protection 
strategies being envisaged (DeSombre 2002 p. 181).  
The effects of population growth have been linked to increased environmental 
degradation triggered by the greater pressures on land and other resources, and an erosion of the 
environmental carrying capacity (Markandya 2001 p. 198). On the other hand, low population 
density implies less vulnerability since there are less people affected by environmental problems 
(Rauscher 2001 p. 148). However, the exact role of population growth in engendering 
environmental degradation has often been contested, with some scholars (e.g. Markandya 2001 
pp. 198-200) contending that population growth can result in increased productivity. This is 
often known as the Boserup hypothesis, which argues that with scarcity of land relative to labor, 
there ensues an intensification of agriculture and increased productivity per unit area (Boserup 
1965 quoted from Markandya, 2001 p. 198).  
3.1.4 Non-state Actors  
It is well-established that non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) have an influential role to play in raising environmental awareness among the public, in 
agenda-setting at either national or international levels, and in the various stages of regime 
formation (e.g. Bramble and Porter 1992; Feld et al. 1994; Handl 1991; Lindborg 1992; 
McMahon 1993; Porter and Brown 1991; Princen and Finger 1994; Raustiala 1997; Rittberger 
2000; Stairs and Taylor 1992; Wapner 2000). The influence of NGOs in the field of state 
participation in IEAs has been studied as well.  Roberts et. al .(2004 p. 28), for example, use the 
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total number of NGOs as a proxy for the strength of a state’s civil society and for the level of 
environmental pressure brought to bear on the state. Their results show that the total number of 
NGOs (among other factors such as the narrowness of national export base and the voice and 
accountability of citizens) in a state has a significant influence on the state’s participation in 
IEAs (Roberts et. al. p. 39). They thus conclude that “institutional and grassroots 
democratization” are important for commitment to IEAs (p. 45). Gulbrandsen and Andresen 
(2004 p. 57) also find that NGOs can play important roles in supporting and calling for 
ratification of treaties. Similarly, Raustiala (1997 p. 731) assigns the role of ‘facilitators of 
ratification’ to NGOs.  
3.1.5 Trade Openness 
It has been argued that trade openness is “good for the environment” and that it can foster 
IEC (e.g. Antweiler et al. 2001 p. 878). In his analysis of the effect of trade openness on IEC, 
Neumayer (2002b p. 830) finds that there is “some evidence that general trade openness 
promote[s] multilateral environmental cooperation.” However, though trade liberalization can 
provide benefits to the environment, this relationship does not happen “automatically” (Brack 
1995 p. 501). According to Brack, appropriate policies will need to be implemented to make 
trade regimes more conducive to environmental protection. 
Moreover, the relationship between trade openness and increased potential for IEC is not 
straightforward either. The expansion of trade can have negative environmental repercussions 
such as higher release of air or water pollutants, the introduction of invasive plant and animal 
species which can negatively impact local species, or to the depletion of natural resources, inter 
alia (Brack 1995 p. 499; Copeland and Taylor 1994; Ervin 2001 p.85; Tussie 2000b p.1). 
Copeland and Taylor (1994 pp. 756, 757, 781) have further demonstrated that the effects of 
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economic growth on pollution are not the same in an autarky and in a free trade regime. They 
find that “economic growth in autarky has no effect on pollution levels, but economic growth in 
a trading environment can raise pollution levels” (p. 756).  
Developing countries are often considered to be more vulnerable to the negative impacts 
of trade liberalization (Ervin 2001 p. 94). It has been commonly stated that bigger and more 
powerful countries can significantly influence world prices “through their trade and 
environmental policies” while smaller economies take these as “given” (Schulze and Ursprung 
2001b p.17; Steinberg 1997 p. 232). It is also often feared that free trade might result in 
“environmental dumping,” which refers to the possibility that all countries might relax their 
environmental policies and standards in order to gain competitive advantage in the promotion of 
their products (Carraro 2001 p. 348; Schulze and Ursprung 2001a p.45). According to Schulze 
and Ursprung (2001b p. 42), trade liberalization may “decrease the welfare of the country with 
high preferences for environmental quality.” The trade-environment debate also includes 
arguments suggestive of the  relocation of industries to those countries with lax environmental 
standards, dubbed as ‘pollution havens,’ in order to maximize competitiveness (Carraro 2001 p. 
348; Esty 2001 p. 121). However, the evidence for this ‘race to the bottom’ is widely considered 
to be ‘mixed’ or unconvincing (e.g. see Esty 2001 p. 124; Schulze and Ursprung 2001a p. 61).  
Finally, the trade-environment debate brings contention pertaining to issues of fairness 
and equity. As epitomized in Rauscher (2001 p. 148),  if we accept the logic of trade combined 
with economic theories pertaining to the law of comparative advantage, toxic wastes should be 
stored or treated where the environmental costs are low – that is, in  poor and under-populated 
areas (Rauscher 2001 p. 148). Terms such as ‘toxic colonialism’(Hilz and Radka, 1990) have 
indeed been used to refer to industrialized countries’ strategies of dumping their toxic wastes in 
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developing countries, which often might not have the means or facilities to manage these 
hazardous wastes safely (also Dasgupta and Maler 1994). Perceptions of inequities and 
unfairness certainly accounted for the failure of the Basel Convention in enlisting the 
participation of the majority of developing countries, who ultimately negotiated their ‘own’ 
hazardous waste treaty in the form of the Bamako Convention.42
3.2 PART II: IEA Design 
 
Regime Design Matters. This title of Mitchell’s 1994 article clearly captures the general 
recognition in the literature on IEC of the importance of the design of IEAs as a “crucial” 
determinant of participation in IEAs, as well as a significant factor influencing the “stability and 
global efficiency” of the environmental coalition (Finus 2001 pp. 236, 238; Helm and Sprinz 
2000; Helm 2000b p. 164; Sand 1992; Schmidt 2000). In the case of the UNFCCC, for example, 
Barrett and Stavins (2003 p. 366) note that the architecture of the climate change regime can 
influence both participation and compliance.  
The current state of research into IEA design points to the following factors as being 
most influential in impacting state participation: (i) the flexibility of the agreements; (ii) the 
strength of the IEA provisions; and (iii) participation incentives. Moreover, various researchers 
have analyzed the influence of the minimum ratification clause, also commonly known as the 
threshold number, on the level of participation in IEAs. Details on each of these potential 
determinants of participation are provided below.  
                                                 
42 Full title: Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement 
and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, Bamako, 1991. 
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3.2.1 Flexibility of the IEA 
Most IEAs provide party members with the possibility of entering into reservations, of 
opting out of certain clauses, or of completely withdrawing from the treaties. It is generally 
agreed that allowing reservations tends to favor participation because it increases the flexibility 
of the IEAs (Harvard Law Review 1992). On the other hand, disallowing of reservations, while 
effective in maintaining the desired strength of the IEAs, may nevertheless work against high 
rates of participation by being inflexible and by not meeting the needs of potential party 
members. As stated by DeSombre (2002 p. 11): 
Although many complain about opt-out provisions in regulatory treaties, the fact that no state can be bound 
by international law against its will makes them a necessary evil. Without them few states would agree to 
regulation created by less than unanimous voting.  
 
Similarly, encouraging flexible means of dispute resolution (e.g. through negotiations) 
tends to appeal to a wider audience than strict requirements for recourse to the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ).  The 1963 Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of 
Disputes, negotiated under the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 
succeeded in securing only two parties as at September 2003, compared to the thirty-two parties 
to the parent treaty.43 Under the Optional Protocol, all disputes arising under the parent treaty are 
to be dealt “within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice” (Article 1), 
unless the parties agree to alternate measures within a period of two months after notification of 
the dispute.44 The low rate of participation in the Optional Protocol may be due to the general 
unpalatability within the international community of submitting disputes to the ICJ, or due to the 
                                                 
43 Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development. 2003/2004. 
http://www.greenyearbook.org/agree/nuc-saf/civillia.htm  
44 Text of the parent treaty and the optional protocol available online at 
http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/acrc/ProtVienna.txt.html or at the IAEA site at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1996/inf500.shtml.  
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inflexible language of the text of the Protocol, connoted, for example, by the word 
“compulsory.” 
3.2.2 Strength of IEAs 
Several researchers have argued that the stricter the requirements of an IEA, the less 
likely it is that countries will participate in the IEA (e.g. see Schmidt 2001 p. 214), and free-
riding incentives will prevail (Finus 2001 p. 279). Carraro (1999b  p. 9), for example, notes that 
those treaties which are “rather empty in terms of quantitative targets and/or deadlines” tend to 
enlist greater participation than those with precise commitments. Likewise, Finus (2001 p.314) 
considers that more countries sign IEAs which are meant to “achieve little.” In his analysis of the 
UNFCCC, Barrett (2000 p. 119) considers that the UNFCCC benefited from earlier ratification 
and entry into force than the KP because it did not require any “particular target by any particular 
date.”  
3.2.3 Participation Incentives 
Recently, calls for increased membership in IEAs have been further qualified to include 
specific encouragements for developing countries to participate in the treaties. Two types of 
incentives are mentioned in the literature: positive incentives, such as side-payments and 
financial or technical assistance; and negative incentives such as external threats and trade 
restrictions (Barrett and Stavins 2003 pp. 361-367; Underdal 1998 p. 106). Many IEAs do 
recognize the fact that the special needs of developing countries need to be taken into 
consideration, and that developed nations need to provide financial and technical assistance to 
allow the developing states to comply with their international environmental obligations without 
jeopardizing their development needs (Caldwell 1988; Chasek 2000; Evans 2000).  
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Principle 9 of the Stockholm Declaration45 recognizes that conditions of 
underdevelopment and natural disasters lead to environmental deficiencies which can be 
improved by rapid development fostered by the transfer of financial and technological assistance 
to supplement the domestic effort of the developing countries. The most recent IEAs (e.g. the 
MP, the UNFCCC, and the CBD)46 contain special provisions for financial assistance, 
technological transfer, technical support and scientific collaboration. Both the UNFCCC and the 
CBD mention that the extent to which developing countries succeed in implementing their 
commitments under the conventions depends, in the first instance, on the developed countries’ 
fulfillment of their obligation to provide financial and technological assistance. Developed 
countries are held responsible for the proper implementation of the CBD by the developing 
countries, thus attesting to the worldwide acceptance of the necessity for compensating the 
developing world for their efforts to preserve and conserve their natural resources. 
                                                 
45 Principle 9 reads: “Environmental deficiencies generated by the conditions of under-development and natural 
disasters pose grave problems and can best be remedied by accelerated development through the transfer of 
substantial quantities of financial and technological assistance as a supplement to the domestic effort of the 
developing countries and such timely assistance as may be required.” Text of the Declaration is accessible online at 
http://www.unep.org.  
46 Further details on the provisions are as follows: (i) the Montreal Protocol (1987) - Article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2 
of the Protocol allow developing countries a moratorium of ten years to comply with control measures and 
implement the quantitative targets and also allow them quick access to alternative technology; moreover, the MP 
requires the developed countries to disburse funds to meet the incremental costs incurred by the developing world in 
adapting technology to reduce the emissions of ozone-depleting substances (ODS); (ii) the Convention for the 
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution (Barcelona, 1976) recognizes that priority needs to be given 
to the developing countries in the Mediterranean region for provision of technical cooperation in the field of marine 
pollution.( Re: Article 12(3)); (iii) the Climate Change Convention - Article 12(7) requires the Conference of Parties 
(COP) to arrange for the provision of technical and financial assistance for reporting requirements and for 
implementing projects and measures adopted under Article 4 of the Convention;46 and (iv) the Convention on 
Biological Diversity recognizes the special needs of developing countries for research and training, exchange of 
information, technical and scientific cooperation for implementing the Convention. The Convention also includes 
special provisions for the participation of developing countries in biotechnological research activities and for access 
to the results and benefits of biotechnologies based upon genetic resources provided by the developing countries 
(Article 19, paragraphs 1, 2). Article 20 also stipulates that developed parties shall help developing countries meet 
incremental costs incurred to them in the implementation of the obligations of the Convention. 
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3.2.4 Minimum Ratification Clause 
 The minimum ratification clause, often also called the threshold number or the n-rule 
(Black et al. 1993 p. 281), normally specifies the total number of ratifications that are needed for 
a treaty to enter into force. The minimum ratification clause has been considered as an “internal 
stabilization” instrument, making participation “contingent” on the participation of others 
(Schmidt 2001 p. 220). Black et. al. (1993) have analyzed the threshold number “as an 
instrument to create incentives” for IEC, and they report that the threshold number helps to 
increase participation in IEAs while deterring free-riding (also Barrett 2000 p. 137; Carraro et al. 
2003). In this sense, the threshold number is seen as being important in making cooperation more 
profitable (e.g. Black et al. 1993) and more stable by decreasing the number of free-riders and 
increasing the number of signatories (Carraro et al. 2003). However, Schmidt (2001 p. 220) 
warns that “the more successful the minimum ratification clause is in making a large number of 
countries sign the agreement, the greater are the incentives to breach it afterwards.” 
3.3 Critique of current state of research and proposals for advancement of knowledge 
As mentioned in Chapter One and as detailed in the preceding sections, environmental 
economics has had much to contribute to the field of state participation in IEAs. The game-
theoretic framework has been used extensively to explain environmental coalitions and 
participation in IEAs. These economic analyses have focused on country characteristics as well 
as on the structure and design of IEAs as potential determinants of participation. 
However, though these econometric analyses have contributed positively to our 
understanding of IEC, they suffer from several limitations, many of which have been recognized 
by the environmental economists themselves. The econometric explanations, for example, often 
“rely on ad hoc arguments rather than on scientific and empirical foundations” (Finus 2001 p. 
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105), and most of the research is deemed to be ‘theoretical’ rather than relying on ‘observation’ 
or empirical insights. Moreover, the econometric models are highly “stylized,” being based on 
“simplifying assumptions” to apply two-player models to large N situations, or to extrapolate 
findings based on the homogeneity of countries to heterogeneous countries (Finus 2001 p.12; 
Helm 2000a p.2). These far-ranging assumptions often diminish the utility of the analyses since 
the findings are not directly transportable to the general field of global environmental policy 
formulation. As rightly noted by Jeppesen and Andersen (1998 p. 80), while the games used in 
Game Theory (e.g. Prisoners’ Dilemma and Chicken Game) may be useful as “analytical and 
theoretical instruments,” they are nevertheless “distant from reality” when it comes to actual 
negotiation and cooperative processes. The final results of econometric analyses often therefore 
necessitate disclaimers on the applicability of the results to actual policy formulation, an example 
of which is Schmidt’s (2000 p. 193) following statement:  
The results of this analysis have been derived using highly stylized models. In the light of the various 
simplifications there clearly are limitations to the scope of the present study. The findings therefore cannot 
be directly applied to real-world political decision-making and have to be interpreted with some caution. 
 
Another example is Barrett’s (1994 p.879) following listing of his assumptions for his 
study on self-enforcing IEAs: 
By necessity, the analysis imposes a number of restrictive assumptions, and the above result must be seen 
in the light of these. The most important assumptions are: (1) that all countries are identical; (ii) that each 
country’s net benefit function is known by all countries, and known to be known by all countries; (iii) that 
the choice instrument is restricted to pollution abatement; (iv) that abatement levels are instantly and 
costlessly observable; (v) that the pollutant does not accumulate in the environment; and (vi) that the cost 
functions are independent. 
 
The applicability of Barrett’s findings are therefore of little relevance for the purpose of 
environmental policy formulation in view of the fact that: (i) not all countries are identical; (ii) 
there is no transparent system or international information-sharing for all cost-benefit settings; 
(iii) pollution abatement does not figure as the sole instrument of choice in international standard 
setting; (iv) abatement levels are neither instantly nor costlessly observable; (v) pollutants 
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accumulate in the environment; and (vi) cost functions are not independent. Thus, in real case 
scenario, all of the assumptions are violated, which renders a direct application of the results to 
actual policy-making illegitimate.   
Moreover, econometric analyses of why countries support or veto specific IEAs have 
been mostly case-specific, and have tended to be restricted to one particular type of IEAs – viz. 
emissions-based IEAs. Many researchers have, for example, focused almost exclusively on IEAs 
pertaining to global warming, ozone depletion, or acid rain (e.g. Finus 2001; Helm and Sprinz 
2000; Hoel 1992; Kaitala and Pohjola 1998; Murdoch and Sandler 1997; Murdoch et al. 2003; 
Schmidt 2000), with the almost complete failure to address other types of IEAs, such as those 
dealing with natural resource protection, biodiversity, and water resources. Also, such analyses 
have generally relied mostly on two or three-player models. In his attempt to provide a general 
model for the “forms of international cooperation,” Morrow (1994) based his analysis on a two-
actor game-theoretic model to demonstrate the usefulness of leadership and institutions in 
helping actors engage in cooperation. Schmidt’s (2000) analysis on the design of IEAs also 
focused on two or three countries. In several other investigations, researchers have either  
assumed identical or symmetric countries (e.g. Barrett 1994; Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Finus 
2001), or have focused on two groups of countries that can act as single agents (Endres and Finus 
1998;  also Hoel 1992).  
In view of the above constraints, many researchers from within the econometrics field 
have called for further research on participation in IEAs.  Carraro (1999b), for example, solicited 
more empirical analysis to test whether theoretical results derived from the assumption of 
symmetric countries still hold when the heterogeneity of countries in terms of size, natural 
resource endowments, and development stages, inter alia, is taken into account. Finus (2001 p. 
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234) and Helm (2000b p.166) have called for further research into the design IEAs. Sprinz and 
Vaahtoranta (1994; 1998 pp. 36, 41), in their presentation of the “interest-based approach” to 
international environmental regulation pertaining to ozone depletion and acid rain, 
acknowledged that future research on international environmental negotiations needed to focus 
on “a few additional domestic factors.”  
Many of the cross-national analyses of state participation in IEAs conducted outside the 
framework of game theory suffer from several lacunae as well. As stated in Chapter One, these 
analyses present three main problems – viz. they do not benefit from a rigorous theoretical 
foundation, and they have a small sample size for either the IEAs or the countries analyzed. For 
example, though Roberts et. al. (2004) consider treaty engagement among 192 countries, the 
number of IEAs tested in the analysis amounts to only twenty-two treaties. Dietz and Kalof’s 
(1992) analysis considers only twelve treaties, while Dolsak’s (2001) and Fredriksson and 
Gaston’s (2000) studies analyze participation only with respect to the climate change regime. 
Recchia’s (2002 p. 479) study falls short in terms of the sample size of countries analyzed. 
Recchia’s study focuses only on nineteen states which have been “continuous democracies for at 
least 20 years.” By resorting to the ‘most similar comparative approach,’ the analysis fails to 
consider variation in participation levels among “authoritarian regimes, poorer economies, and 
non-Western countries.” Smaller democracies (e.g. the Bahamas) are also not included in the 
analysis as these are considered not to be active participants in the international negotiations 
preceding the enactment of the treaty (Recchia 2002 p. 479).  
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Similarly, Neumayer’s study on the influence of democracy  or of trade openness on 
participation  tests the formulated hypotheses only with regard to four47 and six48 IEAs 
respectively (Neumayer 2002a; Neumayer 2002b). Further, Neumayer (2002b p. 819) fails to 
make the technical distinction between signature and ratification (see Section 4.6.2), even though 
he concedes that “[t]here is a disadvantage connected to analyzing signature rather than 
ratification” since “[s]ignature is not a formal commitment.”  
From a theoretical standpoint, many of the hypotheses being tested in the quantitative 
cross-national analyses mentioned above do not logically stem out from an application of the 
basic postulates of the main IR theories governing international cooperation. For example, while 
Roberts et. al. (2004 pp. 25-29) have provided a good overview of realism, constructivism,  and 
institutionalism in explaining IEC, their analysis lays greater emphasis on world-systems theory 
and on the impacts of the “colonial history” of states on their levels of IEA ratification, without 
any adequate application of the postulates of theories reviewed. Similarly, Neumayer’s (2002a) 
analysis does not provide adequate theoretical justification for the selection of the variables used 
in the analysis. For example, though the reasoning behind the influence of democracy on 
international environmental commitment is provided, there is no definition provided for the term 
‘importance’ as used in the analysis to determine the importance of the states, nor is there 
adequate theoretical justification provided for the use of the proxy variable of ‘population size’ 
to determine the ‘importance’ of states (see Neumayer 2002a p. 150). Fredriksson and Gaston’s 
(2000 pp.350, 353-356) selection of specific variables for country characteristics also suffer from 
                                                 
47 viz. the KP, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for 
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (Rotterdam Convention), and the Copenhagen 
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol. 
48 viz. CITES, the MP, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the KP, the Rotterdam Convention, and the 
Cartagena Protocol. 
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a lack of theoretical justification, with most of the arguments for such selection centering solely 
around considerations pertaining to maximization of self-interest or minimization of costs. 
Finally, the analysis of the influence of treaty design variations on IEA participation 
suffers from a clear lack of quantitative determinations. In his discussion of treaties relating to 
non-proliferation, Keeley (1985 p.103) notes that though treaties have been used as “indicators 
or points on measurement scales,” “as independent variables,” and as “guides to state interaction 
patterns,” what is missing is a “close quantitative analysis of the contents of treaties.”  Among 
the very few studies that have focused on systematic design analysis is DeSombre’s (2001 p.190-
228) investigation of the influence of specific treaty clauses or “participation mechanisms” on 
participation levels in IEAs, as stated in Section 1.2. The clauses studied include the following: 
presence of economic sanctions; provision of environmental aid; differential obligations; and the 
creation of club goods.  However, this study remains a qualitative undertaking, focusing only on 
a handful of IEAs,49 and providing only anecdotal evidence (based on the case of the MP mostly) 
that financial assistance helps to increase participation in an IEA. DeSombre concedes that it is 
difficult to compare among the various approaches because of the varying contexts of the 
treaties. She states (page 221): 
It is not simple to draw conclusions across mechanisms. There is no real way to do a controlled study that 
would examine which mechanisms work best under which circumstances, since they are not all tried in 
analogous situations, or even independently. Some agreements, like the Montreal Protocol, make use of all 
of the mechanisms examined here to some extent; others use only one or two, but in vastly different 
situations. 
 
   
                                                 
49 e.g. CITES, the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, the Whaling Convention, the 
Montreal Protocol (MP); and the UNFCCC, inter alia.  
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3.4 Conclusion 
Present research into the field of IEA participation has shown that several variables are 
important in determining state participation in the IEAs. Some of these variables include political 
stability, economic development, the level of environmental vulnerability, and the strength, 
flexibility or participation incentives offered by the treaty provisions. However, many of the 
conclusions reached on the theme of participation in IEAs are specific to the cases studied and 
cannot be generalized over the broader range of IEAs adopted internationally or of the different 
types of political regimes worldwide. These studies therefore do not provide a systematic 
explanation of the influence of the heterogeneity of states, or the variation in treaty provisions, 
on states’ participation levels in IEAs.  
Moreover, many of the analyses conducted on IEA participation suffer from the lack of a 
good theoretical treatment, especially from the perspective of IR. What is the role of power on 
participation rates in IEAs? Are non-state actors important? What is the influence of a state’s 
acculturation to international norms and standards on its participation level in IEAs? These 
questions have not been addressed in any systematic fashion and they are open for investigation. 
This current state of affairs presents scope for both theoretical and empirical contribution to the 
study on participation in IEAs. The present study aims to fill the gaps in the literature by 
generating hypotheses based on the main IR theories on international cooperation and by 
enlarging the IEA and country sample size, as further detailed in Chapter Five.  
 In the next chapter, I provide an overview of the main IR theories governing international 
cooperation and thereafter expose the hypotheses governing this study based on an application of 
the IR theories to the field of IEC.  
 
  
4.  DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
The literature reviewed in Chapter Three provided a map of the factors that have been 
identified as potential causes for state participation in IEAs. In particular, I highlighted specific 
state characteristics such as level of development, political stability, or environmental 
vulnerability, and IEA characteristics such as strength and flexibility. Furthermore, I have 
pointed out the need to generate hypotheses which better reflect the main strands of IR theorizing 
and which better validate the choice of variables to be associated with states’ participation levels 
in IEAs. 
In this Chapter, I put forth the rationale for the hypotheses to be tested in the present 
study and introduce the models guiding the analysis. In attempting to link possible causal 
variables of state participation in IEAs to IR theories, I focus on the main theory governing IR, 
viz. Realism, and its major contender, Liberalism. Both Realism and Liberalism explain the 
general patterns of international cooperation that is sustained in the international system. For 
example, while Realism emphasizes the role of power and relative gains, Liberalism focuses on 
the role played by international institutions and the maximization of absolute gains.  
However, the pattern and mode in which this maximization of gains (whether relative or 
absolute) occurs is preponderantly determined by the inherent domestic structures of the states. 
Calculations of costs and benefits, and hence the final strategies adopted for the maximization of 
gains, cannot be dissociated from the domestic configurations of states. Starting from the 
premise that domestic parameters are important in determining IEC, I apply basic postulates of 
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Realism and Liberalism to the domestic conditions of states to propose hypotheses for a 
state’s propensity to participate in IEAs.  In the next section I present a brief note on this 
“domestification of International Politics” (Caporaso 1997). I subsequently introduce the models 
and put forth the hypotheses of this study. 
4.1 Consideration of Domestic Factors in IR 
While many scholars would argue for a systemic analysis of IR, there has been growing 
recognition in the literature of the need to consider both domestic and systemic factors in an 
integrated framework to better understand states’ international behavior. Moravcsik (1993), for 
example, favors the inclusion of domestic factors in IR studies in order to overcome the 
indeterminacy of “pure” IR theories. Similarly, Gourevitch (1978) has proposed the “second 
image reversed.” According to Leeds (1999), domestic variables need to be considered when 
analyzing international cooperation as they influence leaders’ calculation of costs and benefits of 
engaging in specific international acts. As stated by Wendt and Friedheim (1995 p.691), 
“systemic theories cannot explain all of world politics, since much state action is driven by 
domestic politics or leader psychology.” Thus, it seems that there is a need to open the “black 
box” of the state (Owen 1994 p.926). Moreover, favoring systemic factors at the expense of 
domestic ones, or vice versa, creates “inaccurate homogenization” (Singer 1961  p. 839), 
resulting in only a partial understanding of the full range of determinants of international 
behavior.  
Though traditionally IR theories have relegated domestic conditions to being merely the 
discarded “second image” of Waltz’s (1959) postulate on IR, or as “constraints” to international 
cooperation (Knopf 1998 p. 677), there has been a resurgence of interest in this very second 
image due to the fact that extant theorizing has failed to account for many important domestic 
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determinants of international behavior, especially in the field of foreign relations and 
international political economy (e.g. Barnett 1990 p.529). IR and domestic politics are now seen 
as “interrelated,” implying that they should be “analyzed simultaneously, as wholes” (Gourevitch 
1978 p.911). Some researchers have therefore called for more research into “linkage politics” 
(James and Rioux 1998 p. 783; Lamborn 1997 p. 201) in order to thrash out the interconnections 
between international and domestic politics. Similarly, Knopf (1998 p. 692) has illustrated, 
through quantitative analysis, that citizen activism played a role in US’s willingness to engage in 
arms cooperation with the former-USSR, thereby showing that domestic pressure could directly 
influence a state’s preferences for international cooperation.  
In line with this emerging focus on the consideration of domestic components of 
international politics, this research focuses of the domestic determinants of states’ participation 
in IEAs. The models are developed mostly through a reliance of “second image theories,” which 
focus on the role played by specific domestic constraints on the international behavior of states. 
However, reliance on these second order analyses does not necessarily mean that we can 
overlook the fact that the states are all intricately involved in, as well as determining, the 
international structure of the world system. I argue that the international structure is not an entity 
which self-generates – rather, it is generated through the international configuration of states, 
which predominantly reflects the various domestic conditions and their individual national 
capabilities. Thus, factors which underlie the theory of Realism, such as relative power 
considerations, can play an important part in the calculations of states when deliberating on 
possible participation in IEAs. Similarly, international institutions can play a significant role in 
making a state more open to the adoption of international norms and standards. This analysis 
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therefore uses Realism and Liberalism as a core premise to generate possible hypotheses 
governing the participation of states in IEAs.  
4.2 Models and Hypotheses for the Analysis of State Participation in IEAs 
4.2.1 Analysis of treaty characteristics 
(i)  Model I: The Legal-Incentives model 
 
The first model, the Legal-Incentives model, is formulated to capture the influence of 
variation in treaty design on state participation in IEAs. This model relies on the literature on 
international environmental cooperation dealing with the design and structure of IEAs. 
Hypotheses for this model are formulated mostly based on the premise of previous work done in 
the area, as summarized in the literature review (Section 3.3). The specific hypotheses 
formulated for this part of the study are detailed below. 
Hypotheses 
 
Researchers have stated that certain positive incentive structures, such as financial 
transfers and Research and Development (R&D) cooperation, tend to enlist greater participation 
in IEAs, especially from developing countries (e.g. Barrett 1992b; Barrett and Stavins 2003 pp. 
361-367; Carraro 1999a; Helm and Sprinz 2000; Schmidt 2000; Underdal 1998 p. 106). 
Financial transfers may seem attractive to both the developed and developing countries in view 
of the added benefits to be accrued therefrom. For the developed countries, the possibility of 
providing financial assistance may likely imply some control over how that money is to be used 
within the developing economies, which also often imply control over the use of technology and 
processes. Thus, disbursing funds may be of benefit to local industries within the developed 
world. Similarly, the availability of funds for implementation of IEA provisions may be seen as 
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attractive by developing nations as this would mean financial empowerment to address 
environmental concerns and to improve production processes. However, ceteris paribus, while 
financial mechanisms within IEAs may be favored by both the developed and developing 
nations, it is likely that such financial transfers may be more influential on the decision of 
developing countries to participate in IEAs or not, due mostly to the fact they are normally less 
empowered economically than their developed counterparts. This argument leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
H1a1: The inclusion of provisions for financial assistance in IEAs tends to increase 
participation in IEAs. 
H1a2: The inclusion of provisions for financial assistance in IEAs tends to increase 
participation from developing countries. 
Many IEAs also provide for the possibilities of technical training and capacity-building, 
especially for developing party members which do not have the necessary technical and 
technological infrastructure for the implementation of the IEAs. Developed countries especially 
may prefer to provide technical training and capacity-building rather than having to disburse 
funds for developing countries to implementation the IEA provisions. For developing countries, 
possibilities for benefiting from technical know-how and much needed training can prove to be 
an attractive package for participation. I can thus formulate the following hypotheses: 
H1b1: The presence of clauses allowing for training and capacity-building tends to 
increase participation in IEAs.  
H1b2: The presence of clauses allowing for training and capacity-building tends to 
increase participation from developing countries. 
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It has also been suggested that the minimum ratification clause (or the threshold number) 
acts as an incentive for enhanced IEC by minimizing opportunities for free-riding, and by 
providing more instances for additional benefits (e.g. Barrett 2000; Black et al. 1993; Carraro et 
al. 2003). Further, states’ concerns with preventing loss in their relative or absolute power, and 
their interest in preventing loss of control on their national sovereignty may incite them to 
participate in IEAs only if they can be sure that a good enough proportion of the international 
community is committing to the same obligations and constraints stipulated within the relevant 
treaty texts. A high threshold number can therefore have a positive influence on participation in 
IEAs. 
H1c: The higher the threshold number, the greater is the level of participation in an IEA. 
 
While negotiating the texts of IEAs, there is always a concern with resolving the tension 
between IEA strength and IEA flexibility. It is critical to strike the right trade-off in order to 
secure maximum participation in the relevant IEAs. Several mechanisms have been utilized to 
increase the flexibility of IEAs viz. (i) the permissibility of reservations; (ii) the allowing of 
withdrawals from the treaty; and (iii) the provision of flexible dispute resolution methods. It is to 
be expected that countries prefer to sign flexible IEAs – for example, those offering the 
possibility of reservations (e.g. Birnie 1988; GAO 1992; Granda 1990; Hurrell and Kingsbury 
1992; Sand 1992). Flexibility helps to provide a reassurance mechanism that states can still 
maintain their own control over their political and socio-economic decision-making and they can 
always find means to ‘get out’ if the IEAs prove to be too costly to them. This suggests that we 
can expect IEA flexibility to exert a positive effect on participation level. Thus, the following 
hypothesis can be postulated: 
H1d: The more flexible an IEA is, the greater the level of participation in the IEA. 
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Closely related to the above argument is the fact that countries tend to prefer less binding 
commitments (Carraro 1999a). Strong IEA clauses clearly limit a state’s ability to maintain full 
control over its domestic policies, which in essence translate into a loss of power. A few 
researchers (e.g. Sand 1992) have stated that developing countries seem to prefer to participate 
more in those conventions which have no binding commitments, and which are merely 
declaratory. This may likely be true since developing countries are still lagging behind the 
developed countries in terms of their economic and industrial development, and may therefore 
not welcome constraints of their development processes. In this context, a weak IEA may indeed 
seem more preferable than a strong one. The following hypotheses will test the influence of IEA 
strength on participation levels. 
H1e1: The stronger the IEA is, the lower the level of participation. 
H1e2: The stronger the IEA is, the lower the level of participation from developing 
countries. 
Game theorists often claim that the nature of information available to countries is of 
fundamental importance for the latter to determine their costs and benefits for engaging in IEC. It 
can therefore be assumed that mechanisms which help to reduce uncertainties and increase 
transparency are bound to favor IEC. Accordingly, several researchers have stated that reporting 
requirements, by increasing transparency on implementation, help to reduce fears about other 
parties’ free-riding and thereby increase the possibility of cooperation (Chayes and Chayes 1991; 
Chayes and Chayes 1995; Victor 1994). An increasing number of IEAs now include provisions 
for observership, either by NGOs or by other interested parties (e.g. other non-member states or 
United Nations (UN) agencies). I thus propose the following hypothesis to test the influence of 
transparency mechanisms on participation levels.  
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H1f: Presence of transparency requirements tends to increase the level of participation in 
the IEA. 
4.2.2 Analysis of state characteristics 
(i) Model II: The Power-Interest Model 
 
 Realist theory subscribes to the Hobbesian understanding of human nature, implying that 
human nature is evil, with a “lust to dominate” and driven by power motivations and security 
concerns (Kegley 1995 p.5; Smith 1986). With its state-centric focus on sovereignty, national 
security and power maximization, Realism considers that nation-states, viewed as unitary actors, 
are always struggling for power in an anarchic international system (e.g. Carr 1946; Morgenthau 
1948 p. 28). World order is maintained through a perpetual quest for power balancing (Rengger 
2000 p. 38). In this framework, therefore, states are concerned with ‘relative gains.’  
The Power-Interest model captures the major influence of Realist considerations on state 
participation in IEAs. Applying the Realist thesis to the field of participation in IEAs, I argue 
that states participate in IEAs only if the latter serve their national interests or enhance their 
power potential. In this model, national self-interests are to be understood as endeavors aimed at 
reducing environmental vulnerability and preventing negative economic impacts on the 
countries. I also use this model to test whether power, a core concept in Realist thought, has any 
influence on countries’ levels of participation in IEAs. Traditionally, the following has been 
considered as basic sources of power: geographic size and position, natural resources, 
population, raw materials, military power, and industrial capacity (Mingst 2001 p. 106; 
Morgenthau 1948). I analyze some of these sources of power to determine their influence, if any, 
on participation level.  
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Hypotheses 
 
A country which is strong militarily can be assumed to be able to impose its wishes on its 
neighbors and, in cases where the international community is involved, on the international 
community as well. Military power ensures that the state will be better able to safeguard its 
national security and its national self-interests. Thus, a country with great military power will be 
able to ward off international pressure for international environmental protection. It will 
participate only in those IEAs which do not pose any threat to its national security and self-
interests and will shun those which do not benefit it. Also, it will not be too much concerned with 
international environmental standard-setting as it can easily dictate its needs to relevant countries 
through bilateral agreements. Hence, all things being equal, it is likely that substantial military 
power, or the desire to become more powerful militarily, will be positively related to a low level 
of  participation in IEAs. This argument leads to my first hypothesis: 
H2a: The greater the military power of a country, the lower its level of participation in 
IEAs.  
However, the power of a state is not the exclusive domain of the military arena. It is 
generally acknowledged that high economic development enhances the power potential of a 
state. Apart from the fact that an economic hegemon can easily impose its wishes on the 
international community, developed countries also have to contend with domestic demands. 
Developed countries generally tend to have a more environmentally aware population and 
greater local environmental activism. Starting from the general premise that the catering to 
domestic public opinion is a strategy to maintain power and political stability, I expect that 
developed countries will be engaging more strongly in environmental protection in order to 
appease domestic public pressure. This higher level of domestic environmental regulation, 
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however, may negatively impact the competitiveness of the developed countries in the 
international market. As noted by several analysts, in view of the possibility of other countries 
‘free-riding’ as well as producing pollution havens for industrial production, there is a possibility 
that the developed countries may suffer loss of their competitive advantage if environmental 
standards are not implemented globally (Congleton 1992 p. 412; Sage 1996). Relying on the 
general observation that developed countries are concerned with domestic environmental 
pressure and with the need to maintain economic and industrial power by deterring free-riding, I 
argue that developed countries will participate extensively in IEAs. This argument leads to my 
second hypothesis:  
H2b: The higher the level of economic and industrial development of a country, the 
higher its level of participation in IEAs. 
Closely linked to the notion of environmental security is the concept of environmental 
vulnerability. A state with a high degree of environmental vulnerability will face increased risk 
to its national security and hence will make increased efforts to engage in enhancing 
environmental protection. When threats to national security emanate from outside the territories 
of the state, the latter will make efforts to secure adherence to international norms and standards 
and to assurance mechanisms which provide security to its citizens. Environmentalists 
commonly consider high population density as aggravating a state’s environmental vulnerability 
in view of the pressure exerted on the environment by the sheer number of people. Thus, states 
with high population density will feel the need to implement environmental measures to reduce 
their vulnerability, and in the process, will favor internationalization of environmental norms in 
order not to be at a competitive disadvantage globally.  
 73
Moreover, geographic contiguity, which in routine conflict studies tends to be correlated, 
together with military capability, with conflict-prone behavior and war-proneness (Doyle 1983 p. 
878; Maoz and Russett 1993 p. 902; Vasquez 1993), takes on added importance in the field of 
IEC. Geographic contiguity, by virtue of its ability to render a state vulnerable (e.g. through the 
transboundary flows of pollutants) and thus less powerful, becomes a crucial variable potentially 
influencing states’ participation in IEAs. A state which has a greater number of contiguous 
neighbors is more vulnerable to cross-border transport of environmental pollution than a state 
with a smaller number of such neighbors. Thus, to reduce its environmental vulnerability, the 
state will be more open to international standards. Based on these arguments, I formulate the 
next two hypotheses as follows: 
H2c: A state with a high population density will participate in more IEAs than one with a 
low population density. 
H2d: A state with a higher number of contiguous neighbors will participate in more IEAs 
than a state with a smaller number of contiguous neighbors. 
Since Realist thought is preponderantly premised on the concept of national security, it 
can be stated that environmental protection, especially international environmental protection, 
will always take second place to national security. When there are issues related to domestic 
political destabilization, environmental protection will in fact become ‘low politics’50 and take 
the back seat. I therefore propose that countries with political instability will participate less in 
IEAs than those with political stability. 
H2e: A politically stable country will participate in more IEAs than one with political 
instability.   
                                                 
50 Researchers have traditionally made the distinction between the  “low politics” of the environment as compared to 
the “high politics” of  military and security issues (Keohane and Nye 1997 p.718; List and Rittberger 1998 p. 68; 
Schmidt 2002  p. 11). 
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It is also acknowledged that the scarcity of environmental resources has the potential of 
destabilizing internal security by giving rise to “internal decay and collapse” (Homer-Dixon 
1991; Kaplan 1994). In order to avoid these threats to national security, states with access to 
limited resources will therefore try to regulate the environment both nationally and 
internationally in order to prevent internal destabilization. On the other hand, states with 
extensive natural resource bases, and with greater extent of raw materials, do not have to factor 
struggles over access to these resources within their short-term political decision-making. They 
will be able to exploit these resources unhampered and will not welcome extensive 
environmental regulations which may limit the use of these resources and thereby result in 
decreased economic, industrial and technological power. Hence, these states will not favor 
extensive participation in IEAs. This argument leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2f: The larger the natural resource base of a country, the lower its level of participation 
in IEAs.  
(ii) Model III: The Liberal-Interdependent Model 
Liberalism is generally associated with the freedom of the individual and the attendant 
rights and institutions (Doyle 1983 p. 871), a belief in the superiority of markets as compared to 
state regulation (Fukuyama 1992 p.44; Keohane 1989 pp. 10, 11), minimal government, and a 
liberty to participate in public affairs (Rosenau and Durfee 2000 p. 34). Institutions are deemed 
to change the payoff structure and catalyze cooperation though processes of iteration, the 
enhancement of transparency, the monitoring of violators’ actions,  and through the creation of a 
long ‘shadow of the future’ (Keohane 1984; Oye 1986).  
In contrast with Realism, the Liberal school of thought considers states to be concerned 
with the maximization of ‘absolute gains’ as opposed to ‘relative gains.’ However, states are not 
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central to international politics. Also important are transnational and non-state actors. Keohane 
and Nye’s (1997 p.718) concept of  “complex interdependence” challenges Realism’s core 
assumptions about the primacy of force in an international system characterized by state actors 
struggling for the maximization of power (also Keohane 1984). Complex interdependence is 
about a world in which non-state and transnational actors have a role to play in world politics, 
acting as “transmission belts” between governments (Keohane and Nye 1997 pp. 719, 720). 
Complex interdependence is also characterized by the absence of a “clear hierarchy of issues,” 
such that there is no perpetual dominance of military security concerns (Keohane and Nye 1997 
p. 719). Moreover, military force is often seen as an “ineffective instrument of policy,” not 
always relevant for the resolution of disagreements (Keohane and Nye 1997 p. 719). 
The Liberal-Interdependent model relies on the general propositions of the Liberal 
paradigm to arrive at possible determinants of state participation in IEAs. This model is a pure 
“second image” model in view of the fact that the premise of liberalism is grounded in domestic 
and transnational parameters. As stated by Legro (1999 p.10), “liberal assumptions underlie most 
of what are referred to as “second image” and many “second-image reversed” theories.” This 
model tests hypotheses relating global trade flows, the role of civic organizations, and the 
domestic political and institutional structures of countries as variables influencing their levels of 
participation in IEAs. The specific hypotheses proposed are given hereunder. 
Hypotheses 
The ‘Democratic Peace Theory’ posits that liberal democratic states cooperate more 
easily with liberal democracies than with non-democracies (Chander and Tulkens 1997; Russett 
et al. 1993). This means that a liberal democratic state will tend to be more inclined to 
international cooperation than a non-democratic one, provided there is an international 
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preference for democracy, as is the case presently. Applying this premise for international 
cooperation to the field of international environment, I propose that liberal democracies will be 
desirous to cooperate more with each other to ensure international environmental protection than 
with non-democracies. An IEA being an instrument of international environmental cooperation, I 
thus expect that democratic countries will tend to participate more in IEAs than non-democratic 
ones (which is a general statement also made by Congleton 1992, among others; Neumayer 
2002a; Sand 1992).  
H3a: Countries which have a democratic political system tend to participate more in 
IEAs than those which have non-democratic political structures. 
Moreover, strong and effective domestic governmental institutions can be considered as a 
prime element in ensuring meaningful commitment to international environmental protection. 
Without the necessary institutional framework, participation in IEAs can pose structural and 
logistic challenges. To capture this line of thought, I propose the second hypothesis for this 
model: 
H3b: Countries with strong governmental institutions tend to participate in more IEAs 
than those with weak institutions 
A state’s level of participation in international environmental institutions may render that 
state more amenable to accepting international standards and obligations embodied within treaty 
texts by virtue of the state’s higher exposure to international norms, principles and standards than 
another state which shies away from the international institutions. Thus, countries which are 
more densely involved in international environmental institutions can be assumed to be more 
likely to participate in IEAs in view of their greater acculturation to international environmental 
norms and standards. I propose the following hypothesis: 
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H3c: Countries which participate in international environmental institutions tend to 
participate in a greater number of IEAs than countries which do not participate in such 
institutions.  
Analysts have shown that liberal economies tend to be typified by high levels of 
privatization and a good quality of life (e.g. Asthana and Shukla 2002). Moreover, liberal 
economies can also be characterized by economic freedom and high volumes of trade. If we 
consider that liberal states tend to participate in more IEAs than non-liberal ones, the following 
hypotheses can be postulated: 
H3d: Countries with a higher quality of life will participate in a greater number of IEAs 
than those with a lower quality of life. 
H3e: Countries with a liberal economy will participate in more IEAs than those with 
lesser economic freedom. 
H3f: Countries with high volumes of trade will participate in more IEAs than those with 
low volumes of trade. 
 Under the liberal framework, citizens are deemed to be free to participate in national 
policy-making and in organizing based on their interests. Agenda 21 includes several sections 
dealing with the strengthening of civil society in order to facilitate citizens’ participation in 
policy formulation for sustainable development (OECD 2001 p.109). Thus, for sound 
environmental policies, it can be deemed that citizens who are environmentally aware will 
organize better to strengthen the civil society as well as to promote environmental protection 
than those who are illiterate and unaware of the issues. I thus argue that local civic 
environmentalism will foster greater participation in IEAs.  
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H3g: Countries with a greater extent of civic environmentalism will participate in a 
greater number of IEAs than one with low civil society engagement.  
(iii) Model IV: The Developing-Logistics Model 
Prior to the Rio Conference, the Forum of International Law of the Environment, which 
was convened in Siena from 17-21 April 1990, considered the issue of IEA participation and the 
means of widening such participation, with particular emphasis on overcoming the difficulties 
met by developing countries in ratifying such treaties (Maffei et al. 1996). The desirability of 
securing the participation of developing countries in treaties has also been recognized in Agenda 
21.51  However, securing commitment from developing countries needs to overhaul many of the 
traditional N-S acrimonies which have typified international debates for decades.  
Developing countries view the developed world’s call for greater environmental 
protection with distrust, equating it with attempts to subvert their economic development or trade 
(Springer 1988 p.51; Wells 1996 p.6), while at the same time enhancing their own economic 
interests (Harvard Law Review 1992). The North, on the other hand, believes that the South only 
indulges in “pressure tactics” to obtain foreign aid (Najam 1993). Issues on which there has 
always been discord are the seemingly diverging goals of environmental protection and the need 
for development. While the North focuses on measures to protect the environment, the 
developing countries tend to be concerned with “market access, investment, access to 
technology, and financing” (Rosenberg 1994).  
The fourth model of this study, the developing-logistics model, aims to provide a means 
of assessing determinants of developing country participation in IEAs. Variables which will be 
                                                 
51 Agenda 21. Chapter 39.1(c). Available at the web page of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 
Division for Sustainable Development. 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm  
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analyzed are those that bear special significance to developing countries – for example, foreign 
aid dependency, corruption, poor sanitation, malnutrition, and high rates of infant mortality, inter 
alia. The hypotheses for this model are given below. 
Hypotheses 
 
For successful formulation and implementation of environmental policies, a state needs to 
benefit from political stability and a well-functioning government system (Brinkerhoff and Gage 
2002; Cowhey 1993), low levels of corruption (Morrell and Poznanski 1985), a strong civil 
society, an environmentally aware population, and good economy (Evans 2000; Von Prittwitz 
1990). These influences seem to be more decisive for developing countries as they seem to be 
more prone to problems associated with corruption, high levels of debt, unstable governing 
structures, and poor quality of life, inter alia.  
High poverty levels within the developing world cannot be dissociated from the latter’s 
high debt burdens and high dependency on foreign aid. Debt servicing allocates much needed 
resources away from programs to improve citizens’ quality of life, with the result that there is no 
social and environmental improvement. Poverty thus establishes a vicious circle, where poverty, 
combined with other stressors such as population growth, perpetuates a deterioration of 
environmental and social living conditions. The scourge of poverty is also often compounded by 
internal problems associated with political corruption and drug trafficking. Marshall J. (1991) 
has documented extensively the corruption of political leaders and their connection with or their 
protection of major drug traffickers in third world countries such as Mexico, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Thailand, and Peru, among others. Unfortunately, few studies have elaborated on the degree of 
corruption and no empirically validated links have been established between corruption levels 
and participation in IEAs. 
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Assuming that commitment to domestic environmental protection also leads to 
international environmental commitment, I argue that developing countries’ participation in 
IEAs is determined by factors such as malnutrition, high rates of infant mortality, poor 
sanitation, corruption, and foreign aid dependency, inter alia. These social challenges are 
deemed to erode the capacity of the developing countries to commit to international 
environmental protection measures. I thus formulate the following hypotheses to test the 
influence of these parameters on the participation of developing countries in IEAs: 
H4a: A developing country with a greater control on corruption will tend to participate 
in more IEAs than one with a lower level of such control. 
H4b: A developing country with a higher level of undernutrition will participate in fewer 
IEAs than a developing country with a lower level of undernutrition. 
H4c: A developing country with a higher level of infant mortality will participate in fewer 
IEAs than a developing country with a lower level of infant mortality. 
H4d: A developing country with a higher level of sanitation will participate in a greater 
number of IEAs than a developing country with a lower level of sanitation. 
H4e: A developing country with a greater extent of foreign aid dependency will 
participate in fewer IEAs than one with a smaller dependence of foreign aid. 
 Developing countries are typically not empowered to produce military equipment. They 
rely mostly on arms imports from other countries to build their military arsenal. It is quite a 
paradox that while many developing countries cannot allocate much scarce resources for the 
improvement of their citizens’ quality of life, they nevertheless spend enormous amounts of 
economic resources on empowering their military divisions. This state of affairs can sometimes 
be related to problems of civil war, or to insecurities elicited by neighboring hostile countries or 
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external powers exerting their military prowess in an international structure governed by anarchy 
and concerns with relative power gains. It can thus be assumed that developing countries which 
are investing heavily in empowering their military divisions through massive arms imports will 
be less likely to be concerned with the international environmental protection. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
H4f: Countries which are engaged in higher levels of arms imports will tend to 
participate less in IEAs than countries which do not import high amounts of arms. 
On the more positive side, it may be expected that developing countries which exhibit 
greater economic development or which are more open to trade may likely be more willing to 
participate in more IEAs than those which do not exhibit such tendencies.  
H4g: Developing countries which exhibit greater economic development or which are 
more open to trade tend will participate in more IEAs than those which have lower 
economic development or trade transactions. 
 Finally, it can be hypothesized that developing countries which benefit from greater 
levels of democracy and greater levels of local environmental activism will participate more in 
IEAs in view of the positive role that democracy plays in empowering the population and in 
opening up national debates on environmental protection. 
H4h: Developing countries which are more democratic will participate in more IEAs 
than those which are less democratic. 
H4i: Developing countries with a higher level of civic environmentalism will participate 
in more IEAs than their counterparts with a lower level of such civic activism. 
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(v) The Interactive Model 
 While models II-IV above provide a snapshot of potential determinants of participation, 
they nevertheless provide only a partial understanding of participation. It is not likely that a 
‘pure’ Realist or a ‘pure’ Liberal explanation of participation can provide a true picture of how 
decisions are made by national leaders. While the dichotomization of theorizing on IEA 
participation provided by Models II and III above provide a parsimonious understanding of 
potential determinants of participation, there is a need to test the independent effect of each of 
the crucial variables of each model, while holding constant the variables of all the other 
competing models. This is the purport of this fifth model, the interactive model.  
  The interactive model posits that both Realist and Liberal considerations may likely play 
a role in influencing state participation in IEAs. While a state may participate in more IEAs if it 
faces a greater level of environmental vulnerability, that state may also be less likely to 
participate in IEAs if it has weak governmental institutions, if it has low density of interaction in 
international environmental institutions, or if it is simply logistically constrained by endemic 
factors such as poverty and corruption. Similarly, even if a state is powerful militarily, it may 
still be open to participation in IEAs in view of pressures placed on its decision-making 
mechanisms by civic environmentalism or a democratic political system which opens up avenues 
for citizens’ contest of the decisions of political figures. It is also possible for a state with a high 
participation in international environmental institutions or with high levels of economic freedom 
and high volumes of trade to resist participation in IEAs because of concerns with the negative 
impacts on those of its industries which are heavily reliant on natural resource exploitation.  
 Which of the above scenarios actually play out in real policy-making? It is likely that 
environmental vulnerability may play an important part in a nation’s decision to participate in an 
 83
IEA, irrespective of its level of economic or political development. Thus, variables such as  
contiguity and population may matter in the overall decision-making process. Further, concerns 
with maintaining power cannot be overruled in political calculations. This means that we need to 
include military expenditures and the extent of natural resource base of a state to control for this 
concern with power enhancement and sustenance. Apart from these Realist variables, it is likely 
that the political system is also open to Liberal considerations in national policy-making. The 
nature of the political regime certainly matters as it acts as the basic source of all national and 
international policies. The permeability of the state to the influence of international 
environmental institutions will also likely influence the propensity of the state to participate in 
IEAs. Finally, the influence of inherent domestic constraints such as poverty and corruption need 
to be considered in tandem with the other variables.  
4.3 Conclusion 
As I have presented in the conceptual model (Figure 1) in Chapter One, participation in 
IEAs can be considered to be influenced parsimoniously by: (i) IEA characteristics; and (ii) state 
characteristics. The various models proposed in this study test various treaty and state 
characteristics which may potentially impact a state’s decision to participate in an IEA or not. 
Model I focuses on specific treaty variables such as strength, flexibility, and threshold number. 
Models II and III test variables that matter in the Realist and Liberal schools of thought. Model 
IV analyzes endemic structural constraints of the developing world. Finally, to provide an 
integrated understanding of state participation in IEAs, Model V tests the independent effect of 
the crucial variables of Models II-IV, with all the other predictors being held constant.  
In the next Chapter, I establish the research design for the study and present the results of 
the analysis.
  
5.  RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
 The previous chapter delineated the hypotheses to be tested in this study. In the present 
Chapter, I specify the research design for the analysis and provide the results of the study. I 
conclude this chapter with a general discussion of the findings of the study.  
5.1 Research Design 
 
In this study, the dependence of IEA participation on specific country and treaty 
characteristics is investigated using multiple linear regression analysis. For the analysis of IEA 
design, the dependent variable is the total number of countries that are participants to each 
specific treaty. For the analysis of state characteristics, the dependent variable, IEA participation 
(P), is the total number of global IEAs ratified by any specific country. The general formula 
summarizing this study can be given as: 
P = F {f1(IEA characteristics), f2(state characteristics)} 
This analysis is divided into two parts: 
(i) analysis of the influence of IEA characteristics on state participation in IEAs; and  
(ii) analysis of the influence of state characteristics on state participation in IEAs.  
5.2 Model Building 
5.2.1 Model I: Influence of IEA design on IEA participation 
This section of the study uses the legal provisions of IEA texts as the unit of analysis. The 
analysis therefore relies on extensive content analysis with appropriate coding of the IEAs based 
on variables of interest. Thirty-one treaties (as given at Annex 3) were selected so as to have 
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roughly the same number of IEAs from various issue areas. The IEAs were selected as follows: 
10 IEAs dealing with natural resources and nature conservation; 7 IEAs dealing with the 
atmosphere; 6 IEAs dealing with hazardous substances and nuclear radiation; and 8 IEAs dealing 
with marine waters and marine resources.  Moreover, eight of the IEAs were framework 
conventions and six were protocols.  
The dependent variable, participation, was compiled based on membership data obtained 
from the ENTRI database of SEDAC/CIESIN. For this model, three dependent variables are 
used: (i) total participation, PT, calculated as a percentage of total allowable parties; (ii) 
developed country participation, PDD, calculated by dividing the total number of developed 
country members by the total number of developed countries allowed to participate; and (iii) 
developing country participation, PDG, obtained by dividing the total number of developing party 
members by the total number of developing countries allowed to participate.52  
This part of the analysis relies on the hypotheses formulated in Section 4.3.4 and the 
main themes to be examined pertain to treaty provisions relating to strength, flexibility, 
transparency, financial transfers, capacity building, and threshold number.  
The following equation summarizes the investigation: 
PT/DD/DG  = α+ ß1(strength) + ß2(transparency) + ß3(financial mechanism) + ß4(threshold 
number) + ß5(capacity-building) + ß6(flexibility) + ξ 
Operationalization of variables 
 A strong IEA characteristically embodies clear quantitative targets, implementation 
deadlines, requirements for enactment of legislation, review and verification mechanisms, and 
                                                 
52 All the IEAs considered in the analysis were global IEAs. The total number of countries included in the dataset is 
196, with 44 developed and 152 developing states. Thus, for total participation, PT, actual participation level was 
divided by 196, and by 44 and 152 to yield the percentages for developed and developing country participation 
respectively.  
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membership or trade sanctions, among others. To construct the ‘strength’ variable, the total score 
of the IEAs was calculated based on the presence (or absence) of each of these measures for 
‘strength.’ Transparency was obtained by adding the score for: whether the IEA allows NGOs 
and other organizations to act as observers in the proceedings of the treaty affairs; the 
requirement to prepare yearly reports either by the parties or by the treaty bodies; and the 
requirements for parties to report on their implementation measures. Capacity-building relates to 
whether the IEA allows for education, training or specifically refers to the term ‘capacity-
building’ in its provisions. Flexibility of the IEA is determined by whether the agreement allows 
individual party to propose amendments and whether the IEA allows parties to settle disputes 
through negotiations first. The threshold number is obtained direct from the IEA text which 
normally specifies the minimum number of ratifications required before the IEA can enter into 
force. Similarly, the text also normally specifies whether financial transfers can occur. 
Presence of specific treaty provisions was coded as 1; absence was coded as 0. The coding 
template is provided in Table 1 below and the full dataset is as given at Table 16 at Annex 4. 
Table 17 at Annex 5 summarizes the descriptives of the dependent and independent variables for 
Model I.  
Table 1: Operationalization of variables for Model 1 
MODEL IV 
Legal-Incentives 
  
CODE Legal provisions analyzed VALUES 
Strength Presence of: 
(i) legislative requirements [1,0]; 
(ii) review [1,0] and verification mechanisms [1,0]; 
(iii) target deadlines [1,0]; 
(iv) trade [1,0] or membership sanctions [1,0]; 
(v) requirement for participation for specific 
countries (or group of countries) before into 
force [1,0] 
Maximum possible 
value of 7; 
minimum 0. 
Transparency Presence of: 
(i) observership by NGOs [1,0] and other 
interested parties [1,0]; 
(ii) presence of reporting requirements [1,0]; 
(iii) requirements for submission of yearly reports 
Maximum possible 
value of 5; 
minimum 0. 
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by parties [1,0]  and by treaty bodies [1,0] 
 
Threshold Minimum participation requirement 
 
As stipulated in 
treaty text: 
minimum value of 
3; maximum of 60 
 
Dispneg Provisions for dispute resolution by negotiation first  
 
Minimum of 0; 
maximum of 1. 
 
Amendpty Provision for any party to propose amendments to the treaty 
 
Minimum of 0; 
maximum of 1. 
 
Fintransfers Provisions for financial transfers among parties Minimum of 0; 
maximum of 1. 
 
Capacity (i) Provisions for education, training, or capacity-
building [1,0] 
(ii) Provisions for technical and scientific 
cooperation [1,0] 
(iii) Provisions for cooperation on Research and 
Development [1,0] 
Minimum of 0; 
maximum of 3. 
 
5.2.2 Models II, III, IV and V: Influence of country characteristics on IEA participation 
 
 The unit of analysis for this portion of the research template is the ‘sovereign state.’ This 
analysis relates selected country variables to their total level of participation in IEAs. The 
participation of 196 nations in 110 global IEAs (as at Annex 2) is analyzed. The dependent 
variable, P, was compiled based on participation data obtained from the ENTRI database of 
SEDAC/CIESIN. The total number of global IEAs to which a specific country is a party member 
was totaled to give that country’s level of participation, P. Details on each of the models for this 
part of the analysis are provided below. 
(i) Model II: Power-Interest Model 
To establish the relationship between P and characteristics governing Model II (Power-
Interest model), the following equation is used:  
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P =  α + ß1 (industrial development) + ß2(economic development)  + ß3(political stability) 
+ ß4 (natural resources) +  ß5 (raw materials) + ß6(population density) + ß7(contiguity) 
ß8(military power) + ξ  
Operationalization of the independent variables 
Industrial and economic development can be obtained fairly accurately from the level of 
industrial and economic growth sustained by the relevant states. Thus, industrial development is 
operationalized by using the average annual percentage industrial growth and economic 
development was operationalized through use of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. 
A direct measure of political stability is not readily available. To operationalize ‘political 
stability,’ I have coded the countries dichotomously: countries which have experienced a military 
coup from 1945 onwards or which are presently engaged in civil wars have been coded as 1; 
those which have been free from such political turmoil have been coded as 0.   
 There is no single measure for the full natural resource base of a state. To operationalize 
this variable, I have considered the extent of forest resources and the extent of raw materials as 
proxies for the natural resources of the state. Within the context of global environmental 
protection, forest resources are highly prized in view of their various functions in maintaining 
ecological stability and protecting against global warming. Raw materials are also important in 
view of their association with pollutant loads, mostly through extractive processes, and with the 
concept of power. An overall index for the complete set of raw materials of countries could not 
be identified. As a proxy for the extent of raw materials, I have therefore used the total value of 
mineral production, relying on the assumption that states with a higher extent of mineral resource 
production (as deduced from the value of mineral production) will likely  be the depositories of a 
large extent of such raw materials.  
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An overall index of environmental vulnerability is non-existent. To capture the variable 
‘environmental vulnerability,’ I have used the proxies of population density and contiguity. It is 
widely acknowledged in the literature of environmental management that high population 
density exerts a pressure on the environment by either causing greater environmental degradation 
or greater depletion of the environmental resources.  Thus, high population density results in 
enhanced environmental vulnerability in view of the greater scarcity of resources, as well as the 
greater level of environmental deterioration engendered by the higher numbers of people per unit 
area. Contiguity also enhances a state’s environmental vulnerability as it makes the state more 
susceptible to cross-border transport of pollutants. A nation with a high density of contiguous 
neighbors will have porous international borders in terms of diffusion of pollutants. The state 
will thus be vulnerable to any possible laxity in environmental measures present in the 
neighboring states since pollution transfers do not respect geographical or jurisdictional 
boundaries.  
(ii) Model III: Liberal-Interdependent Model 
To establish the relationship between P and characteristics governing Model II (Liberal-
Interdependent model), the following equation is used: 
P = α + ß1 (democracy) + ß2(quality of life) + ß3(liberal economy) + ß4(strong 
governmental institutions) + ß5(trade volume) + ß6(participation in international 
environmental institutions) + ß7 (local environmental activism) + ξ  
Operationalization of the independent variables 
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The level of democracy is given by the Polity score obtained from the 2005 
Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) database,53 which is an average of the Polity scores for 
1993-2002. To measure the strength of governmental institutions, World Bank’s measure of 
governmental effectiveness is used. This measure assesses the “quality of public service 
provision, the quality of bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of civil 
service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies” 
(ESI, 2005).  The Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) is used to provide an indication of the quality of life in a country. HDI is a 
composite measure of the level of achievement of a country in three areas: longevity (measured 
by the life expectancy at birth), knowledge (measured by a combination of the adult literacy rate 
and the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio), and the standard of 
living (GDP per capita, PPP $US).54   
To operationalize ‘liberal economy,’ the proxy of ‘economic freedom’ is used, based on 
the argument that all liberal economies can be characterized by a certain degree of economic 
freedom. An index of economic freedom is available from the dataset provided in the 2002 
World Rankings database. Volumes of trade are measured directly by the total volumes of trade 
carried out in the state, and this is available from the World Development Indicators database. 
Civic environmentalism is generated by the local involvement of civic groups in environmental 
governance issues. UNCED’s Agenda 21 promotes the development of local development 
initiatives within communities worldwide to promote environmental sustainability. As a proxy 
for civic engagement, the total number of such local Agenda 21 initiatives in a particular country 
is used. As a measure of the level of state participation in international environmental 
                                                 
53 Accessible online at http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/ESI/ ; full dataset available at 
http://www.yale.edu/esi/  
54 More details on the calculation of the HDI are provided at http://www.undp.org/.  
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institutions, the participation of states in environmental intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) 
is used.  
(iii) Model IV: The Developing-Logistics Model 
To establish the relationship between P and characteristics governing Model IV 
(Developing-Logistics Model), the following equation is proposed: 
 P = α + ß1(corruption) + ß2(foreign aid dependence) + ß3(undernourishment) + 
ß4(infant mortality) + ß5(access to proper sanitation) + ß6(democracy)+  ß7(arms imports) 
+ ß8(volume of trade) + ß9(civic engagement) + ß10(economic development) + ξ 
Operationalization of the independent variables 
Many of the variables for model IV can be measured directly by existing data. For 
example, undernutrition, infant mortality, access to proper sanitation facilities, trade volume, and 
arms imports can be directly operationalized, respectively, by the percentage of population 
suffering from malnutrition, the rate of infant mortality, the percentage of population with access 
to proper sanitation facilities, the trade in goods as a percentage of GDP, and arms imports as a 
percentage of total trade. Corruption is operationalized through a measure obtained from the 
2005 ESI database, which provides an indication of the level of control on corruption within 
states. This measure (GRAFT) is based on surveys of households, firms and public officials. 
Foreign aid dependence is proxied by the level of official development assistance (ODA) 
received by a state per capita, relying on the presumption that the more ODA received by a state 
per capita, the greater the reliance of the state on foreign aid. This measure is directly available 
from the Human Development Report (HDR) of the UNDP.  Finally, democracy, civic 
environmentalism and economic development are measured in the same way as detailed for 
Model III above.  
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Model V: The Interactive Model 
Based on Section 4.3.2 (v), the following equation is proposed to capture the independent 
influence of variables from Models II, III and IV above.  
 P = α + ß1(corruption) + ß2(foreign aid dependence) +  ß3(contiguity) + ß4(volume 
of trade)+ ß5(military power) + ß6(democracy)+  ß7(participation in international 
environmental institutions) + ß8(mineral resources) + ß9(civic engagement) + ß10(quality 
of life) + ß11(HDI)+ ξ 
 The operationalization of these variables has already been described in the relevant 
sections above. Tables 5, 6 and 7 provide a summary of the independent variables for the various 
models as well as the sources of data.55 Table 18 at Annex 6 summarizes the descriptives of the 
dependent and independent variables for Models II, III and IV (and therefore V).   
Table 2: Independent variables for Model II 
POWER-INTEREST MODEL 
Dependent variable: Participation, P 
 
Independent Variables Description Source Measure of 
Gdpcap1 GDP per capita, 1999 
(PPP $US) 
Human 
Development 
Report (HDR), 
2001,56 Table 1 
 
Economic 
development 
Indgth Average annual 
percentage industrial 
growth, 1990-2000 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(WDI), 2002 
Table 4.1 
Industrial 
development 
Milcoup Political stability57  
 
Countries of the 
world and their 
leaders yearbook, 
1993; Wikipedia 
online 
encyclopedia58
Political stability 
                                                 
55 Model V is not included in the tables as the independent variables are the same as those from Models II, III and 
IV. 
56 Accessible online from http://hdr.undp.org/  
57 Countries which have experienced military coups from 1945 onwards or which are presently engaged in civil wars 
are coded as 1; the remaining countries are coded as 0. 
58 Accessible through www.wikipedia.org/  
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Forest 
 
 
Forest area, as a 
percentage of total 
land area, 2000 
 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(WDI), 2002 
Table 3.4  
Extent of natural 
resources 
Mineral Mineral Production 
Value in US$(m), 
2001 
World Rankings, 
2001,59 Table 
12.3 
Extent of raw 
materials 
Popdens 
 
Population density, 
people/km2, 2000 
WDI, 2002 
Tables 1.1 and 
1.6 
Environmental 
vulnerability 
Contiguity 
 
Total number of 
contiguous 
neighbors60
Wikipedia online 
encyclopedia 
Environmental 
vulnerability 
Milexp Military 
expenditures, % of 
central government 
expenditures, 1999 
WDI, 2002 Table 
5.7 
 
 
Power 
 
Table 3: Independent variables for Model III 
 
LIBERAL-INTERDEPENDENT MODEL 
Dependent variable: Participation, P 
 
   
Independent Variables Description Source Measure of 
Polity Democracy measure (high 
values correspond to high 
levels of democratic 
institutions); Average of 
1993-2002 Polity.61
Environmental 
Sustainability Index 
(ESI)62 2005;  
Democratic governance 
HDI Human Development 
Index, 1999 
HDR, 2001 Quality of life 
Ecofree Economic Freedom Index, 
2001 (lower values 
correspond to greater 
economic freedom) 
World Rankings, 2001, 
Table 8.12 
Liberal economy 
Goveff Strong governmental 
institutions, 2002 
World Bank63; also 
available from ESI 2005 
Strength of governmental 
institutions 
Tgoods Trade in goods, % of 
GDP, 2000 
WDI 2002, Table 6.1 
 
Volume of trade 
Eionum Number of memberships 
in environmental 
intergovernmental 
organizations (out of 100), 
2003-2004 
ESI 2005 International acculturation 
to environmental norms 
and standards 
                                                 
59 Kurian, George Thomas. 2001. The Illustrated Book of World Rankings. Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe Reference.  
60 The total number of contiguous neighbors for each country was totaled, based on information provided on each 
country as provided by the Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia. 
61 Also available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/#exec  
62 Accessible online at http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/ESI/ ; full dataset available at 
http://www.yale.edu/esi/  
63 Data available from http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002/index.html  
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Agenda21 
 
 
Number of Local Agenda 
21 initiatives per million 
population, 2001 
ESI, 2005 Civil society engagement 
in environmental 
governance 
 
Table 4: Independent Variable for Model IV 
 
DEVELOPING-LOGISTICS MODEL 
Dependent Variable: Participation, P 
 
Variable Code Description Source Measure of 
Graft Corruption measure 
(high scores 
correspond to 
effective control of 
corruption), 2002 
ESI 2005 Corruption 
Undernutrition Prevalence of 
undernourishment, % 
of population, 1996-
1998 
WDI 2002, 
Table 2.18 
Quality of life 
Sanitation Access to sanitation 
facilities, % of 
population, 2000 
WDI 2002, 
Table 1.3 
Quality of life 
Imortality Under five mortality 
rate per 1000 live 
births, 1999 
HDI 2001, 
Table 8 
Quality of life 
Odacap ODA received per 
capita , US$, 1999 
HDR, 2001 
Table 15 
 
Foreign aid 
dependency 
Arms Arms trade, Imports 
as % of total imports, 
1999 
WDI, 2002 
Table 5.7 
Arms imports 
Gdpcap1 GDP per capita, 1999 HDI 2001, 
Table 1 
Economic 
development 
Tgoods Trade in goods, % of 
GDP, 2000 
WDI, 2002, 
Table 6.1 
Volume of trade 
Polity Democracy measure 
(high values 
correspond to high 
levels of democratic 
institutions), average 
of 1993-2002.64
Environmental 
Sustainability 
Index (ESI)65 
2005;  
Democratic 
governance 
Agenda21 Number of Local 
Agenda 21 initiatives 
per million 
population, 2001 
ESI, 2005 Civil society 
engagement in 
environmental 
governance 
 
 The variables for Model V are extracted from Models II-IV and these have already been 
described above. 
                                                 
64 Also available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/#exec  
65 Accessible online at http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/ESI/  
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5.3 ANALYSIS 
The various models have been analyzed through multiple linear regression analysis with 
Stata 8.0. Preliminary analyses of Pearson’s correlation coefficients do not show any strong 
correlations among the independent variables (Tables 9-13 at Annex 7). For Model I, the highest 
correlation is between threshold number and provisions for financial transfers (fintransfers), with 
a correlation of 0.821. For Model II, the highest correlation is between GDP per capita (gdpcap1) 
and mineral production value in its natural log form (mineral_t), being of a value of 0.387. For 
Model III, the highest correlation of 0.686 is between local Agenda 21 initiatives in its natural 
log form (agenda21_t) and governmental effectiveness (goveff). The highest correlation in 
Model IV is of 0.652 between infant mortality (mort) and the population’s access to sanitation 
facilities (sanitation). For Model V, mineral production value, in its natural log form, shows a 
correlation of 0.6291 with HDI, the highest for the model.  
The high correlation of 0.821 in Model I does not seem to constiture a collinearity problem 
for Model I. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the different regressors of Model I all range 
below 5, showing that collinearity is not affecting the regression coefficients. Models II, III, IV 
and V also do not depict collinearity problems, as shown by their low VIF values (see Annex 8). 
Two-way scatter plots between the dependent and independent variables show that some of 
the relationships are not linear. For example, the graph of participation and ODA/capita, or of 
participation and population density are not linear. For multiple linear regression to provide 
unbiased estimates of the parameters, variables can be transformed to establish a linear 
relationship where such is not apparent. Using the ‘ladder’ function in Stata 8.0, the best 
transformation for the non-linear variables was obtained based on the chi-square value of the 
transformation. For the non-linear variables of population density, mineral value production, 
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number of Agenda 21 initiatives, ODA/capita, and population suffering from undernutrition, the 
natural log transformations were the best, with the smallest chi-square. These transformations 
were further checked for linearity by their partial plots.  
 A preliminary analysis was done for all the models and the plots of residuals versus 
predicted values were analyzed to detect any patterns in the plots. Though there was no definite 
pattern in the plots, which hints at lack of heteroscedasticity, the regressions were rerun with 
robust standard errors to control for any non-visual heteroscedasticity that may be present in the 
data. Moreover, to test the normality assumptions underlying the multiple linear regression 
analyses, I made use of the Jarque-Bera (JB) test, which provides a test for any non-normality in 
the residuals. The hypotheses for the JB test are as follows: 
Ho: The residuals are normally distributed  
Ha:  The residuals are not normally distributed 
For all models, the JB test fails to reject the null hypothesis of the distribution being normal 
at a significance level of 0.05. In other words, the JB test shows that no statistically significant 
claim can be made that the distribution is not normal.66
The results of the regression analyses are presented in Tables 5-11 below.  
5.4 RESULTS 
5.4.1 REGRESSION RESULTS FOR MODEL I 
 
Table 5: Regression Results for Model I 
       
     
Model I 
Total 
Participation Unstandardized  Standardized   
                                                 
66 For Model I, the probability that the JB statistic of 1.41 would exceed the critical value is 0.4929 for the first 
regression; for the second regression, the JB is 2.24 and the prob > chi2 is 0.3263; for the third regression, the JB 
statistic is 0.29 and prob >chi2 is 0.8640. For Model II, the JB statistic is 0.87 and prob > chi2 is 0.6484; for Model 
III, JB = 0.66, and prob >chi2 is 0.7176; for Model IV, the JB statistic is 0.01 and prob >chi2 is 0.9970. For Model 
V, the JB statistic is 0.50 and prob >chi2 is 0.7791.  
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coefficients coefficients PT
     B Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Beta t Significance 
Constant 19.381 8.376  2.31 0.030 
Strength -12.247 5.370 -0.453 -2.28 0.032**
Transparency 7.728 3.273 0.441 2.36 0.027**
Threshold 0.291 0.441 0.155 0.66 0.515 
Dispneg 19.404 10.650 0.331 1.82 0.081*
Amendpty 6.334 9.946 0.095 0.64 0.531 
Fintransfers 2.488 15.463 0.036 0.16 0.874 
Capacity -1.085 5.707 -0.043 -0.19 0.851 
 
N 31 
R2 0.5009 
F-statistic(7, 23) 8.47***
*** significant at the 0.005 level 
** significant at the 0.05 level 
* significant at the 0.1 level 
 
For the above model, the F-value of 8.47 is statistically significant at p < 0.005, showing 
good model fit. In line with theoretical expectations, stronger agreements show a negative 
association with participation, and flexible provisions such as emphasizing negotiations as a 
means of dispute settlement or allowing any party to propose amendments to the IEA texts, show 
a positive relationship with participation. The variable ‘capacity’ is showing a negative 
relationship with participation, implying that there is a tendency among states to view provisions 
for capacity-building in an unfavorable light.  
Variables which are statistically significant at the 5% level are ‘strength’ and 
‘transparency’, while ‘dispneg’ (dispute settlement through negotiation) is statistically significant 
at the 10% level. The threshold number, together with ‘amendpty’ (amendment by party), 
‘fintransfers’ (financial transfers), and ‘capacity’ are not statistically significant. 
From these results we can conclude that IEAs which have strong clauses tend to elicit 
lower participation rates, while IEAs which favor dispute resolution through negotiation tend to 
sustain higher levels of participation from the international community. Further, IEAs which 
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include transparency measures, such as allowing NGOs and other interested parties to act as 
observers, or requiring parties to report on their implementation, tend to elicit higher 
participation rates from the international community.  
With all other variables held constant, the incorporation of an additional clause for 
strengthening an IEA will result in a loss of participation from 12 states, while the inclusion of 
an additional clause for increasing the transparency of an IEA will cause the IEA to sustain 
participation from 7 additional states.  The legal possibility of resolving disputes through 
negotiations first will tend to increase participation in an IEA by 19 more states.  
From the beta weights of the variables, the strength of an IEA seems to exert the greatest 
influence on total participation, followed very closely by the transparency provisions of the IEA. 
With all other variables held constant, an increase of one standard deviation in the strength of an 
IEA will result in a decrease of 0.45 standard deviation in total participation, while an increase of 
one standard deviation in the transparency of the IEA will result in an increase of 0.44 standard 
deviation in total participation. Similarly, with all other variables held constant, an increase of 
one standard deviation in the variable ‘dispneg’ (dispute resolution through negotiation) will 
cause an increase of 0.33 standard deviation in participation.  
 
Table 6: Regression Results for Model I - Developed Countries 
       
     
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
 Standardized 
coefficients 
  
Model I 
Participation 
from developed 
countries 
PDD      B Robust 
standard 
error 
Beta T Significance 
Constant 35.584 12.820  2.78 0.011 
Strength -12.336 5.515 -0.472 -2.24 0.035**
Transparency 7.767 3.860 0.458 2.01 0.056*
Threshold 0.044 0.520 0.024 0.08 0.933 
Dispneg 20.639 10.862 0.364 1.90 0.070*
Amendpty -1.990 13.004 -0.031 -0.15 0.880 
Fintransfers -4.652 14.626 -0.069 -0.32 0.753 
Capacity 2.261 6.654 0.093 0.34 0.737 
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N 31   
R2 0.4178   
F-statistic(7, 23) 4.21***   
*** significant at the 0.005 level 
** significant at the 0.05 level 
* significant at the 0.1 level 
 
 The F-statistic (value of 4.21) is significant at p < 0.005, attesting to good model fit. 
Strong clauses within an IEA seem to detract from high participation from developed countries, 
while transparency provisions seem to attract more developed states to participate in the IEA. 
Moreover, developed countries seem not to favor clauses allowing any party to propose 
amendments to the treaty text, as well as clauses allowing financial transfers to take place among 
parties. On the other hand, developed countries seem to favor measures for capacity-building.  
Variable ‘strength’ is statistically significant at the 5% level, while ‘transparency’ and 
‘dispneg’ (dispute settlement through negotiation) are statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Variables ‘threshold’, ‘amendpty’, ‘fintransfers’ and ‘capacity’ do not show any statistical 
significance with participation from developed countries. 
The results show that developed countries tend to participate less in stronger agreements, 
and more in those agreements which include provisions enhancing transparency or favoring 
dispute settlement through negotiations. With all other variables held constant, the inclusion of 
one additional clause for strengthening an IEA will cause a decrease in participation from 12 
developed countries. One additional clause for enhancing the transparency of an IEA will result 
in an increase in participation from 7 more developed nations. Presence of a clause allowing 
dispute resolution through negotiation will result in an increase in participation from 20 
developed countries. 
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From the beta weights, the strength of an IEA seems to exert the greatest influence on 
participation from developed countries, followed by the presence of transparency clauses. With 
all other variables held constant, an increase of one standard deviation in the strength of an IEA 
will result in a decrease of 0.47 standard deviation in participation from developed countries, 
while an increase of one standard deviation in the transparency of an IEA will result in an 
increase of 0.46 standard deviation in participation from developed countries. Though not 
statistically significant, the presence of a clause allowing for financial transfers seems to have an 
adverse impact on participation from developed countries, as does a clause allowing parties to 
bring amendments to the IEA texts.  
 
Table 7: Regression Results for Model I - Developing Countries 
       
     
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
 Standardized 
coefficients 
  
Model IV 
Participation 
from 
developing 
countries 
PDG
     B Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Beta T Significance 
Constant 14.746 7.610  1.94 0.065 
Strength -12.042 5.442 -0.433 -2.21 0.037**
Transparency 7.791 3.258 0.432 2.39 0.025**
Threshold 0.328 0.438 0.170 0.75 0.461 
Dispneg 19.016 11.017 0.316 1.73 0.098*
Amendpty 8.383 9.526 0.122 0.88 0.388 
Fintransfers 4.509 16.527 0.063 0.27 0.787 
Capacity -1.875 5.739 -0.073 -0.33 0.747 
 
 
N 31 
R2 0.504 
F-statistic(7, 23) 9.22***
*** significant at the 0.005 level 
** significant at the 0.05 level
* significant at the 0.1 level 
 
 The F-statistic (value of 9.22) is statistically significant at a p-value of less than 0.005 
level. The direction of the regression coefficients show that developing countries tend not to 
favor strong IEAs and those which have provisions for capacity-building, and to prefer IEAs 
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which are transparent, include provisions for amendments by any party, allow for dispute 
resolution  through negotiations first, and include mechanisms for financial transfers.  
The variable ‘Strength’ and ‘transparency’ are both statistically significant at the 5% 
level, while ‘dispneg’ (dispute settlement through negotiation) is statistically significant at the 
10% level. The variables threshold, ‘amendpty’ (any party to bring amendment to IEA text), 
‘fintransfers’ (provisions for financial transfers) and ‘capacity’ do not depict statistical 
significance with participation from developing countries. 
The results show that developing countries tend to participate less in stronger IEAs than 
in weaker ones, and that they favor IEAs which enhance transparency and favor flexibility. With 
all other variables held constant, an additional clause meant to strengthen an IEA will result in a 
loss of participation from 12 developing countries, while an increase of an additional clause on 
transparency will result in an increase in participation from 7 developing nations. The possibility 
of resolving disputes through negotiation causes an increase in participation from 19 developing 
countries, if all other variables are held constant. 
Both the strength and transparency provisions of IEAs seem to exert the same level of 
influence on participation from developing countries. If there is an increase of one standard 
deviation in the strength of an IEA, participation from developing countries will decrease by 0.43 
standard deviation, while all other variables are held constant. Similarly, if transparency of the 
IEA increases by one standard deviation, participation from developing countries increases by 
0.43 standard deviation, when all other variables are held constant. 
5.4.2 REGRESSION RESULTS FOR MODELS II, III, IV and V 
(i) MODEL II: Power-Interest  
 
Table 8: Regression Results for Model II 
Model II Unstandardized   Standardized    
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coefficients coefficients 
     B Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Beta t Significance 
Constant 12.874 5.362  2.40 0.018 
Gdpcap1 0.0015 0.0002 0.600 6.74 0.000*** 
Indgth 0.018 0.196 0.004 0.09 0.926 
Forest -0.046 0.050 -0.049 -0.93 0.355 
Mineral_t67 1.862 0.419 0.270 4.44 0.000*** 
Contiguity 0.881 0.418 0.119 2.11 0.038** 
Popdens_t68 1.380 0.925 0.102 1.49 0.139 
Milexp -0.439 0.130 -0.200 -3.38 0.001*** 
Milcoup -2.910 2.150 -0.078 -1.35 0.179 
 
N 108 
R2 0.7469 
F-statistic(8,99) 41.58*** 
*** significant at less than 0.005 level 
** significant at less than 0.05 level 
 
The F-statistisc of 41.58 is statistically significant at p < 0.005 level, showing that Model 
II has statistically significant predictive capability. The signs of the estimated coefficients for 
economic and industrial development, and environmental vulnerability (population density and 
contiguity) depict a positive association between the predictors and the criterion, thus being in 
line with theoretical expectations. For natural resources, the proxy of forest area shows a 
negative relationship with participation, while the proxy of mineral resource production value 
associates positively with the independent variable. Political instability and military expenditures 
show a negative relationship with participation.  
From Model II, the following variables show statistical significance at the 0.5% level: 
gdpcap1 (GDP per capita), mineral_t (transformed mineral production value), contiguity, and 
milexp (military expenditures). Industrial growth, forest areas, population density and political 
instability are not statistically significant. Based on these results, we can argue that countries 
which are more closely surrounded by contiguous neighbors, which produce more mineral 
                                                 
67 Mineral_t stands for the natural log transformation of the variable mineral  i.e. Mineral_t = ln(mineral). 
68 Similarly, popdens_t  = ln(popdens).  
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resources for commercial exploitation, and which have high economic growth tend to participate 
in more IEAs than countries which are less vulnerable environmentally, are less involved in 
mineral resource production, or which have lower levels of economic development. The results 
also show that countries which spend a higher percentage of their national budget on military 
expenditures tend to participate in IEAs to a lesser extent than countries which spend a smaller 
percentage of their national budget on such military expenditures.  
With all other variables held constant, an increase in military expenditures by 1% of the 
central government expenditures in a state will cause a decrease in the state participation by 0.44 
IEAs. Similarly, with all other variables held constant, an increase of $US 1 in the GDP per 
capita of a state will result in an increase in state participation by 0.001 IEAs, and an increase in 
the number of contiguous neighbors by one will result in an increase in participation by 0.88 
IEAs.  
If we compare the beta weights for the independent variables, we can state the GDP per 
capita seems to have the greatest influence on participation, followed by the mineral production 
value (in its natural logarithmic form), expenditures on military, and the contiguity score. With 
all other independent variables held constant, an increase of one standard deviation in GDP per 
capita causes an increase of 0.6 standard deviation in participation. Similarly, with all other 
variables held constant, an increase of 1 standard deviation in the mineral production value (in its 
natural logarithmic form) will result in an increase of 0.27 standard deviation in participation, 
and an increase of 1 standard deviation in the expenditures on military, when calculated as a 
percentage of total government expenditures, will result in a decrease of 0.20 standard deviation 
in participation. Countries which have a contiguity score 1 standard deviation higher than 
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another country will have a participation which is 0.12 standard deviation higher, with all other 
variables held constant. 
(ii) MODEL III: Liberal-Interdependent 
Table 9: Regression Results for Model III 
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
  Standardized 
coefficients 
   Model III 
     B Robust 
standard error 
Beta t Significance 
Constant -23.174 15.643  -1.48 0.144 
HDI 22.954 13.130 0.185 1.75 0.086* 
Eionum 1.326 0.220 0.412 6.02 0.000*** 
Ecofree 12.163 4.401 0.248 2.76 0.008** 
Goveff 9.127 2.847 0.455 3.21 0.002*** 
Tgoods -0.084 0.026 -0.163 -3.23 0.002*** 
Polity 0.247 0.212 0.075 1.16 0.250 
Agenda21_t69 1.680 0.920 0.170 1.83 0.073* 
 
N 64 
R2 0.824 
F-statistic(7,56) 45.11*** 
***significant at the 0.005 level 
** significant at the 0.05 level 
* significant at the 0.1 level 
 
The F-statistic (45.11) is statistically significant at p< 0.005 level, demonstrating good 
model fit. The signs of all the regression coefficients meet theoretical expectations, except for the 
variable measuring volumes of trade (tgoods) and economic freedom (ecofree), which depict 
negative associations with participation. Higher values of ‘ecofree’ signify lower levels of 
economic freedom. Hence, the results show that lower degrees of economic freedom (i.e. higher 
values of ‘ecofree’) tend to be positively associated with higher levels of participation, which is 
in antithesis to the posited relationship.  
 Variables which are statistically significant at the 0.5% level are ‘eionum’ (participation 
in environmental IGOs), volumes of trade (tgoods), and governmental effectiveness (goveff). 
Economic freedom is statistically significant at the 5% level, while HDI and local Agenda 21 
                                                 
69 Agenda21_t = ln (Agenda21). 
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initiatives (in its natural logarithmic form) are statistically significant at the 10% level. The 
variable ‘polity’ does not show any statistical significance with participation in IEAs. 
The results show that countries which have higher levels of human development, have 
higher density of interaction in international environmental institutions, have stronger 
governmental institutions, and higher levels of civic environmentalism tend to participate in 
IEAs to a greater extent than countries which have lower degrees of each of the mentioned 
parameters. The results also show that countries which are involved in higher volumes of trading 
and which have a higher level of economic freedom tend to participate less in IEAs than 
countries with lower trade openness and lower levels of economic freedom. 
With all other independent variables held constant, an increase in governmental 
effectiveness by one score will cause a state to participate in 9 additional IEAs, and an increase 
of one unit in the HDI score will result in the state participating in 22 more states. Similarly, 
when other variables are held constant, an increase of one unit in membership in environmental 
IGOs will result in an increase in participation by 1 IEA. On the other hand, a decrease in 
economic freedom by one score will result in an increase in participation by 12 IEAs, while an 
increase in the amount of trade by 1% of GDP will result in a decrease in participation by 0.08 
IEAs, with all other variables held constant. If the number of local Agenda 21 initiatives 
increases by 1%, this will result in an increase in participation by 0.02 IEAs.70
If we compare the beta weights of the independent variables, we can state that 
governmental effectiveness and membership in environmental IGOs seem to exert the greatest 
influence on participation. With all other variables held constant, an increase of one standard 
deviation in governmental effectiveness will result in an increase of 0.45 standard deviation in 
                                                 
70 Because of the natural log transformation, a change of 1% in X is associated with a change of 0.01b1 in Y. This is 
because Y + δY = b0 + b1ln(1.01X), which makes δY = b1ln(1.01) i.e. δY = 0.01b1. 
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participation, while an increase of one standard deviation in membership in environmental IGOs 
will result in an increase of 0.41 standard deviation in participation. Similarly,  with all other 
variables are held constant, an increase of one standard deviation in the amount of trade (when 
calculated as a percentage of GDP) will result in a decrease of 0.16 standard deviation in 
participation; an increase of one standard deviation in HDI will result in an increase of 0.19 
standard deviation in participation; and an increase of 1 standard deviation in ‘ecofree’ will result 
in an increase of 0.25 standard deviation in participation.  
 
(iii) MODEL IV 
 
Table 10: Regression Results for Model IV 
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
  Standardized 
coefficients 
   Model IV 
     B Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Beta t Significance 
Constant 67.764 8.547  7.93 0.000 
Graft 6.221 2.305 0.293 2.70 0.010** 
Sanitation 0.037 0.048 0.077 0.77 0.447 
Undernutrition_t71 -5.955 1.690 -0.414 -3.52 0.001*** 
Imortality -0.029 0.019 -0.160 -1.56 0.127 
Odacap_t72 -3.791 0.922 -0.449 -4.11 0.000*** 
Polity 0.231 0.211 0.113 1.09 0.280 
Arms -0.722 0.307 -0.270 -2.36 0.023** 
Tgoods -0.061 0.040 -0.143 -1.51 0.138 
Agenda21_t 0.651 1.009 0.088 0.64 0.523 
Gdpcap1 -0.0007 0.0007 -0.161 -0.97 0.339 
 
N 52 
R2 0.649 
F-statistic(10, 41) 15.44*** 
*** Significant at the 0.005 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
 
The F-statistic (value of 15.44) is statistically significant at the 0.5% level, thereby 
demonstrating good model fit. Except for the variables ‘tgoods’ (volumes of trade) and 
                                                 
71 Undernutrition_t = ln(undernutrition) 
72 Odacap_t = ln(odacap) 
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‘gdpcap1’ (level of economic development), the signs of the regression coefficients all tally with 
theoretical expectations.  
Undernutrition and foreign aid dependency are statistically significant at the 0.5% level. 
Control on corruption (variable graft) and arms imports are statistically significant at the 5% 
level. The variables sanitation, infant mortality, polity, volumes of trade, Agenda 21 initiatives 
and GDP/capita do not show any statistical significance with participation from developing 
countries.  
From these results, we can state that developing countries which have better control on 
corruption, have lower dependence on foreign aid, have lower percentage of the population 
suffering from undernourishment, and which have lower volumes of arms imports tend to 
participate in IEAs to a greater extent than developing countries which exhibit the opposite 
trends in these domestic components. With all other variables held constant, an increase of one 
unit in the control on corruption in a developing country will result in that state participating in 
6.2 additional IEAs, while an increase in arms imports by 1% of the total imports will result in a 
decrease of developing country participation by 0.7 IEAs. An increase in foreign aid dependency 
by 1% in a developing country will result in that country reducing its participation by 0.04 
IEAs73.   
If we compare the beta weights, foreign aid dependence seems to exert the greatest 
impact on participation from developing countries, followed by the percentage of population 
suffering from malnutrition, the control on corruption, and the extent of arms imports, in that 
order. With all other variables held constant, an increase of 1 standard deviation in foreign aid 
dependence (in its natural logarithmic form) will result in a decrease of 0.45 standard deviation 
in participation from developing countries. Similarly, with all other variables held constant, an 
                                                 
73 Because of the ln transformation, a 1% increase in Odacap results in 0.01*(-3.79) = 0.038 
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increase of 1standard deviation in the level of undernutrition (in its natural logarithm) will result 
in a decrease of 0.41 standard deviation in participation from developing countries;  an increase 
of 1 standard deviation in the control of corruption will result in an increase of 0.29 standard 
deviation in participation from developing countries; and an increase of 1 standard deviation in 
arms imports will result in a decrease of 0.27 standard deviation in participation from developing 
countries.  
Model V 
 
Table 11: Regression Results for Model V 
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
  Standardized 
coefficients 
   Model V 
     B Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Beta t Significance 
Constant 8.687 9.355  0.93 0.357 
Contiguity 0.966 0.420 0.181 2.30 0.025** 
Milexp -0.393 0.130 -0.300 -3.03 0.004*** 
Graft 6.385 2.207 0.334 2.89 0.005*** 
Polity 0.229 0.253 0.109 0.90 0.369 
Eionum 0.997 0.278 0.309 3.59 0.001*** 
Mineral_t 0.477 0.669 0.095 0.71 0.479 
Odacap_t -1.599 1.064 -0.165 -1.50 0.139 
Agenda21_t 0.342 1.078 0.041 0.32 0.753 
Popdens_t 1.418 0.915 0.132 1.55 0.127 
HDI 22.685 12.055 0.279 1.88 0.065* 
Tgoods -0.051 0.034 -0.137 -1.52 0.135 
 
N 67 
R2 0.6650 
F-statistic(11, 55) 12.23*** 
*** Significant at the 0.005 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
  * Significant at the 0.1 level 
 
 The F-statistic of 12.23 is statistically significant at p <0.005 level, showing that Model V 
as a whole has statistically significant predictive capability. All the regression coefficients 
demonstrate an association with participation which is in line with theoretical expectations, 
expect for the variable ‘tgoods’ (volume of trade), which is showing a negative relationship with 
participation.  
 109
 Military expenditures, control on corruption, and participation in international 
environmental IGOs are statistically significant at the 0.5% level. Contiguity is statistically 
significant at the 5% level, while HDI is statistically significant at the 10% level. The variables 
polity, mineral value production, foreign aid dependency, Agenda 21 initiatives, population 
density and trade volumes are not statistically significant.  
 These results show that states which invest more heavily in their military empowerment 
are less likely to participate in IEAs than those which do not devote as much resources for their 
military build-up. Moreover, states which have better control on corruption and which participate 
in environmental IGOs are more likely to participate in IEAs than states which suffer from high 
degrees of corruption or which shy away from participation in international environmental 
institutions. Further, a state which is surrounded by a great number of contiguous neighbors is 
more likely to participate in IEAs than one which is more isolated. Also, it seems that states 
which have a high quality of life, as denoted by their high HDI scores, tend to participate in IEAs 
to a greater extent than states with lower levels of human development.  
 With all other variables held constant, an increase of 1% in the military expenditures of a 
state will cause that state to be less likely to participate in 0.39 IEAs. On the other hand, with all 
other variables held constant, an increase of one unit in corruption control will likely increase 
participation by 6 IEAs. A state which participates in one additional environmental IGO is more 
likely to participate in one additional IEA, when all other variables are held constant. A state 
which has one contiguous neighbor more than another state will be more likely to participate in 
approximately one IEA more than the other state, keeping constant all other variables. Moreover, 
with all other variables held constant, a one unit increase in the HDI of a state will make that 
state more likely to participate in 22 additional IEAs.  
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 Looking at the beta weights, corruption control seems to exert the greatest influence on 
participation in IEAs, and contiguity seems to exert the least influence. The influence of military 
expenditures is almost at par with that of participation in environmental IGOs. When all other 
variables are held constant, an increase of one standard deviation in the variable ‘graft’ will 
result in an increase of 0.33 standard deviation in participation. An increase of one standard 
deviation in the level of a state’s participation in environmental IGOs will result in an increase of 
0.31 standard deviation in participation; an increase of one standard deviation in military 
expenditures will result in a decrease of 0.30 standard deviation in participation; an increase of 
one standard deviation in HDI will result in an increase of 0.28 standard deviation in 
participation; and an increase of one standard deviation in contiguity will result in an increase of 
0.18 standard deviation in participation, when all other variables are held constant.  
5.5 Discussion of Findings  
Treaty Provisions 
 
Model I shows that participation in IEAs tends to be negatively impacted by strong and 
binding provisions and seems to be enhanced by provisions which promote transparency and 
flexible means of dispute settlement. Contrary to expectations, Model I shows that both 
developed and developing countries seem to disfavor IEAs which have requirements for 
enactment of domestic legislation for treaty implementation, which specify quantitative targets 
and implementation deadlines, which include verification and review mechanisms, which include 
sanctions, or which require a specific group of countries to participate for entry into force of the 
treaty. Model I thus disproves the common statement made by several researchers alleging that 
developing countries tend to prefer weaker IEAs, with the underlying assumption that developed 
countries exhibit contrary tendencies. I suspect that statements referring to the preference of 
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developed countries for stringent environmental measures may fit the regional landscape better 
than the global one. While developed countries may be highly committed to strong regional 
environmental measures, perhaps because they are directly impacted by the environmental 
externalities, their preference for weak global IEAs is at par with that of the developing nations.  
The natural predilection on the part of both the developed and developing countries for 
transparent measures within IEA texts and for flexibility to resolve potential disputes through 
negotiations first can be understood in terms of states’ concerns with satisfying themselves that 
other party members are not free-riding and that they can maintain some level of control on the 
treaty implementation process. Clauses enhancing transparency will likely make the processes of 
treaty implementation more open to international scrutiny and any potential opt-outs or free-
riders can be easily identified and dealt with, such that the costs of implementation do not fall 
disproportionately on any particular group of states. Transparency also increases the likelihood 
that the IEA will be effective by shedding light on various management problems such as misuse 
of funds transferred for treaty implementation, or inadequate domestic efforts to fully comply 
and implement the IEA provisions.  
Control over dispute resolution is crucial in international relations among states. Loss of 
such control can potentially be viewed as an erosion of national sovereignty, and thus less 
palatable to a state concerned with the maintenance or increase in its power potential. The 
general preference for negotiations as the first means of addressing conflicts points to the fact 
that, at least in the international environmental domain, countries are interested in avoiding 
protracted tensions in their relationships and believe that they can arrive at mutually agreeable 
positions through the processes of negotiations. This is an important finding as it holds promise 
for peace. A preference for negotiations is a potential harbinger of friendly debates and an open 
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and frank atmosphere to resolve conflicting interests and establish mutually recognized rights 
and obligations.  
The variable ‘threshold’ does not show any direct impact on total participation, as well as 
on participation from the developed or developing nations. This is antithetic to the increasing 
economic exposés which posit that IEC tends to increase when there is a minimum ratification 
clause embedded in the treaty text. While economic analysis seems to argue that making 
participation contingent on that of other states will likely increase overall participation, in real 
policy-making contexts, this need not be an automatic outcome. Overall, a ratification threshold 
does not inevitably translate into higher levels of participation. It is likely that countries may not 
be concerned so much about the number of required ratifications, as about the nature of 
participation. In other words, while countries may not care about how many other states have 
already ratified a particular treaty, they may nevertheless be interested in whether a particular 
country or a particular group of countries are ratifying or not. This would explain why the 
majority of ratifications for the KP, especially from the OECD countries, occurred in 2002 and 
not before. It is quite likely that before US’s decision to withdraw completely from the treaty, the 
majority of OECD countries were potentially holding out until US, the major emitter, commit to 
GHG reduction targets mandated by the KP. Only after it became clear that such would not occur 
did the majority of states ratify the KP in 2002 to signify their decision to go ahead with the KP, 
even without the participation of the US. It is interesting to point out also that the KP does not 
merely include a simple ratification threshold. As present in other IEAs such as MARPOL 73/78, 
the KP includes a minimum ratification threshold as well as the requirement for ratification from 
major GHG emitters, which would ensure that a minimum percentage of emissions is covered by 
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the ratifications. This added requirement is meant to strengthen the treaty and ensure its 
effectiveness.   
Though the variables ‘threshold’, ‘amendtpty’ (amendment by any party), ‘fintransfers’ 
(financial transfers), and capacity-building do not depict any statistical significance, they depict  
different directions of causation for the developed and developing countries. The results show a 
tendency among developing countries to favor provisions facilitating financial transfers as well 
as provisions allowing any party to propose amendments to the treaty. Moreover, developing 
countries seem not to prefer measures for capacity-building. Developed countries, on the other 
hand, show a tendency to favor the absence of clauses allowing amendment propositions from 
any party member, the absence of requirements for financial transfers, and a positive legal 
requirement for capacity-building measures (see Table 12). 
Table 12: Differences of IEA Preferences for Developed and Developing Countries 
 
Treaty Characteristics 
 
                Preference 
 Developing Developed 
Capacity-building provisions No Yes 
Amendment by any party Yes No 
Financial mechanism Yes  No 
 
The low preference from developed countries for provisions for financial transfers 
probably stems from the fact that they will, in all probability, be the ones responsible for 
disbursing funds for the financial transfers. Developed countries often resent the fact they are 
being called to disburse valuable financial resources to fund development projects within 
developing countries, which in many cases, often misuse or misappropriate the transferred funds. 
The fact that corruption within the developing world (as shown in Models IV and V) seems to 
detract from participation attests to the lack of commitment to international environmental 
protection on the part of corrupt political figures within the developing world. The concerns of 
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the developed world may thus not be misguided. This may explain why developed countries 
seem to prefer to invest in measures for capacity-building (such as training, technology transfers, 
and R&D cooperation) rather than on direct monetary transfers. 
On the other hand, it may seem unfair and inequitable to request developing countries to 
implement treaty provisions with their own scarce resources for the protection of the global 
environment  - an environment which has been spoilt mostly by the development processes of 
the developed world. The preference of developing nations for financial transfers may thus be 
understood in terms of their perceptions that they are “entitled” to such disbursements since they 
were not responsible in creating the environmental problems in the first place. This goes to the 
heart of the underlying rift between the North and the South: developing countries fear that they 
will lose their freedom to follow their desired development paths by participating in strong IEAs 
which place all sorts of restrictions on their development processes, without however providing 
any compensation to them to meet their development needs; and the developed North viewing 
the developing south as a world of corruption and inefficiencies. Developing countries often 
argue that global environmental problems such as global warming and ozone depletion have 
been caused by the developed nations and thus it is only fitting that they share the higher burden 
of abatement and mitigation.  
In one sense, however, allowing financial transfers makes sense if the goal is to increase 
international commitment to the protection of the global environment. Model IV provides some 
light into why this is so. Based on Model IV, low participation among developing countries can 
be attributed to their endemic socio-economic constraints. The fact that developing nations are 
often heavily dependent on foreign aid and face high levels of various social ills (such as 
undernutrition) makes their demands for financial transfers legitimate. This line of argument has 
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found its place within the texts of recent IEAs (e.g. the UNFCCC, the MP, and the KP) which 
specifically includes provisions acknowledging the special conditions of developing nations and 
provides special mechanisms for financial transfers. The low preference of developing countries 
for measures geared towards capacity-building only strengthen the finding that financial transfers 
seem to be a better strategy to attract developing nations to participate in IEAs. Developing 
nations’ low preference for capacity-building provisions may stem from the fact that such 
measures often do not have concrete plans of action and no concrete outcomes. Moreover, the 
promise of capacity-building may not materialize in the short-time frame, as opposed to financial 
transfers, which have clearly specified modus operandi and which occur within clearly 
demarcated time-frames.  
The difference in preference between developed and developing nations in so far as 
amendment clauses are concerned can also be understood in terms of the different concerns and 
priorities of the two groups. Developed nations do not prefer the ability for any party member to 
bring amendments to the treaty texts, most likely because they are the ones who have been 
responsible for the drafting and finalizing of the treaty texts. It is no surprise that they will try to 
restrict the freedom of other party members to bring changes to compromises which have been 
reached after innumerable sessions of negotiations and bargaining. Moreover, allowing 
amendments by any party member will likely alter the structure of the calculations of costs and 
benefits which the developed nations relied on to participate in the IEAs in the first place. 
Suddenly, the IEAs may not seem beneficial at all. Given the fact that withdrawing from IEAs is 
not without costs itself, amendments can only be a trigger of additional costs rather than benefits 
for the developed world.  
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On the other hand, the fact the developing nations prefer to be able to bring amendments 
to IEA provisions may merely reflect their desire to safeguard their national interests and 
concerns in a process which did not involve them significantly in the initial phases. Though IEA 
negotiations are more open to participation from developing countries nowadays, in the past, 
most of the IEAs were sponsored by the developed world. It is thus likely that the developing 
nations may not find all aspects of the IEA to be in their favor and they may desire to have the 
freedom to request for a modification of the status quo if need be.  
State Characteristics 
The power-interest model illustrates that power considerations do matter in a state’s 
decision to participate in IEAs. For example, a desire to reduce its level of environmental 
vulnerability will make a state more likely to agree to the international norms and standards 
embodied within treaty texts. Thus, a nation which has a higher number of contiguous neighbors 
will tend to participate in more IEAs than another state with a lower level of contiguity. 
Similarly, a state with a greater amount of economic power will participate in more IEAs than 
one with a lower level of economic development, probably to safeguard its competitive 
advantage in the international market.  
Military power stands as an opposing force to participation. The power-interest model 
establishes that a state is more likely to participate in an IEA if it is less invested in enhancing its 
military potential. It is well-known that the military is often responsible for a high level of 
environmental pollution, either through its routine practice sessions, or in real deployment. In 
both cases, the military makes use of munitions which have been proven to be harmful to the 
environment and to life. A state interested in empowering its military on in investing larger 
portions of its national budget on military expenditures will likely invest less resources and 
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attention to global environmental protection. Such a state will thus tend to participate less in 
IEAs than another state not so bent on military empowerment. The negative association of the 
variable ‘milexp’ (military expenditures) with participation thus reflects an inherent tension 
between the military and the environment, as well as the conflicting priorities brought to bear on 
policy-makers by the need to build up the military arsenal and the need to commit to global 
environmental protection.  
The positive association of mineral production value with participation negates 
hypothesis H2f, which postulated a negative association. This result, as compared to the negative 
impact on participation depicted by the variable ‘forest’ (forest resources as % of land area), 
shows that the influence of natural resource endowment on participation may be highly 
dependent on which type of resources we are including in the model – i.e. whether we are 
considering renewable or non-renewable resources. Since mineral resources are non-renewable 
resources, thus necessitating prudent management strategies for their long-lasting benefits, it is 
likely that a certain element of caution and environmental prudence may be motivating decision-
makers, thereby accounting for the positive association of the variable with participation (this 
positive association is also maintained in Model V). Forest resources, on the other hand, are very 
heavily exploited in most parts of the world, and are more amenable to renewal strategies than 
mineral resources. The negative association may reflect the unwillingness of states which are 
heavily reliant on their forestry industries to agree to lower economic returns, as well as the 
tendency to rely on reforestation and other forestry management strategies to address any 
depletion of the forest resources that may be occurring due to timber exports or consumption.  
 The liberal-interdependent model, true to its purported objective, attests to the fact that 
institutions (whether domestic or international) have an impact on participation. High levels of 
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participation in environmental IGOs make a state more likely to participate in IEAs. This is 
probably due to the fact that the state undergoes a process of international acculturation to 
environmental norms and standards, and the mechanisms of the IGOs may exert a pressure on 
the state to commit to the legal norms and standards in IEAs. It is not likely that the variable 
‘eionum’ (participation in environmental IGOs) merely reflects an underlying commitment by 
the state for international environmental protection and does not therefore provide an 
independent explanation for participation. Participation in environmental IGOs and participation 
in IEAs are different processes and involve different actors and calculations. IEAs, by their very 
nature, are legally binding, subject to International Law, and subject to the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda.  
Moreover, participation in IEAs is a more serious business than participating in an 
environmental IGO: the former often requires binding commitments to arrest or alter national 
development priorities, to adopt new production processes, to disburse funds, or to reallocate 
much scarce national resources; the latter, on the other hand, often does not require such wide-
ranging policy shifts and are more open to flexible means of enforcement. It is likely therefore 
that the significant positive relationship between ‘eionum’ and participation illustrates the 
independent influence of environmental IGOs on participation. Participation in environmental 
IGOs may provide a learning experience for the states, where they get to be familiar with the 
nature of the global environmental problems and are sensitized to the need for international 
cooperation on the subject. Further, it is likely that members of the IGOs may act to exert a 
pressure on other members who have not yet ratified a particular treaty to do so. It is also quite 
possible that membership in the environmental IGOs may require adoption or commitment of 
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specific measures detailed in IEAs, which will make participation in those IEAs an attractive 
feature in terms of integrating policies and strategies. 
 On the domestic front, the strength of governmental institutions seems to exert a positive 
influence on participation. For a state to eventually participate in an IEA, lots of background 
work need to be conducted: first, in anticipation of the international negotiations to take place for 
the adoption of the draft treaty text; and second, for the processes of treaty ratification within the 
domestic political structure. Delegates to the international conferences need to be well-versed in 
the treaty processes and in the treaty stipulations, which often require close collaboration among 
various branches of the government. Further, the attractiveness or unattractiveness of a particular 
IEA is subject to the stance of domestic agencies bestowed with the mandate of dealing with the 
theme dealt with by the treaty. Bureaucrats who deal with the specific issues on a daily basis 
therefore have an important role to play in determining the position of the country vis-à-vis the 
treaty. Thus, calculations of costs and benefits occur at various levels of the political machine, 
which render participation in IEAs vulnerable to how well that machine functions. Weak 
governmental institutions may not grasp the essential thesis of a particular IEA or may simply be 
too lax in ensuring that ratification processes go smoothly. Hence, strong governmental 
institutions may likely be a crucial factor in explaining state participation in IEAs. This is indeed 
validated by the beta weight of the variable ‘goveff’ in Model III.  
 The results from Model III specifically negate hypotheses H3e and H3f. Contrary to the 
hypothesized relationships, both economic freedom and high volumes of trade seem to exert a 
negative impact on participation. One possible explanation for this finding is that trade 
provisions often run counter to environmental policies. States which are involved in high levels 
of international trading will likely desire to maximize their economic gains and minimize 
 120
potential losses. In view of the inherent tensions that exist between the trade-environment 
interface, high volumes of trade may run counter to international environmental goals. In this 
conflict, trade almost always wins. Thus, a state with high volumes of trade, and for that matter, 
a high level of economic freedom, will be less desirous of curbing its international trade policies 
to participate in IEAs. The goals of free trade often stand in opposition to global environmental 
protection, causing states favoring free trade through their liberal economic policies to shy away 
from the global norms and standards codified in IEAs.  
 The positive association between HDI and participation shows that states with high 
quality of life invest in or commit to more in global environmental protection. High values of 
HDI reflect both economic and human development. With improvements in the quality of life of 
its citizens, national leaders face less constraints to devote resources for meeting urgent domestic 
priorities. There is scope therefore for concentrating on the international forum. Moreover, 
countries with high human development tend to have a well-educated population. Environmental 
awareness among the population may likely trigger processes for placing the country on the 
international front for global environmental protection. This tends to be strengthened by the 
positive impact of local Agenda 21 initiatives on state participation in IEAs. A higher number of 
local initiatives reflect the level of environmental awareness of the population and their 
commitment to environmental protection. Popular movements often compel national leaders to 
alter their projected paths and to implement measures supported by the people. Even if local 
Agenda 21 initiatives do not automatically translate into a direct pressure for national policy-
makers to participate in IEAs, the fact that the population has demonstrated a willingness to 
strive for environmental protection may suggest to the leaders that non-participation may be a 
costly enterprise.   
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 The significance of HDI has to be understood in light of the various endemic constraints 
highlighted in Model IV. Indeed, the developing-logistics model suggests that developing nations 
face certain socio-economic and political challenges which render them less amenable to 
participating in IEAs. In Model IV, foreign aid dependency seems to exert the greatest negative 
impact on participation. Foreign aid dependency in a sense suggests that poverty acts as a 
constraining determinant of participation. Poor nations typically lack adequate resources to meet 
basic survival needs. In such a context, commitment to global environmental protection cannot 
become a national objective. The need to feed the population cannot be overridden by global 
environmental concerns.  
Thus, states with high dependency on foreign aid and with high levels of undernutrition 
are, not surprisingly, less likely to participate in IEAs. Economic development, likely to be low, 
therefore does not seem to exert any statistically significant on participation. Though not 
statistically significant, the negative correlation between GDP/capita and participation in Model 
IV hints at the fact that developing nations are concerned with achieving higher standards of 
living and economic development through industrial production and technological development. 
In this quest for rapid industrial progress, concerns with environmental protection are dampened 
within the national policy debate as the goals of environmental protection and unhampered 
industrial development often clash with each other. In any case, endemic social challenges 
relating to survival issues and high levels of poverty seem to act as major constraining forces on 
any positive impact on participation that might be accrued from a certain level of economic 
progress and civic environmentalism. Further, while strong governmental institutions seem to 
catalyze participation in IEAs, Model IV shows that lack of control on corruption is detrimental 
to participation. Corruption entails mismanagement of public funds, public distrust in the 
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political process, and lack of commitment to the improvement of the citizens’ quality of life. 
Within such a framework, participation in IEAs may be seen merely as a cost.  
In tandem with the finding regarding military expenditures in Model II, developing 
nations which invest heavily in arms imports tend to be less likely to participate in IEAs. Apart 
from the inherent incompatibility between military and environmental goals, as discussed 
already, another plausible explanation for the limiting impact of military build-up on 
participation is that, and especially so within the context of developing countries, scarcity of 
resources may dictate the relegation of environmental concerns as a non-priority. If scarce funds 
and other resources are earmarked for military arsenal build up, there is not much left over for 
global environmental protection.  
This raises the question as to why nations, especially those which are poor, invest so 
heavily in arsenal build-up?  Plausible explanations may be found within the literature dealing 
with the role of ideational factors in global politics. The way that national leaders perceive their 
roles and functions, and their own understandings of their identities, in concert with those of 
their counterparts in the international system, may generate a commitment to military 
empowerment, at the expense of other more laudable goals. On the other hand, the desire (and 
perhaps the need) to invest in military empowerment may merely reflect the current structure of 
the international and domestic system. In the international field, concerns with relative power 
may compel leaders to engage in perpetual military empowerment. Within the domestic arena, 
the high arms imports of developing countries may merely reflect ethnic tensions, propensity to 
suffer from civil wars, or insecurity concerns due to their strategic positions.  
What is the impact on participation of military empowerment when we factor in the 
positive impact of participation in environmental IGOs? What is the independent impact of the 
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Realist variables when they are juxtaposed with the Liberal variables? The Integrative Model 
attempts to present an integrated understanding of the determinants of participation. It tests for 
the independent impact of each variable from one school of thought, when the variables from the 
competing theory is held constant. Model V shows that both power concerns and 
institutionalization matter when we consider state participation in IEAs. Contiguity still 
maintains its positive influence on participation, and military expenditures its negative impact. 
Moreover, participation in environmental IGOs is conducive to participation in IEAs, as is a high 
level of human development.  
A variable which has not been discussed so far, but which is important in view of its 
statistical non-significance in Models II-V is the variable ‘polity.’ It seems that the level of 
democracy within states does not act as a direct determinant of that state’s participation in IEAs. 
This is contrary to arguments made by researchers such as Neumayer or Congleton, but more in 
line with Midlarsky’s observation that the association between democracy and participation may 
not be that straightforward. When considered in concert with the statistical non-significance of 
political stability in Model II, it is possible to argue that the exact placement of states on their 
paths of democratization, if such is occurring at all, or their level of domestic political instability, 
does not seem to impact states’ participation in IEAs.  
While this may seem counter-intuitive at first sight, deeper probing shows that it is quite 
likely that domestic political instability may not adversely impact state participation in IEAs. The 
two processes can be easily compartmentalized in a rarefied fashion by the national leaders, who 
often associate participation in IEAs as a statement of their belonging to the ‘international 
community,’ and as an avenue for national prestige building and for deflecting, even if in a very 
small measure, international criticism on their domestic policies. There are indeed several 
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instances of states which are facing great political instability or which are famous for non-
democratic ventures, but which do in fact participate in IEAs. Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Croatia, for example, have each become parties to 19 and 46 IEAs respectively since their 
formation in 1992. Moreover, Cuba is party to 34 IEAs, comparable to the participation of Israel, 
which is party to 33 IEAs.  
Whatever the exact motivations of the leaders, the finding that domestic political 
complexities associated with non-democratic tendencies or instabilities do not exert constraining 
forces on participation is welcome as it shows that there are prospects for enhanced international 
environmental cooperation, irrespective of the domestic political idiosyncrasies. 
Notwithstanding, it is legitimate however to wonder how meaningful such participation is. 
Participation may have been intended, right from the start, as a political statement rather than as 
a commitment to global environmental protection. Even if such be the case, participation is still 
to be preferred over non-participation, as participation will likely involve the party member in a 
process of international acculturation to environmental norms and standards. Regular COP 
meetings and regular dissemination or reports on treaty implementation can spike interest in the 
policy measures incorporated within the treaty provisions and may incite otherwise recalcitrant 
parties to comply. Finally, participation subjects the party member to potential international 
“shaming mechanisms,” which might ‘compel’ the member to enunciate policies to implement 
the treaty provisions.  
5.6 Conclusion 
 The purpose of this chapter was to test if participation in IEAs is determined by country 
characteristics and IEA characteristics. Each model of this study provides some insight into 
participation. The legal-incentives model, for example, highlights the fact that strong and binding 
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provisions within treaty texts seem to be viewed unfavorably by both the developed and 
developing world. The power-interest model has emphasized the role of power and 
environmental vulnerability, while the liberal-interdependent model has highlighted the role of 
institutions and good governance. Issues which are prominent in the developing logistics model 
relate to poverty, low quality of life, and corruption. The integrative model provides a synopsis 
of Models II-IV, and show that both power concerns and institutions matter in determining state 
participation in IEAs. Furthermore, human development seems to be a good precursor of higher 
levels of state participation in IEAs.  
These findings have important policy implications for international environmental 
governance. In the next Chapter, I address these briefly and provide suggestions for future 
research.  
  
6.  CONCLUSION 
“…this world of nations has certainly been made by 
men, and its guise must therefore be found within the 
modifications of our own human mind.”   
- Vico, 1744, from Cox,(1986). 
 
International environmental governance presupposes a strong framework of international 
cooperation which clearly sets out rights, obligations and liabilities. IEAs often manage to 
provide such a structure for international environmental cooperation. However, for IEAs to be 
effective in improving the global environment, the participation of the whole international 
community is warranted. Since some countries are more prone to participating in IEAs than 
others, and since some IEAs manage to sustain higher rates of participation than others, it 
becomes an interesting undertaking to try and understand which underlying factors tend to 
account for such differential levels of participation in the IEAs. The desire to investigate causal 
factors for states’ varying participation in IEAs was the motivating idea behind this research.   
In the following section I summarize the findings of this study and thereafter address 
their implications for international environmental policies. I finally propose some suggestions for 
future research in the field. 
6.1 Overview of the research findings 
This research set out to analyze the influence of country and IEA characteristics on 
participation levels in IEAs. The basic research question governing this study is as follows: 
which country and treaty characteristics determine a country’s participation in IEAs? This study 
relies on the dominant theories governing IR, namely, Realism and Liberalism. These theories 
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have been integrated into the field of IEC through the development of the (i) the power-interest 
model, which emphasizes military and economic power; and (ii) the liberal-interdependent 
model, which considers the role of international institutions and civic engagement. Moreover, to 
take account of the differing socio-economic realities of developing countries, the developing-
logistics model has been proposed to capture the influence of conditions endemic to the 
developing world on their level of participation in IEAs. In an attempt to provide an integrated 
understanding of the determinants of participation, the integrative model is developed to consider 
the independent impact on one set of variables, while maintaining constant the competing set of 
variables. Further, to capture the influence of treaty design variations on participation levels, the 
legal-incentives model has been developed, which emphasizes variations in treaty clauses on 
IEA participation. 
This study has employed multiple linear regression analysis to establish statistical 
dependence of IEA participation on specific treaty and country variables. Where treaty 
characteristics are concerned, the analysis shows that IEAs which appear to be more attractive to 
the international community are those which are flexible and transparent. IEAs which embody 
requirements for enactment of legislation, which enunciate quantitative deadlines, which 
stipulate sanctions for non-compliance, or which mandate ratification from specific groups of 
countries for entry into force, tend to secure lower levels of participation than weaker IEAs. 
Contrary to some researchers’ claim, both the developed and developing countries seem to favor 
weaker IEAs over stronger ones.  
The empirical tests also show that countries which tend to participate to a greater extent 
in IEAs are those that have high levels of economic and human development, high involvement 
in environmental IGOs, strong governmental institutions, good quality of life, strong civic 
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engagement, and high levels of environmental vulnerability. On the other hand, domestic 
conditions which tend to detract from high participation in IEAs involve high military 
expenditures, high volumes of trade transactions, economic freedom, high levels of corruption, 
social challenges associated with survival issues and mismanagement of national resources. The 
various profiles for a potential participant in IEAs, as obtained from the regression models, are 
provided in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: Profile of Likely Participants in IEAs 
Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
High economic 
development 
Low volumes of 
trade 
Low levels of 
corruption 
Low levels of  
corruption 
High mineral 
production 
value 
High 
participation in 
environmental 
IGOs 
Low levels of 
population 
undernutrition 
High participation 
in environmental 
IGOs 
High number 
of contiguous 
neighbors 
Low economic 
freedom 
Low foreign aid 
dependency 
High number of 
contiguous 
neighbors 
Low military 
expenditures 
Strong 
governmental 
institutions 
Low arms imports Low military 
expenditures 
 High human 
development 
 High human 
development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State 
profile 
 High levels of 
civic 
environmentalism 
  
 
 
From the above results, we can conclude that different socio-economic conditions 
generate different levels of international environmental commitments: poor countries which rely 
on foreign aid are less amenable to participating in IEAs than other countries benefiting from 
high levels of human and economic development. The overriding concerns with military 
empowerment also seem to be a major factor detracting from wide participation in IEAs. Based 
on the above results, we can now understand why Angola and Eritrea participate in IEAs to a 
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lesser extent than developed nations such as US or Finland, as well as other developing countries 
such as Brazil or Chile.  
As shown in Table 14 below, Angola and Eritrea’s domestic conditions reflect severe 
incapacities related to low levels of human development, low GDP/capita, high levels of 
malnutrition, and high foreign aid dependency. Moreover, both Angola and Eritrea spend a huge 
proportion of their national budget for military matters, and their arms imports share a higher 
percentage of their total imports as compared to the other countries listed in Table 14. Moreover, 
the USA, despite its status as a highly developed economy, participates in less IEAs than other 
developed nations such as Germany or Finland due to its higher levels of military expenditures, 
its lower vulnerability to transboundary pollution (due to its low contiguity score), its lower 
population density, its lower level of civic engagement, its greater economic freedom, its lower 
control on corruption, its weaker governmental institutions, and its lower participation in 
environmental IGOs. 
 
Table 14: Summary of Data for Selected Countries 
 US France Germany Finland Chile Brazil Angola Eritrea 
 
Participation 55 76 78 75 57 54 8 8 
 
HDI, 1999 0.934 0.924 0.921 0.925 0.825 0.750 0.422 0.416 
 
GDP per capita, 
1999 (PPP US$) 
31872 22897 
 
23742 23096 8652 7037 3179 880 
Military 
expenditures, as 
% govt. 
expenditures, 
1999 
 
15.7 
 
5.9 
 
4.7 
 
4.5 
 
12.3 
 
5.5 
 
41.1 
 
51.1 
Arms imports, as 
% of total 
imports, 1999 
 
0.2 
 
0.3 
 
0.3 
 
1.3 
 
0.7 
 
0.3 
 
7.3 
 
33.5 
Population 
density 
(peope/km2, 
2000) 
31 107 230 17 20 20 11 41 
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Malnutrition (% 
population), 
1996-98 
- - - - 4 10 43 65 
Corruption score, 
2002 
1.77 1.45 1.82 2.39 1.55 -0.05 -1.12 - 
Government 
effectiveness, 
2002 
1.70 1.67 1.76 2.01 1.19 -0.22 -1.16 - 
Contiguity 2 8 9 3 3 10 4 3 
Foreign aid 
dependence 
(ODA/capita), 
US$, 1999 
- - - - 4.6 1.1 31.4 37.2 
Number of 
memberships in 
environmental 
IGOs, 2003-2004 
21 29 28 20 12 19 9 - 
Local Agenda 21 
initiatives (per 
million 
population), 
2001 
0.3 1.16 24.75 58.28 0.96 0.21 - - 
Mineral 
production value 
(US$ m), 2001 
89400 11521 11803 424 2440 7171 2610 0.3 
Economic 
freedom 
1.9 2.5 2.3 2.25 2.15 - - - 
 
Overall, the five models show that the determinants of state participation in IEAs can be 
conceptualized as being dichotomously influenced by a set of ‘enablers’ and a competing set of  
‘limitors.’ Typical ‘enablers’ relate to economic and human development, high returns from 
mineral production, sensitization to environmental vulnerability, good domestic governance, 
openness to international acculturation of environmental norms and standards, and civic 
engagement. ‘Limitors’ are in the form of military objectives, corruption, and poverty. The 
integrative approach supported by Model V identifies three ‘enablers’, viz. human development, 
environmental vulnerability, and international environmental acculturation, and two ‘limitors’, 
namely, corruption and military design.  
What do the above results imply for international environmental protection? How can 
policies be geared towards enhancing participation in IEAs? How can treaties be designed to 
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sustain high participation levels? The next section focuses briefly on the policy implications of 
the research findings. 
6.2 Policy implications of research findings 
An integrated understanding of participation, based on Model V and Model I, shows that 
participation can be understood in terms of the following four major determinants: (i) impact of 
domestic and international institutions (ii) human development; (iii) power motivations; and (iv) 
IEA design. Policies proposed to increase participation in IEAs therefore have to enhance any 
positive influence exerted by these parameters, and mitigate their negative influences, if any.  
If we start with the impact of domestic and international institutions, policies meant to 
address government inefficiencies, its corruptive practices if known, and laxity in reform can 
play a positive role in strengthening the state’s willingness to participate in IEAs. After all, the 
bureaucrats are the primary responders to international calls for participation in IEAs: they are 
the ones who prepare scientific and technical documents, and who steer the state in its policy 
response. Very rarely does the head of a state participate in international environmental 
negotiations, and more strange will be his or her participation in preparatory meetings and 
conferences in preparation for the final conference for adoption of a treaty text.  
The heavy involvement of these bureaucrats and technocrats in churning out policy and 
technical papers with regard to a specific environmental issue suggests that a good starting point 
for enhancing IEC may be placing emphasis on these actors. Strategies for building IEC may 
have to start with programs to sensitize domestic bureaucrats and, whenever necessary, to 
educate them on the relevant themes being placed on the international agenda. This sensitization 
and involvement of domestic actors will likely entail disbursing funds for attracting actors from 
the developing nations to participate in international seminars and workshops for committing of 
 132
resources for capacity-building. Promoting state participation in environmental IGOs will also 
likely result in greater participation in IEAs. As discussed previously, such participation may 
make the state more open to accepting new international norms and standards, as codified in the 
IEAs, and to agree to implement them.  
On the human development front, policies geared towards enhancing citizens’ quality of 
life may empower the population as well allow political leaders the freedom to address concerns 
other than survival and development imperatives. A focus on human development will diminish 
the impact of limitors such as poverty and corruption, and will enhance enablers such as civic 
environmentalism. These issues are especially important for developing nations which are often 
mired deep in social challenges associated with poor sanitation, low levels of nutrition or high 
rates of infant mortality. As long as international environmental policies are developed in 
isolation from measures meant to address human development, it is likely that participation in 
IEAs will not only be less than optimal, but may also not be meaningful.  The finding that trade 
openness and economic freedom tend to act as disincentives for high participation in IEAs shows 
perhaps that the principle of sustainable development is still not a cornerstone of international 
trading. Trade and the environment still sit on opposite ends of human development, and treaty 
negotiators and drafters need to find avenues for bringing trade provisions more in line with 
environmental sustainability. While IEAs may allow for market mechanisms in order to make 
participation more conducive to countries able and willing to effect such transactions, such 
mechanisms however need to be made operative with the ultimate goal of achieving sustainable 
development. 
On the whole, international environmental protection needs to be addressed from a 
holistic perspective, whereby all aspects of human development are taken into account.  To 
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secure wide participation in IEAs and strengthen IEC, policies will have to be devised to cater to 
the following: (i) integrate international endeavors for global environmental protection with 
measures to eradicate poverty, to improve the conditions of life in the developing world, and to 
promote human development; (ii) design strategies to make trade provisions environmentally 
sustainable; (iii) reduce foreign aid dependence of developing countries; (iv) empower local 
communities to be more involved in domestic environmental protection initiatives; (v) promote 
membership in international environmental institutions; and (vi) facilitate strong domestic 
governance.  
In terms of IEA design, it seems that IEAs will have to be engineered such that they 
succeed in striking the right balance between flexibility and strength. One possible starting point 
is to build on the preference of states for the inclusion of transparency measures within IEA 
texts. Thus, strengthening reporting requirements and allowing non-state actors to act as 
observers within the treaty proceedings can potentially improve participation rates as well as 
promote IEA effectiveness. There has indeed been a definite trend towards the inclusion of such 
parameters in the most recent IEAs (e.g. the UNFCCC, the CBD, the CCD, the MP and the KP, 
inter alia). On the other hand, strength and flexibility need not be in competition with each other. 
IEAs can be built such that binding clauses are viewed separately from specific mechanisms 
allowing parties to implement the treaties in a flexible but effective approach. Flexibility in this 
sense may further empower participating states in their goals of abiding by the mandated targets 
and deadlines.  
Treaty drafters also need to be sensitive to the reasonable needs and concerns of potential 
participants. On the one hand, developing countries’ inherent logistical constraints (such as low 
levels of economic development, poverty, and low quality of life) will have to be met with 
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special provisions to allow them to benefit from much needed financial transfers and capacity-
building. On the other hand, developed countries need to be allowed to conduct international 
market transactions without fear of losing their competitive advantage or of suffering from losses 
of funds transferred due to corruption in the recipient countries. Moreover, package for capacity-
building may be made more enticing and more effective by incorporating results-oriented 
strategies and programs. 
The case of the MP may shed some light on the delicate balance that needs to be achieved 
to sustain participation from both the developed and developing nations. While the success of the 
MP has been imputed to a host of factors by various researchers, it is certainly true that the 
design of the MP was geared towards achieving both strength and flexibility. While the MP 
established clear targets and deadlines for the control and phasing out of specific ODS, the treaty 
also allowed developing countries a grace period of ten years to implement the treaty provisions. 
Moreover, the treaty established the Ozone Fund to meet the incremental costs associated with 
developing countries’ switching to new technology which was ODS-free, and also established 
trade restrictions for non-parties. These measures ensured that the needs of developing countries 
were met, while at the same time securing wide participation in a global phase-out and control of 
ODS.  
As mentioned in Chapter One, the KP also includes several mechanisms to increase its 
flexibility as well as to entice both the developed and developing countries to participate. The KP 
includes three key measures, commonly termed as the “flexibility mechanisms,” to lower overall 
costs of participation and to make participation attractive to both the developed and developing 
world. As detailed previously, these measures include the clean development mechanism 
(CDM), joint implementation (JI) and emissions trading. Moreover, the KP, in its Article 10, also 
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includes special provisions for developing nations, as well as the recognition of the principle of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities” and the “specific regional and development 
priorities” of countries. Further, the KP (through Article 11) requires that developed countries 
meet the full costs incurred by developing nations in implementing the protocol and that 
adequate financial and technological transfer take place for that purpose.  
While the mechanisms of the MP and the KP need certainly to be replicated in other 
IEAs, provisions for technology transfer and financial assistance are unfortunately not tied to the 
recipients demonstrating a clean record free from corruptive practices. In view of the negative 
impact of ineffective control of corruption on participation, IEAs may wisely be tied to reducing 
corruption, at least in regard to environmental policies. Funds to be transferred may potentially 
be made subject to clean bills of record or clear implementation plans on the part of the recipient 
countries.   
The statistical insignificance of the variable measuring democracy, coupled with the 
statistical significance of measures for corruption and poor quality of life (as indicated by 
undernutrition), reflect perhaps the fact that the ‘empowering factors’ required to make 
democracy work are not present in many societies. The finding that states which participate in 
more environmental IGOs tend to participate in a higher number of IEAs shows the impact of 
international acculturation to environmental norms that possibly ensues from the density of 
interaction occasioned by membership in these organizations. To secure a meaningful level of 
participation in IEAs, therefore, there need to be a focus on opening up international dialogue, 
while at the same time addressing the empowerment of local groups and communities to take 
part in their domestic policy-making processes. This empowerment will require the eradication 
of problems associated with basic survival issues. Addressing problems of poverty, poor 
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nutrition, and corruption, among others, has to be the first priority of international environmental 
policies. There is thus a very close link between the environment and human development. 
 The positive association between contiguity and participation suggests that there is much 
scope for regional set-ups to address and strengthen global environmental problems. Countries in 
a particular region may be encouraged to form coalitions to bear pressure on unwilling states to 
participate in IEAs. However, the most difficult perhaps remains the issue of military buildup, 
especially in those countries suffering from lack of resources for meeting even the bare 
necessities of life. The preponderance of military concerns, as inferred from Models II, III and 
IV, reflects the present international structure where military prowess equates to survival. In a 
structure where a nation can perpetually face military attacks from a stronger state, it cannot be 
expected that leaders will not ardently wish to strengthen their military power. Efforts to get 
leaders to use scarce resources for empowering their people rather than build their military 
arsenal have to tackle the root of the problem viz.  the international structure as it currently 
stands. This links to the subject of IR theorizing, which I briefly discuss below. 
 In traditional IR literature, there is certainly a bifurcation between the Realist and 
Liberalist schools of thought, and between the domestic and the international. While the latter 
compartmentalization is being increasingly challenged by researchers, the dichotomizing of the 
two schools of thought remains as such. Based on the results of this research, the differentiation 
between the domestic and international cannot be substantiated, as also is the division between 
Realism and Liberalism. Model V, the integrative model, points towards the fact that the 
domestic and the international, as well as the Realist and Liberal concerns can be merged in a 
holistic template which provides a better understanding of IR than mere focus on either the 
Realist or Liberal thought.  
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 This study has shown that participation in IEAs can be successfully explained by both the 
Realist and Liberal understanding of IR. Power considerations interact with institutional 
concerns, and the domestic parameters influence, and are in turn determined, by international 
factors. In a sense this study substantiates claims already made by several researchers that there 
cannot be a clean compartmentalization of the field of IR. It is obvious therefore that there is no 
one theory of IR. The existence of the various theories can be partially ascribed to the 
compartmentalized and unbalanced nature in which global politics is approached and analyzed. 
For example, while Realism focuses solely on the base side of human nature, with total discard 
of the ‘good’ part, Liberalism focuses solely on the ‘good’ part, while overlooking any evil 
tendencies in human nature. Such unbalanced view of human nature necessarily results in a 
framework which is not all-embracing and which is ‘extreme’ in its explanatory power.  
One cannot therefore speak of the theory of IR, essentially because the subject is 
broached from various different angles, depending on the needs and interests of the researcher. 
While one theory may shed light on some aspects of IR, another contending theory cannot aspire 
to replace the previous one. Each theory can only aspire to enlighten those aspects cast off by 
another competing theory, without any one theory possibly aspiring to represent the whole gamut 
of strategic international interaction. Each approach and method of analysis provides only a 
snapshot of the whole picture of IEC, without any one single approach providing a wholesome 
understanding of all the processes and underpinnings of IEC. As stated by Ruggie (1998 p.882), 
“no approach [of IR] can sustain claims to monopoly on truth.” Thus, Realism, Liberalism, and 
Constructivism (with all of the variants) all contribute something to our understanding of IEC, 
without any one theory being utterly irrelevant in enlightening international politics. In the words 
of Jervis (1998 pp.971-972):  
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[E]ach school of thought enriches others as powerful research of one kind strengthens, not weakens, the 
alternatives. No one approach consistently maintains a leading position: each of them catches important 
elements of international politics, and many of our arguments are about the relative importance of and the 
interrelationships among various factors. 
 
The current state of IR theorizing takes the structure as given. Realism posits that leaders 
are always concerned about security gains, a statement which is reflected in the influence of 
military expenditures and arms imports in Models II and II. However, the question of how the 
leaders get to that point is not asked. It is assumed that the evil side of human nature 
predominates. Also not asked are the following questions: If Realism is so predominant, is it 
because it reflects reality, or because we are taught to behave in a way which makes the 
assumptions of Realism become a reality? Under what conditions will Realism predominantly 
prevail over Liberalism, and vice versa? Is there a ‘tipping point’ or is it based on the nature of 
issue areas? In Model V above, under what conditions will military expenditures take overriding 
importance over participation in environmental IGOs?  
Submitting without reservation to any one particular paradigm, with complete shunning 
of alternative explanations, is tantamount to being inside Plato’s Cave. The importance of 
determining which theory informs political decision-making and why cannot be taken 
nonchalantly, in view of the wide repercussions on the quality of human life and what it means 
for humanity to progress. Going along this path opens the space for a constructivist contribution 
to understanding IR and to re-analyzing the basic assumptions of inter-state interaction. As 
pointed out by Wendt (1992 pp. 617, 628), Realism can be a “self-fulfilling prophecy” and 
anarchy may merely be “what states make of it.” There is certainly much scope for integrating 
the theories and analyzing under what conditions one takes the upper hand, and why.  
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6.3 Suggestions for further research 
 
 This research has focused on the determinants of overall participation in global IEAs by 
focusing on specific treaty and state variables. One first scope for further research therefore 
relates to expanding the research template by (i) categorizing state participation through an 
analysis of states’ participation in specific groups of treaties; (ii) expanding the set of IEAs 
considered in Model I; and (iii) including regional IEAs in the analysis.  
It is likely that states may be participating more in one group of IEAs than another, or 
more in regional IEAs than global ones. Differentiating the analysis based on types of IEAs 
ratified may therefore promote greater understanding into the patterns of state participation in 
global and regional IEAs. Moreover, it is likely that states who take part in the international 
negotiations preceding the adoption of the treaty text may be more open to participation in the 
relevant treaty. The influence of having states take part in the treaty drafting phase can therefore 
be studied and the implications, either in terms of ratification times or implementation success, 
can be studied. 
The number of IEAs in Model I can be increased, which would permit the analysis of a 
greater number of variables. For example, the individual influence of the various variables 
incorporating the variable ‘strength’ can be analyzed to delineate the influence of each 
component separately. Also promising is an analysis of the influence of various environmental 
norms and principles on state participation.  
An undertaking which relates states’ levels of participation in IEAs to their domestic 
environmental quality, assessed on those parameters which matter most for the specific IEAs, 
can enlighten us on the effectiveness of the IEAs. There is no clear link established yet in the 
literature on participation in IEAs and environmental quality.  
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Finally, the development of an integrated and coherent theory on IEC presents promise 
for intellectual development. There is no reason why the development of such a theory cannot 
occur within the current scope of IR theorizing. What is needed perhaps is a new outlook which 
brings the parts together to make a coherent whole. As suggested by this research, an integrated 
approach may present a more realistic understanding of what actually motivates national leaders.  
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Annex 1 – VCLT ARTICLES 
 
Table 15: Articles of VCLT 
ARTICLES TEXT 
2 1. For the purposes of the present Convention: 
(a) “treaty” means an international agreement concluded between States in written 
form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or 
more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation; 
(b) “ratification”, “acceptance”, “approval” and “accession” mean in each case the 
international 
act so named whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be 
bound by a 
treaty; 
 
6 Article 6: Capacity of States to conclude treaties 
Every State possesses capacity to conclude treaties. 
 
9 Article 9: Adoption of the text 
1. The adoption of the text of a treaty takes place by the consent of all the States 
participating in its 
drawing up except as provided in paragraph 2. 
2. The adoption of the text of a treaty at an international conference takes place by the 
vote of two-thirds 
of the States present and voting, unless by the same majority they shall decide to 
apply a different rule. 
 
11 Article 11: Means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty 
The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, 
exchange of instruments 
constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other 
means if so agreed. 
 
12 Article 12: Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by signature 
1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by the signature of its 
representative when: 
(a) the treaty provides that signature shall have that effect; 
(b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that signature 
should have 
that effect; or 
(c) the intention of the State to give that effect to the signature appears from the full 
powers of its 
representative or was expressed during the negotiation. 
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1: 
(a) the initialing of a text constitutes a signature of the treaty when it is established 
that the 
negotiating States so agreed; 
(b) the signature ad referendum of a treaty by a representative, if confirmed by his 
State, 
constitutes a full signature of the treaty. 
 
13 Article 13: Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by an exchange of instruments 
constituting a treaty 
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The consent of States to be bound by a treaty constituted by instruments exchanged 
between them is 
expressed by that exchange when: 
(a) the instruments provide that their exchange shall have that effect; or 
(b) it is otherwise established that those States were agreed that the exchange of 
instruments 
should have that effect. 
 
14 Article 14: Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by ratification, acceptance or 
approval 
1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when: 
(a) the treaty provides for such consent to be expressed by means of ratification; 
(b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that ratification 
should be 
required; 
(c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification; or 
(d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the 
full powers 
of its representative or was expressed during the negotiation. 
2. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by acceptance or 
approval under conditions 
similar to those which apply to ratification. 
 
15 Article 15: Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by accession 
The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by accession when: 
(a) the treaty provides that such consent may be expressed by that State by means of 
accession; 
(b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that such 
consent may be 
expressed by that State by means of accession; or 
(c) all the parties have subsequently agreed that such consent may be expressed by 
that State by 
means of accession. 
 
16 Article 16: Exchange or deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession 
Unless the treaty otherwise provides, instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession 
establish the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty upon: 
(a) their exchange between the contracting States; 
(b) their deposit with the depositary; or 
(c) their notification to the contracting States or to the depositary, if so agreed. 
 
18 Article 18: Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its 
entry into force 
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a 
treaty when: 
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject 
to 
ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to 
become a 
party to the treaty; or 
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force 
of the treaty 
and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed. 
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24 Article 24: Entry into force 
1. A treaty enters into force in such manner and upon such date as it may provide or 
as the negotiating 
States may agree. 
2. Failing any such provision or agreement, a treaty enters into force as soon as 
consent to be bound by 
the treaty has been established for all the negotiating States. 
3. When the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is established on a date after 
the treaty has come 
into force, the treaty enters into force for that State on that date, unless the treaty 
otherwise provides. 
4. The provisions of a treaty regulating the authentication of its text, the establishment 
of the consent of 
States to be bound by the treaty, the manner or date of its entry into force, 
reservations, the functions of 
the depositary and other matters arising necessarily before the entry into force of the 
treaty apply from the 
time of the adoption of its text. 
 
25 Article 25: Provisional application 
1. A treaty or a part of a treaty is applied provisionally pending its entry into force if: 
(a) the treaty itself so provides; or 
(b) the negotiating States have in some other manner so agreed. 
2. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the negotiating States have otherwise 
agreed, the provisional 
application of a treaty or a part of a treaty with respect to a State shall be terminated if 
that State notifies 
the other States between which the treaty is being applied provisionally of its 
intention not to become a 
party to the treaty. 
 
26 Article 26: Pacta sunt servanda 
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them 
in good faith. 
 
27 Article 27: Internal law and observance of treaties 
A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure 
to perform a treaty. 
This rule is without prejudice to article 46. 
 
28 Article 28: Non-retroactivity of treaties 
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its 
provisions do not bind 
a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to 
exist before the 
date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party. 
 
34 Article 34: General rule regarding third States 
A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its 
consent. 
 
35 Article 35: Treaties providing for obligations for third States 
An obligation arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the 
treaty intend the 
 162
provision to be the means of establishing the obligation and the third State expressly 
accepts that 
obligation in writing. 
 
36 Article 36: Treaties providing for rights for third States 
1. A right arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty 
intend the 
provision to accord that right either to the third State, or to a group of States to which 
it belongs, or to all 
States, and the third State assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as the 
contrary is not 
indicated, unless the treaty otherwise provides. 
2. A State exercising a right in accordance with paragraph 1 shall comply with the 
conditions for its 
exercise provided for in the treaty or established in conformity with the treaty. 
 
37 Article 37: Revocation or modification of obligations or rights of third States 
1. When an obligation has arisen for a third State in conformity with article 35, the 
obligation may be 
revoked or modified only with the consent of the parties to the treaty and of the third 
State, unless it is 
established that they had otherwise agreed. 
2. When a right has arisen for a third State in conformity with article 36, the right may 
not be revoked or 
modified by the parties if it is established that the right was intended not to be 
revocable or subject to 
modification without the consent of the third State. 
 
39 Article 39: General rule regarding the amendment of treaties 
A treaty may be amended by agreement between the parties. The rules laid down in 
Part II apply to such 
an agreement except in so far as the treaty may otherwise provide. 
 
48 Article 48: Error 
1. A State may invoke an error in a treaty as invalidating its consent to be bound by 
the treaty if the error 
relates to a fact or situation which was assumed by that State to exist at the time when 
the treaty was 
concluded and formed an essential basis of its consent to be bound by the treaty. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the State in question contributed by its own conduct 
to the error or if the 
circumstances were such as to put that State on notice of a possible error. 
3. An error relating only to the wording of the text of a treaty does not affect its 
validity; article 79 then 
applies. 
 
49 Article 49: Fraud 
If a State has been induced to conclude a treaty by the fraudulent conduct of another 
negotiating State, the 
State may invoke the fraud as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty. 
 
50 Article 50: Corruption of a representative of a State 
If the expression of a State's consent to be bound by a treaty has been procured 
through the corruption of 
its representative directly or indirectly by another negotiating State, the State may 
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invoke such corruption 
as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty. 
 
51 Article 51: Coercion of a representative of a State 
The expression of a State's consent to be bound by a treaty which has been procured 
by the coercion of its 
representative through acts or threats directed against him shall be without any legal 
effect. 
 
52 Article 52: Coercion of a State by the threat or use of force 
A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in 
violation of the 
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
53 Article 53: Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law 
(jus cogens) 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
general 
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of 
general international 
law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm 
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character. 
 
56 Article 56: Denunciation of or withdrawal from a treaty containing 
no provision regarding termination, denunciation or withdrawal 
1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not 
provide for 
denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless: 
(a) it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or 
withdrawal; or 
(b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty. 
2. A party shall give not less than twelve months' notice of its intention to denounce 
or withdraw from a 
treaty under paragraph 1. 
 
60 Article 60: Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of 
its breach 
1. A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to 
invoke the breach as a 
ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part. 
2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles: 
(a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty in 
whole or in 
part or to terminate it either: 
(i) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting State, or 
(ii) as between all the parties; 
(b) a party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending the 
operation 
of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State; 
(c) any party other than the defaulting State to invoke the breach as a ground for 
suspending the 
operation of the treaty in whole or in part with respect to itself if the treaty is of such a 
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character 
that a material breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the position of 
every party 
with respect to the further performance of its obligations under the treaty. 
3. A material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of this article, consists in: 
(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or 
(b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or 
purpose of the 
treaty. 
4. The foregoing paragraphs are without prejudice to any provision in the treaty 
applicable in the event of 
a breach. 
5. Paragraphs 1 to 3 do not apply to provisions relating to the protection of the human 
person contained in 
treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to provisions prohibiting any form 
of reprisals against 
persons protected by such treaties. 
 
77 Article 77: Functions of depositaries 
1. The functions of a depositary, unless otherwise provided in the treaty or agreed by 
the contracting 
States, comprise in particular: 
(a) keeping custody of the original text of the treaty and of any full powers delivered 
to the 
depositary; 
(b) preparing certified copies of the original text and preparing any further text of the 
treaty in 
such additional languages as may be required by the treaty and transmitting them to 
the parties 
and to the States entitled to become parties to the treaty; 
(c) receiving any signatures to the treaty and receiving and keeping custody of any 
instruments, 
notifications and communications relating to it; 
(d) examining whether the signature or any instrument, notification or communication 
relating to 
the treaty is in due and proper form and, if need be, bringing the matter to the 
attention of the 
State in question; 
(e) informing the parties and the States entitled to become parties to the treaty of acts, 
notifications and communications relating to the treaty; 
(f) informing the States entitled to become parties to the treaty when the number of 
signatures or 
of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession required for the entry 
into force 
of the treaty has been received or deposited; 
(g) registering the treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations; 
(h) performing the functions specified in other provisions of the present Convention. 
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Annex 2 – List of IEAs (1921 – 1998) 
1 Convention Concerning the Use of White Lead in Painting, 1921 
2 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Washington (as amended), 1946 
3 General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean, Rome, 1949 
4 International Convention for the Protection of Birds, Paris, 1950 
5 International Plant Protection convention, Rome, 1951 
6 Protocol to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Washington, 1956 
7 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Geneva, 1958 
8 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Geneva, 1958 
9 Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, 1958 
10 Convention on Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Geneva, 1958 
11 The Antarctic Treaty, Washington, 1959 
12 Agreement concerning Co-operation in the Quarantine of Plants and their Protection against Pests and Diseases, 
Sofia, 1959 
13 Protection of Workers Against Ionizing Radiations, Geneva, 1960 
14 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Paris, 1960 
15 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Geneva, 1961 
16 Convention on the African Migratory Locust, Kano, 1962 
17 Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (as 
amended in 1964 and 1982), Brussels, 1963 
18 Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, 1963 
19 Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1963 
20 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Washington, 1963 
21 Agreement for the Establishment of a Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in the Eastern Region of its 
Distribution Area in South-West Asia, Rome, 1963 
22 Additional Protocol to the Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the 
Field of Nuclear Energy as amended in 1963, Paris, 1964 
23 Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, Copenhagen, 1964 
24 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, Brussels, 1964 
25 Agreement for the Establishment of a Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in the Near East, Rome, 
1965 
26 International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Rio de Janeiro, 1966 
27 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, London, 1967 
28 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Brussels, 1969 
29 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Brussels, 
1969 
30 Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material, Brussels, 1971 
31 Convention Concerning Protection against Hazards of Poisoning arising from Benzene (ILO No. 136), Geneva, 
1971 
32 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Ramsar, 1971 
33 Treaty on Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the 
Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof, Washington, 1971 
34 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Washington, 1972 
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35 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Washington, 1972 
36 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, London, 1972 
37 Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects, Washington, 1972 
38 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris, 1972 
39 Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by Substances other than Oil, 
London, 1973 (parent:1969) 
40 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington, 1973 
41 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) - Annex V (Optional)=Garbage, 
London, 1973 
42 Convention Concerning the Prevention and Control of Occupational Hazards Caused by Carcinogenic Substances 
and Agents(ILO No. 139), Geneva, 1974 
43 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), London, 1974 
44 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, 
Geneva, 1976 
45 Protocol to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund of Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage, London, 1976 
46 Protocol to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, London, 1976 
47 Convention concerning the Protection of Workers against Occupational Hazards in the Working Environment 
Due to Air Pollution, Geneva, 1977 
48 International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels, Torremolinos, 1977 
49 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships as modified by the Protocol of 1978, London, 
1978 
50 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships: Annex III - Hazardous substances carried in 
packaged form, London, 1978 
51 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) - Annex IV (Optional): Sewage, 
London, 1978 
52 Amendment to Annexes to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
other Matter concerning Incineration at Sea, Torremolinos, 1978 
53 Amendments to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
concerning Settlement of Disputes, Torremolinos, 1978 
54 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants as amended on 23.10.1978, Geneva, 1978 
55 Protocol relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Protocol), London, 1978 
56 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn, 1979 
57 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, Bern, 1979 
58 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Vienna, 1979 
59 Amendment to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (Art. X1), 
Bonn, 1979 
60 Agreement governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, New York, 1979 
61 International Plant Protection Convention (1979 Revised Text), Rome, 1979 
62 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Canberra, 1980 
63 Amendments to the Annexes to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
Other Matter, Colombo, 1980 
64 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 1982 
65 Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 1960 amended by 
Additional Protocol of 1964, Paris, 1982 
66 Protocol to amend the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 
Paris, 1982 
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67 International Tropical Timber Agreement, Geneva, 1983 
68 Amendment to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (Art. 
XXI), Gaborone, 1983 
69 Protocol to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, London, 1984 
70 Protocol to amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation 
for Oil Pollution Damage, London, 1984 
71 Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 1985 
72 Convention Concerning Safety in the Use of Asbestos, Geneva, 1986 
73 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Vienna, 1986 
74 Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Vienna, 1986  
75 Protocol amending the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from land-based sources, Paris, 1986  
76 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 1987  
77 Amendments to Article 6 & 7 of the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as 
Waterfowl Habitat, Regina - Canada, 1987 
78 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and The Paris Convention, Vienna, 1988 
79 Protocol relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Protocol 1988), London, 
1988 
80 Basel Convention On the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Basel, 
1989  
81 International Convention on Salvage, London, 1989 
82 London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, London, 1990 
83 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, London, 1990 
84 Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection, Madrid, 1991 
85 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (consolidated version), Geneva, 1991 
86 Protocol to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, London, 1992 
87 Protocol to amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an international Fund for compensation 
for Oil Pollution Damage, London, 1992  
88 Amendment to Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Copenhagen, 1992 
89 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 1992 
90 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 1992 
91 Protocol to the International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels, Torremolinos, 1993 
92 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing 
Vessels on the High Seas, London, 1993 
93 Convention on Nuclear Safety, Vienna, 1994 
94 International Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and or 
Desertification, Paris, 1994 
95 International Tropical Timber Agreement, Geneva, 1994 
96 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
1982, New York, 1994 
97 Agreement on Co-operative Enforcement Operations directed at Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora, Lusaka, 
1994 
98 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, New 
York, 1995 
99 Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds, Hague, 1995 
100 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 
London, 1996 
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101 International Convention on the Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, London, 1996 
102 Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 1997 
103 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, 1997 
104 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, New York, 1997 
105 International Plant Protection Convention (1997 Revised Text), Rome, 1997 
106 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, 
Vienna, 1997 
107 Protocol to amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, 1997 
108 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 1997 
109 Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matter, Aarhus, 1998 
110 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides 
in International Trade, Rotterdam, 1998 
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Annex 3 – List of IEAs for Model I 
 
 Acronym IEAs 
1 CBD Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 1992 
2 UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rio de Janeiro, 1992 
3 KP Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Kyoto, 1997 
4 VIENCON Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 1985 
5 MP Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 1987  
6 MP-LON London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, London, 1990 
7 MP-COPHG Amendment to Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
Copenhagen, 1992 
8 MP-MREAL Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
Montreal, 1997 
9 ITTA International Tropical Timber Agreement, Geneva, 1994 
10 CCD International Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries 
Experiencing Serious Drought and or Desertification, Paris, 1994 
11 BASEL Basel Convention On the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal, Basel, 1989  
12 WHALING International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Washington (as amended), 
1946 
13 BIRDS International Convention for the Protection of Birds, Paris, 1950 
14 CONTSHLF Convention on the Continental Shelf, Geneva, 1958 
15 CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
Washington, 1973 
16 RAMSAR Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl 
Habitat, Ramsar, 1971 
17 SALVAGE International Convention on Salvage, London, 1989 
18 ERLYNOT Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Vienna, 1986 
19 ASSITNUC Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological 
Emergency, Vienna, 1986  
20 CIVLIABNU Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, 1963 
21 UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 1982 
22 ENVMOD Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques, Geneva, 1976 
23 CMS Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn, 
1979 
24 ANTMRINE Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Canberra, 
1980 
25 ANTARCTC The Antarctic Treaty, Washington, 1959 
26 QUARTINE Agreement concerning Co-operation in the Quarantine of Plants and their 
Protection against Pests and Diseases, Sofia, 1959 
27 LOCUSTAF Convention on the African Migratory Locust, Kano, 1962 
28 WSTEDUMP Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
Other Matter, Washington, 1972 
29 IPPA International Plant Protection Convention (1997 Revised Text), Rome, 1997 
30 NUCWEAP Treaty on Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons 
of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof, 
Washington, 1971 
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31 MARPOL  International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships as modified by 
the Protocol of 1978, London, 1978 
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Annex 4 – Full Dataset for Model I 
 
Table 16: Full Dataset for Model I 
TREATIES % 
Total 
% 
dvg 
% 
dd 
Strength Transparency Threshold dispneg amenddpty fintransfers Capacity 
CBD 89.29 91.45 81.82 0 3 30 1 1 1 2 
UNFCCC 93.72 92.11 88.64 0 3 50 1 1 1 2 
KP 7.33 7.89 4.55 4 3 55 1 1 1 3 
VIENCON 87.24 88.16 84.09 0 3 20 1 1 0 1 
MP 86.73 87.50 84.09 3 4 11 1 1 0 3 
MP-LON 66.33 62.50 79.55 2 4 20 1 1 1 3 
MP-COPHG 48.47 41.45 72.73 1 4 20 0 1 0 3 
MP-MREAL 8.67 5.26 20.45 1 4 20 0 1 0 3 
ITTA 17.86 13.82 31.82 2 4 28 0 1 1 2 
CCD 81.68 81.58 72.73 0 2 50 1 1 1 2 
BASEL 66.84 63.16 79.55 2 4 20 1 1 0 2 
WHALING 19.39 13.16 40.91 2 2 6 0 0 0 0 
BIRDS 5.10 1.32 18.18 1 0 6 0 0 0 0 
CONTSHLF 29.84 25.66 40.91 0 0 22 0 0 0 0 
CITES 75.51 76.32 72.73 1 5 10 1 1 0 0 
RAMSAR 60.73 55.92 70.45 0 0 10 0 1 0 0 
SALVAGE 13.27 8.55 29.55 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 
ERLYNOT 40.82 32.89 68.18 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 
ASSITNUC 37.76 32.24 56.82 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 
CIVLIABNU 15.71 19.08 2.27 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 
UNCLOS 65.82 65.13 68.18 2 3 60 1 0 1 3 
ENVMOD 33.67 28.95 50.00 0 0 20 0 1 0 1 
CMS 30.10 25.66 45.45 0 2 15 1 1 0 1 
ANTMRINE 14.29 7.24 38.64 2 3 8 1 1 0 1 
ANTARCTC 22.51 15.13 45.45 2 1 12 1 0 0 1 
QUARTINE 4.08 5.26 0.00 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 
LOCUSTAF 7.14 9.21 0.00 2 1 6 0 1 0 0 
WSTEDUMP 39.29 31.58 65.91 0 1 15 0 0 0 1 
IPPA 3.57 3.29 4.55 1 0 3 1 1 0 1 
NUCWEAP 63.27 61.84 68.18 1 0 3 0 1 0 0 
MARPOL  48.98 42.76 70.45 2 2 15 1 1 0 3 
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Annex 5 – Descriptives for Variables for Model I 
 
Table 17: Descriptives for Variables for Model I 
Variables Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
     
Model I     
Strength 1 1.095 0 4 
Transparency 1.87 1.688 0 5 
Threshold 18.26 15.792 3 60 
Dispneg 0.55 0.506 0 1 
Amendpty 0.74 0.445 0 1  
Fintransfers 0.23 0.425 0 1 
Capacity 1.26 1.18 0 3 
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Annex 6 – Descriptives for Dependent and Independent Variables for Models II - V 
 
Table 18: Descriptives of Variables for Model II - V 
Variables Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dependent 
Variables 
    
Models II-V      
Total participation, 
P 
29.88 18.09 0 81 
     
Independent 
Variables 
    
Model II     
Gdpcap1 
 
7903.67 8256.049 448 42769 
Indgth 
 
2.0952 5.22026 -16.65 13.97 
Mineral_t 5.1307 3.10922 -2.30 11.40 
Contiguity 
 
3.13 2.643 0 14 
Popdens_t 
 
4.0983 1.43910 0.69 9.71 
Milexp 
 
10.8863 9.42320 0.90 51.10 
Milcoup 
 
0.35 0.478 0 1 
Model III     
HDI 
 
0.6835 0.18181 0.26 0.94 
Eionum 
 
10.05 5.669 0 29 
Ecofree 
 
2.5584 0.41111 1.30 3.20 
Goveff 
 
-0.0810 0.99776 -1.78 2.26 
Tgoods 
 
67.9839 41.45934 14.72 295.30 
Polity 
 
3.1516 6.41911 -10.00 10.70 
Agenda21_t 
 
-0.4030 2.02491 -0.461 4.87 
Model IV     
Graft 
 
-0.4870 0.61859 -1.70 1.55 
Sanitation 
 
67.31 27.651 8 100 
Undernutrition_t 
 
2.8423 0.84958 1.10 4.32 
IMortality 
 
82.71 68.389 5 316 
Odacap_t 
 
2.9975 1.23761 -0.92 5.76 
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Arms 
 
1.9150 4.87090 0 33.50 
Tgoods 
 
64.2476 32.92279 14.72 201.26 
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Annex 7 – Corelation Matrices for Models I - V 
Table 19: Correlation Matrix for Model I Variables 
 Strength Dispneg Amendpty Fintransfers Transparency  Threshold Capacity  
Strength 1        
Dispneg 0.241 1       
Amendpty 0.068 0.353 1      
Fintransfers 0.215 0.335 0.142 1     
Transparency 0.487 0.398 0.354 0.414 1    
Threshold 0.191 0.311 0.024 0.821 0.426 1   
Capacity 0.489 0.368 0.258 0.544 0.685 0.616 1  
         
 
Table 20: Correlation Matrix for Model II Variables 
 GDPCAP1 INDGTH MILCOUP MINERAL_
T 
FORPERC_
T 
POPDENS_
T 
CONTIG MILGEXP 
GDPCAP1 1        
INDGTH 0.018 1       
MILCOUP -0.386 0.131 1      
MINERAL_T 0.387 -0.075 -0.080 1     
FORPERC_T 0.056 0.087 -0.116 0.024 1    
POPDENS_T 0.127 0.105 -0.169 -0.188 -0.021 1   
CONTIG -0.162 -0.084 0.178 0.328 0.011 -0.268 1  
MILGEXP -0.154 0.131 0.202 -0.001 -0.324 -0.072 0.181 1 
         
 
Table 21: Correlation Matrix for Model III Variables 
 POLITY GOVEFF HDI ECOFREE EIONUM TGOODS AGENDA21_T 
POLITY 1       
GOVEFF 0.544 1      
HDI 0.474 0.736 1     
ECOFREE -0.263 -0.743 -0640 1    
EIONUM 0.347 0.495 0.370 -0.378 1   
TGOODS 0.056 0.217 0.273 -0.313 -0.170 1  
AGENDA21_T 0.486 0.686 0.611 -0.492 0.128 0.348 1 
        
 
Table 22: Correlation Matrix for Model IV Variables 
 GRAFT SANTN POPU
NDR_T 
MORT ODAC
AP_T 
DEMR
ANK 
AMTDI
MP 
TGOO
DS 
AGEN
DA21_
T 
GDPCAP1 
GRAFT 1         0.635 
SANTN 0.270 1        0.562 
POPUNDR_T -0.376 -0.544 1       -0.667 
MORT -0.400 -0.652 0.617 1      -0.659 
ODACAP_T 0.077 -0.088 0.237 0.115 1     -0.212 
DEMRANK -0.320 -0.191 0.084 0.322 -0.099 1    -0.337 
AMTDIMP -0.001 -0.262 0.049 0.157 -0.164 0.258 1    
TGOODS 0.273 0.284 -0.207 -0.261 0.231 -0.085 -0.140 1  0.296 
AGENDA21_T 0.418 0.260 -0.146 -0.336 0.585 -0.295 -0.205 0.484 1 0.312 
GDPCAP1 0.635 0.562 -0.667 -0.659 -0.212 -0.337 -0.065 0.296 0.312  
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Table 23: Correlation Matrix for Model V Variables 
 Contigu
ity 
Milexp Graft Polity Eionum Mineral
_t 
Odacap_t Agenda2
1_t 
Popdens_t HDI tgoods 
Contiguity 1           
Milexp 0.1766 1          
Graft -0.0964 0.1694 1         
Polity -0.1243 -0.6008 0.0925 1        
Eionum 0.1852 -0.0698 -0.1783 -0.0151 1       
Mineral_t 0.2003 0.1400 0.2877 -0.1029 0.3310 1      
Odacap_t -0.1984 -0.2523 -0.0186 0.1270 -0.3762 -0.5570 1     
Agenda21_t -0.2682 -0.2216 0.4081 0.2242 -0.4294 -0.1551 0.5060 1    
Popdens_t -0.2282 -0.0971 -0.0915 0.1706 -0.0910 -0.1800 -0.0704 -0.1334 1   
HDI -0.0441 -0.0452 0.6041 0.2655 0.0167 0.6291 -0.2076 0.3446 0.0632 1  
Tgoods -0.3307 -0.1358 0.4334 0.0997 -0.2482 0.1790 0.1350 0.4829 0.0464 0.4133 1 
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Annex 8 – Variance Inflation Factors for all Models 
 
Table 24: Variance Inflation Factors for Models I - V74
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
3.93 1.71 5.83 5.40 4.19 
3.25 1.44 3.57 2.76 3.79 
2.79 1.39 2.65 2.64 2.76 
2.22 1.30 2.26 2.64 2.10 
1.50 1.18 1.70 2.41 2.06 
1.37 1.17 1.54 2.07 2.02 
1.35 1.12 1.29 1.68 1.98 
 1.08  1.61 1.74 
   1.56 1.50 
   1.51 1.45 
    1.28 
 
     
 
                                                 
74 The VIF are for variables presented in the same order as they appear in the models. 
